



2025 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Updates Rev 1

Standalone Document

September 20, 2024



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1 UPDATES TO RISK MODELS

The electrical corporation must report on updates to its risk models. The collective updates to risk models are categorized as either “significant” or “non-significant.” The electrical corporation must categorize the collective changes to its risk models as either significant updates or non-significant updates, not both. The proceeding subsections outline the thresholds to determine if updates to risk models are “significant” or “non-significant.”

When determining if updates to risk models are “significant” (Section 1.1.1) or “non-significant” (Section 1.1.2), the electrical corporation’s analysis must be independent of risk reduction resulting from deployed mitigations described in the approved 2023-2025 Base WMP. For example, if a circuit was undergrounded in late 2023, the analysis would not take that risk reduction into account and would evaluate the risk for that circuit consistent with the point in time represented by WMP Table 6-52 in the approved 2023-2025 Base WMP.

An electrical corporation must analyze its top 5 percent of highest risk circuits, segments, or spans³ to determine whether updates to its risk models are significant. An electrical corporation’s top ignition risk circuits, segments, or spans are the top 5 percent of highest ignition risk circuits, segments, or spans when the circuits, segments or spans are ranked individually from highest to lowest circuit-mile-weighted ignition risk. An electrical corporation’s top Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) risk circuits, segments or spans are the top 5 percent of highest PSPS risk circuits, segments, or spans when the circuits, segments or spans are ranked individually from highest to lowest circuit-mile-weighted PSPS risk.

As discussed in Section 6 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP,¹ PacifiCorp was implementing FireSight, previously known as the Wildfire Risk Reduction Module, to model the risk and consequences of an ignition to inform planning of mitigations. In 2023, the model was implemented, and Section 1.1 below describes the updates to baseline risk modeling as a result of the implementation, including the establishment of a High Fire Risk Area (HFRA), in addition to the High Fire Threat Districts created by the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC). The implementation of FireSight risk modeling also enabled the identification of the highest risk circuits presented in Section 1.1.1.

1.1 SIGNIFICANT UPDATES

If an electrical corporation’s updates to its risk models are significant, it must:

- *Discuss its updated methodology and models (e.g., using a new machine learning algorithm, changing how wildfire consequences are calculated, or changes to assumptions);*
- *Provide justification for the updates;*
- *Show how risk has shifted as a result of the updates; and*
- *Report any resulting changes to prioritization of mitigation initiatives and scheduling and workplans for the implementation of mitigation initiatives resulting from these updates.*

¹ TN13738_20240222T150927: 2023-2025 Final Wildfire Mitigation Plan February 22, 2024. Sourced April 25, 2024 from 2023-25 Base Wildfire Mitigation Plans | Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (ca.gov).

The electrical corporation must use the format established by Tables 1-1 and 1-2 of these 2025 WMP Update Guidelines to summarize the updated top 5 percent of highest-risk circuits, segments, or spans. If one or both tables are more than 20 lines, then an electrical corporation may submit a spreadsheet as an attachment to the 2025 WMP Update rather than a table to provide the information. Discussions of significant updates to risk models must be limited to 20 pages total. Figures and tables are excluded from the 20-page limit.

As discussed in Section 6 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, in 2023 PacifiCorp implemented the FireSight model to provide data to calculate the composite (ignition) risk scores for overhead assets. As a result of implementing the FireSight model, and applying the risk scoring (summarized below and described in detail in Section 6.2.2 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP), PacifiCorp identified new areas of heightened risk of wildfire, with delineated geographic areas and established HFRA, including 728 line miles of overhead transmission and distribution lines. The HFRA is discussed below and in Section 6.4.4 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP.

Section 6.2 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP is updated with discussion of the Fire Sight model and how the composite (ignition) risk is calculated.

The FireSight model looks at risk through two aspects:

- Risk Associated with Ignition Location (RAIL): Considers the risk of ignition from utility assets. This considers the risk at the circuit level.
- Risk Associated with Value Exposure (RAVE): Considers the locational risk (consequence) of an ignition should one occur. This considers the consequence to an area, known as a plexel.

Figure 1 below shows the high level inputs and outputs of the FireSight models with RAIL on the left and RAVE on the right.




Figure 1: FireSight Model Components

The FireSight model outputs a set of attributes that can be selected to calculate the ignition risk, and the utility determines which attributes to use in the ignition risk score. Table PAC 1-1 Table PAC 1-1 below shows the list of attributes available in FireSight, whether they are associated with RAIL, RAVE, or both, and the attributes PacifiCorp selected for use in the ignition risk score.

Table PAC 1-1: FireSight Attributes

RAIL (Circuit Level)	RAVE (Plexel)	Attribute	Description:	Percentiles	Used in the Composite (Ignition) Risk Score
✓	✓	Acres Burned	Number of Acres Burned	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	No
	✓	Building Density	Building Density per Plexel	N/A	No
✓	✓	Buildings Destroyed	Number of Buildings Destroyed	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	No

RAIL (Circuit Level)	RAVE (Plexel)	Attribute	Description:	Percentiles	Used in the Composite (Ignition) Risk Score
	✓	Building Loss Factor	Estimated Building Loss Factor Within the Plexel.	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	Yes
	✓	Building Loss Factor (Average-Mean)	Average Estimated Building Loss Factor Within the Plexel.	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	No
	✓	Building Loss Factor (Median)	Average Estimated Building Loss Factor Within the Plexel.	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	No
✓	✓	Buildings Threatened	Number of Buildings Threatened	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	No
	✓	Burn Frequency	Burn Frequency is the number of times a plexel is touched from all asset ignited simulations run for the selected weather days. It is similar to traditional burn probability although this only represents a frequency, not a probability.	N/A	No
	✓	Disability Population	Disability Population Ratio	N/A	Yes
✓	✓	Fire Behavior Index	Fire Behavior Index	N/A	Yes
	✓	Fire Station Density	Density of Fire Stations in a location	N/A	Yes
✓	✓	Flame Length	Feet	N/A	Yes
	✓	Fuel Model Majority	Majority Fuel in Each Plexel	N/A	Yes

RAIL (Circuit Level)	RAVE (Plexel)	Attribute	Description:	Percentiles	Used in the Composite (Ignition) Risk Score
	✓	Number of Buildings	Number of Building per Plexel	N/A	No
	✓	Population Count	Population Count per Plexel	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	No
	✓	Population Density	Population Density per Plexel	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	No
✓	✓	Population Impacted	Population Count	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	Yes
	✓	Poverty Population	Poverty Population Ratio	N/A	Yes
✓	✓	Rate of Spread	66 Feet/Hour	0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, and 100	Yes
	✓	Road Availability-With Social Vulnerability Population	Availability of Roads in a Location with Consideration of Social Vulnerability Population	N/A	No
	✓	Road Availability-With No Population	Availability of Roads in a Location with No Consideration of Social Vulnerability Population	N/A	No
	✓	Road Miles	Total Miles (Major + Minor)	N/A	No
	✓	Senior Population	Senior Population Ratio	N/A	No
	✓	Terrain Difficulty Index	Terrain Difficulty per Plexel	N/A	Yes

RAIL (Circuit Level)	RAVE (Plexel)	Attribute	Description:	Percentiles	Used in the Composite (Ignition) Risk Score
	✓	Years Since Last Fire	Years Since Last Fire per Plexel	N/A	No

To account for the unique characteristics of its service territory, PacifiCorp models Ignition Risk for each circuit based on wind-driven fire and terrain-driven fire events. By modeling likelihood and consequence for each circuit for each type of fire, PacifiCorp expects to have a better understanding of the highest risk circuits, and the drivers to the risk, in order to apply the appropriate mitigation. Table PAC 1-1 below shows the unique characteristics of each modeled wildfire type.

Table PAC 1-2: Comparison of General Characteristics of Wind-Driven and Fuel/Terrain-Driven Wildfires

Category	Wind-Driven Wildfires	Fuel/Terrain-Driven Wildfires
Locational Risk	More likely in areas subject to PSPS (Public Safety Power Shutoff)	Confined to areas of complex fuels and terrain with difficult access
Frequency	Some years have none; others several	Annually during peak fire season
Event Duration	One-three days per event	Can persist several weeks or months
Outage Risk	Wind-driven and somewhat predictable	Difficult to predict
Consequence	Immediately catastrophic	May be catastrophic over time

Figure 2 below shows the inputs and weightings PacifiCorp selected for the composite risk for wind-driven and fuel/terrain-driven wildfires. On the left side of the table are the RAIL inputs with the selected input for the type of wildfire, the percentile selected, and the weighting for each variable. On the right side of the table are the RAVE inputs with the weightings for each variable. There are no percentiles for these inputs as they are relatively static values, e.g., the number of fire stations, the number of disabled people in geographic area, etc. PacifiCorp selects the attributes, percentiles, and weightings used in the composite risk score calculation for wind-driven and fuel/terrain-driven events, and then performs the calculation.




Figure 2: Inputs and Weightings for Fuel/Terrain-Driven and Wind-Driven Ignition Risk Calculations

The calculation for the combined risk score for each circuit segment is shown in Figure 3 below. Each composite score is on a scale of 0-1. PacifiCorp calculates a final composite risk score for each circuit and/or circuit segment.

Wind Driven Composite Risk + Terrain Driven Composite Risk
Largest Composite Score All Circuits

Figure 3: Combined Composite Risk Score Calculation

PacifiCorp applied the outputs of the FireSight risk models to identify additional areas of heightened wildfire risk in its service territory. More specifically, PacifiCorp leveraged FireSight to model risk scores for wind-driven and fuel/terrain-driven risk on each circuit, assuming a probability factor of one as described in the Section 6.4.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, to focus on the consequence of potential ignitions. Expressed as percentiles, the HFRA reflects those areas with FireSight model risk scores in the 85-100 percentile for either wind-driven or fuel/terrain-driven risk. The breakdown of the new HFRA and overhead incremental line miles is summarized in

Table PAC 1-3.

Table PAC 1-3: HFTD and HFRA Overhead Line Miles

	Total Service Territory Line Miles	HFTD				2024 HFRA Additions		New HFTD and HFRA	
		HFTD Tier 2	% of Service Territory	HFTD Tier 3	% of Service Territory	Line Miles	% of Service Territory	Line Miles	% of Service Territory
OH Transmission Line Miles	731	321	10%	23	1%	120	4%	464	14%
46kV Transmission Miles	-	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
57 kV Transmission Miles	-	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
69 kV Transmission Miles	440	183	6%	10	0%	45	1%	238	7%
115 kV Transmission Miles	239	120	4%	14	0%	75	2%	209	6%
138 kV Transmission Miles	-	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
230 kV Transmission Miles	5	5	0%	-	0%	-	0%	5	0%
345 kV Transmission Miles	-	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%
500 kV Transmission Miles	47	13	0%	-	0%	-	0%	13	0%
OH Distribution Line Miles	2,517	771	24%	40	1%	488	15%	1,299	40%
Total	3,248	1,092	34%	64	2%	728	19%	1,763	54%

Based on the approach described in Section 6.2 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp identified additional geographic areas for inclusion within the HFRA, depicted in purple in Figure 4 below, with the Tier 2 High Fire Threat Area (HFTD) depicted in green, and the Tier 3 HFTD depicted in orange.




Figure 4: 2024 High Fire Threat Districts and High Fire Risk Area

The implementation of FireSight for wildfire risk scoring, and the establishment of a HFRA, will begin to inform mitigation initiatives. PacifiCorp is implementing the asset inspection and vegetation management programs discussed in the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP Sections 8.1.3 and 8.2, respectively, in the HFRA consistent with the program practices in the HFTD. PacifiCorp uses the wildfire risk scoring to inform its prioritization and planning of future grid hardening initiatives, as described in Section 7.1.3 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP.

1.1.1 Top Risk-Contributing Circuit, Segments, or Spans

Significant updates to risk models are defined as:

- Any change or combination of changes to a risk model that moves 10 percent or more of ignition risk into or out of the top ignition risk circuits, segments, or spans,⁶ and/or
- Any change or combination of changes to a risk model that moves 10 percent or more of PSPS risk into or out of the top PSPS risk circuits, segments, or spans.⁷

The electrical corporation must use the format established by Tables 1-1 and 1-2 of these 2025 WMP Update Guidelines to summarize the updated top 5 percent of highest risk circuits, segments, or spans. If one or both tables are more than 20 lines, then an electrical corporation may submit a spreadsheet as an attachment to the 2025 WMP Update rather than a table to provide the information. Discussions of significant updates to risk models must be limited to 20 pages. Figures and tables are excluded from the 20-page limit.

In Table 1-1 below, the top five percent of highest risk circuits are ranked from highest to lowest by circuit-mile-weighted average ignition risk score based on the requirements described in Wildfire Mitigation Plan Update Guidelines. Prior to the implementation of the FireSight risk modeling as described above Section 1.1, PacifiCorp was unable to calculate the highest risk circuits, spans, or segments.

Table 1-1 Summary of Top Ignition Risk Circuits, Segment, or Spans

Risk Rank	Circuit Name	Circuit-Mile-Weighted Ignition Risk Score	% of Total Ignition Risk in Top 5%
1	5G31	233	35.5%
2	5G33	93	14.2%
3	5G21	68	10.3%
4	5G83	65	9.9%
5	5G149	43	6.6%
6	5G5	35	5.3%
7	5L83	33	5.0%
8	5G45	23	3.5%
9	5L97	22	3.4%
10	4G1	18	2.8%
11	5G151	15	2.3%
12	7G81	5	0.8%
13	7G73	2	0.3%
14	5L87	2	0.3%
Totals		656	100%

As discussed in Section 7.1.3 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP , PacifiCorp prioritizes circuits for mitigation within the HFTD or HFRA, based on the maximum fuel/terrain ignition risk score on the circuit. PacifiCorp chose to use the fuel/terrain risk score due to the characteristics of its service territory. PacifiCorp chose to use the maximum risk score to ensure that scores are not skewed through using the mean risk score on a circuit. The fuel/terrain risk score is calculated as described above in Section 1.1 and in Section 6.2 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP.

In response to the 2023-2024 WMP Technical Guidelines published on December 6, 2022, and in response to Required Areas for Continued Improvement PC-23-03, PacifiCorp is also developing a PSPS risk assessment solution to quantify PSPS probability and consequence as an additional input to the overall utility risk model. This solution is expected to be implemented in the fourth quarter of 2024 and at that time the information requested in Table 1-2 below regarding the top PSPS risk circuits, segment, or spans will be provided. Section 6.7 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP provides additional information on the PSPS risk assessment solution development.

Table 1-2 Summary of Top PSPS Risk Circuits, Segment, or Spans

Risk Rank	Circuit Name	Circuit-Mile-Weighted Ignition Risk Score	% of Total PSPS Risk in Top 5%
1			
Totals			

1.1.2 Qualitative Updates

Updates to risk models are also considered significant if any of the following qualitative updates are made:

- Introduction of a new model.
- Discontinuation of an existing model.
- Any change in existing model application or use-case. For example, newly applying an existing vegetation risk model to PSPS decision-making.
- Introduction of new data types. For example, incorporating additional risk drivers into newer versions of a model.
- Changes to data sources. For example, using a new source of data to measure vegetation moisture content.
- Changes to third-party vendors for risk modeling or inputs to risk modeling. Examples of qualitative updates that are not considered significant updates to risk models include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - Updating an existing dataset (e.g., augmenting ignition and outage datasets with 2023 data).
 - Fixing code errors.
 - Cleaning input data.

Below is a summary of the significant qualitative updates made by PacifiCorp in 2023:

- Introduction of a new model: In 2023, PacifiCorp implemented the FireSight model to provide data to calculate the composite (ignition) risk scores for overhead assets. Section 6.2 of the 2025 Update discusses the model and how the composite (ignition) risk is calculated, with additional supporting documentation for the risk methodology and assessment in Appendix B of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP.
- Introduction of a new data type: As noted in Section 6.2.1 of the 2025 Update, in addition to the eight-hour model outputs which is the eight-hour period is the typical period used by utilities to model risk, there is growing interest in 24-hour risk modeling and to understand how that changes the risk profile.² Therefore, PacifiCorp is modeling both eight-hour and 24-hour periods to better understand if there are significant differences in the results that may impact mitigation efforts.

There were no significant qualitative updates in the following areas:

- Discontinuation of an existing model.

There were no insignificant qualitative updates identified in the following areas.

- Changes to third-party vendors for risk modeling or inputs to risk modeling: There were no changes of the third-party vendor who performs the risk modeling.
- Updating existing datasets: There were no significant changes to the data sets presented in Table B-5 in Appendix B.
- Fixing code errors.

² California Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety. "Standardized Wildfire Risk Type Classifications and in Situ Wildfire Risk Assessment." Risk Modeling Working Group. October 11, 2023.

1.2 NON-SIGNIFICANT UPDATES

If an electrical corporation's updates to its risk models do not meet the "significant" criteria of Section 1.1.1, the electrical corporation must provide a tabulated summary of changes in risk ranking of the top 5 percent ignition risk and PSPS risk circuits, segments, or spans.

The electrical corporation must use the format established by Tables 1-1 and 1-2 of these 2025 WMP Update Guidelines to summarize the updated top 5 percent of highest risk circuits, segments, or spans. If one or both tables are more than 20 lines, then an electrical corporation may submit a spreadsheet as an attachment to the 2025 WMP Update rather than a table to provide the information.

Energy Safety defines a non-significant update as:

- *Any change or combination of changes to the risk model that moves less than 10 percent of ignition risk into or out of the top ignition risk circuits, segments, or spans and less than 10 percent PSPS risk into or out of the top PSPS risk circuits, segments, or spans; or*
- *Any change that only moves ignition and PSPS risk within the top risk segments.*

As described in Section 1.1 above, significant updates include the implementation of the FireSight risk model to calculate the composite (ignition) risk scores. These scores were applied for the following:

- Establish the HFRA as shown in Figure 4 above.
- Apply the asset inspection and vegetation management programs discussed in the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP Sections 8.1.3 and 8.2, respectively, in the new HFRA consistent with the program practices in the HFTD.
- Inform its prioritization and planning of future grid hardening initiatives, as described in Section 7.1.3 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP. PacifiCorp prioritizes circuits for mitigation within the HFTD or HFRA, based on the maximum fuel/terrain ignition risk score on the circuit.
- Identify the top five percent of highest risk circuits based on the requirements described in Wildfire Mitigation Plan Update Guidelines. The ranked list of circuits is shown in Table 1-1 above.

There were no non-significant updates identified.

2 CHANGES TO APPROVED TARGETS, OBJECTIVES, AND EXPENDITURES

The electrical corporation must report qualifying changes to targets, objectives, and expenditures from its approved 2023-2025 Base WMP. Each change must be justified by lessons learned, internal policy changes, new laws or regulations, corrective actions resulting from Energy Safety's

compliance process, or other explanations for the change. Thresholds for qualifying changes to targets, objectives, and expenditures are set forth below.

The below information describes the initiatives with unit changes, objective shifts, and/or cost changes for 2025.

2.1 2025 TARGETS OR TARGET COMPLETION DATES

For large volume work (equal to or greater than 100 units), the electrical corporation must report changes of 10 percent or greater to a 2025 target from the electrical corporation’s approved 2023-2025 Base WMP.

For small volume work (less than 100 units), the electrical corporation must report changes of 20 percent or greater to a 2025 target from the electrical corporation’s approved 2023-2025 Base WMP.

Table PAC 2-1 below summarizes the changes in targets or target completion dates where there was a percent change in units that meets the reporting requirements.

Table PAC 2-1: Changes in Targets or Target Completion Dates

Initiative Objective	Tracking ID	Original Value	Updated Value	Target Percentage Change
Transmission Intrusive Pole Inspections	AI-05	960 Inspections	1257 Inspections	31%
Quality Assurance Quality Control	AI-12	No Inspection Target Reported	756 Inspections	No Measure Available
Line Rebuild - Covered conductor installation	GH-01	80 Line-miles	120 Line-miles	50%
Distribution pole replacements and reinforcements	GH-02	1600 Poles	2400 Poles	50%
Transmission pole/tower replacements and reinforcements	GH-03	160 Poles	240 Poles	50%
Expulsion Fuse Replacement	GH-05	0 Fuse Locations	500 Fuse Locations	No Measure Available
Weather Forecasting	SA-05	Continued maintenance on 1 HPCC	Expanded to delivery of 5 HPCCs (6 total HPCCs)	500%
Patrol Inspection - Distribution	VM-03	922 Circuit Miles Inspected	1182 Circuit Miles Inspected	29%

Initiative Objective	Tracking ID	Original Value	Updated Value	Target Percentage Change
Patrol Inspection - Transmission	VM-04	329 Line-miles inspected	417 Line-miles inspected	27%
Quality Assurance / Quality Control-Distribution	VM-11	922 Line-miles	1182 Line-miles	29%
Quality Assurance / Quality Control-Transmission	VM-11	329 Line-miles	417 Line-miles	27%

AI-05 – Transmission Intrusive Pole Inspections:

The differences in quantity of poles from the original value to the updated value is due to the inspection cycle and what poles are identified to be completed.

AI-12 – Quality Assurance Quality Control:

In the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP there was no 2025 target for quality assurance and quality control.

GH-01 – Line Rebuild – Covered Conductor Installation:

The line rebuild forecast increased with the on-boarding of a contractor to handle the resources and installation of covered conductor. Covered conductor installation remains a project that will continue beyond 2025.

GH-02 – Distribution Pole Replacements and Reinforcements:

Distribution pole replacements are captured under the line rebuild project, and with the increased covered conductor installation the number of poles expected to be replaced increased accordingly.

GH-03 – Transmission Pole/Tower Replacements and Reinforcements:

Transmission pole replacements are captured under the line rebuild project, and with the increased covered conductor installation the number of poles expected to be replaced increased accordingly.

GH-05 – Expulsion Fuse Replacements:

With updates to the risk model described in Section 1.1 above and the establishment of a HFRA, additional expulsion fuses were identified for replacement in the HFRA.

SA-05 – Weather Forecasting:

PacifiCorp is procuring an additional five high performance computing clusters (HPCC) to increase modeling capabilities. This will bring the total number of HPCCs to six. Scope changes have been further discussed in Section 8.3.5 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP.

VM-03 – Patrol Inspection – Distribution:

The previously reported 2025 targets were set before the HFRA was established by PacifiCorp. With the establishment of the HFRA and the alignment of vegetation management inspection standards in the HFRA to those in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs, PacifiCorp has increased circuit miles to inspect.

VM-04 – Patrol Inspection – Transmission:

The previously reported 2025 targets were set before the HFRA was established by PacifiCorp. With the establishment of the HFRA and the alignment of vegetation management inspection standards in the HFRA to those in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs, PacifiCorp has increased line miles to inspect.

VM-11 – Quality Assurance / Quality Control – Distribution:

The increase in quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) activities in response to the increased targets in VM-03, Patrol Inspection – Distribution.

VM-11 – Quality Assurance / Quality Control – Transmission:

The increase in quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) activities in response to the increased targets in VM-04, Patrol Inspection – Transmission.

2.1.1 Initiative Objectives

The electrical corporation must report any changes to forecasted initiative objective completion dates in its approved 2023-2025 Base WMP that shift an objective's completion to a different compliance period.

The electrical corporation may not add or delete 3- and 10-year objectives set forth in its approved 2023-2025 Base WMPs.

Table PAC 2-2: Changes to Initiative Objectives from Forecasted Completion Date

Initiative Activity	Initiative ID	Original Forecasted Completion Date	Updated Forecasted Completion Date
Create SME process & procedure for VM database review four times a year	QA/QC, VM-11	December 2024	Q4 2025
Develop audits to provide understanding of the data collection process	QA/QC, VM-11	December 2024	Q4 2025
Install Wildfire Detection Cameras	SA-04	November 2025	December 2024

VM-11 – Create SME process & procedure for VM database review four times a year: This work was deferred due to the GeoDigital database upgrade which will change the work management software. As such, developing a process to review the database and audits of the data collection process (data inputs) is premature as the work management software and functionality is still in development.

VM-11 – Develop audits to provide understanding of the data collection process: This work was deferred due to the GeoDigital database upgrade which will change the work management software. As such, developing a process to review the database and audits of the data collection process (data inputs) is premature as the work management software and functionality is still in development.

SA-04 – Install Wildfire Detection Cameras: The installation timeline for wildfire detection cameras is aligned with the expectations communicated in the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP in Table 8-30: Fire Detection Systems Currently Deployed.

2.1.2 Expenditure Changes

The electrical corporation must report any changes to 2025 projected expenditures in its approved 2023-2025 Base WMP that result in an increase or decrease of more than \$10 million or constitute a greater than 20 percent change in an initiative’s planned total expenditure in the 2025 compliance period.

Table PAC 2-3 below summarizes the changes in expenditures that have a greater than 20 percent change. There are no expenditures that have an increase of decrease of more than \$10 million.

Table PAC 2-3: Changes in Expenditures

Initiative Objective	Tracking ID	Original 2025 Expenditure (\$ thousands)	Updated 2025 Projected Expenditure (\$ thousands)	Difference (\$ thousands)	Difference %	Increase / Decrease Greater than \$10M (Y/N)	Increase / Decrease Greater than 20% (Y/N)
Engagement with access and functional needs populations	CO-02	\$-	\$4	\$4	100%	N	Y
Emergency preparedness plan	EP-01	\$50	\$320	\$270	540%	N	Y
External collaboration and coordination	EP-02	\$30	\$10	\$(20)	-67%	N	Y
Customer support in wildfire and PSPS emergencies	EP-05	\$-	\$281	\$281	100%	N	Y
Transmission Detail Inspections	AI-03	\$137	\$20	\$(117)	-85%	N	Y
Transmission Intrusive Pole Inspections	AI-05	\$171	\$64	\$(107)	-63%	N	Y
Distribution Intrusive Pole Inspections	AI-06	\$90	\$175	\$85	94%	N	Y
Line Rebuild - Covered conductor installation	GH-01	\$62,000	\$120,000	\$58,000	94%	Y	Y
Expulsion Fuse Replacement	GH-05	\$-	\$1,000	\$1,000	100%	N	Y
Top Risk Areas within the HFRA	RA-02	\$-	\$4	\$4	100%	N	Y
Maintenance: Weather Station	MA-01	\$325	\$410	\$85	26%	N	Y
Weather Forecasting	SA-05	\$115	\$670	\$555	483%	N	Y
Pole clearing	VM-05	\$374	\$530	\$156	42%	N	Y
Clearance - Transmission	VM-07	\$1,416	\$2,520	\$1,104	78%	N	Y
Wildfire Mitigation Strategy Development	WP-01	\$544	\$845	\$301	55%	N	Y
Identifying and Evaluating Mitigation Initiatives	WP-02	\$100	\$280	\$180	180%	N	Y

CO-02 – Engagement with Access and Functional Needs Population:

The increase in expenditure is for targeted outreach initiatives to inform customers of specific programs available and requirements to be eligible.

EP-01 – Emergency Preparedness Plan:

Includes the entire emergency management team in which only a partial employee was previously forecasted.

EP-02 – External Collaboration and Coordination:

The forecast has been reduced based on actual expenditures used in performing the external collaboration being less than originally anticipated.

EP-05 – Customer Support in Wildfire and PSPS Emergencies:

The forecast has been increased to manage the increase in customer interactions on the free portable battery, battery rebate, and generator rebate programs. Those programs are designed to assist customers with a need for power were a PSPS event to occur.

AI-03 – Transmission Detail Inspections:

The reduced cost has to do with the projected units to be inspected, based on the inspection cycle, which was reduced from the original projection.

AI-05 – Transmission Intrusive Pole Inspections:

The reduced cost has to do with the projected units to be inspected, based on the inspection cycle, which was reduced from the original projection.

AI-06 – Distribution Intrusive Pole Inspections:

The increased cost has to do with the projected increase in units to be inspected, based on the inspection cycle.

GH-01 – Line Rebuild – Covered conductor installation:

The increase in cost has to do with the additional 40 miles in scope for line rebuild as well as the additional costs expended on a contractor handling the construction management.

GH-05 – Expulsion Fuse Replacement:

The cost increase correlates to the additional 500 expulsion fuses identified for replacement in 2025.

RA-02 – Top Risk Areas within the HFRA:

The cost increase is for FTE's work to maintain and make adjustments to the risk model used to determine the HFRA's.

MA-01 – Weather Station Maintenance:

The increase in cost is based on the increased material, data, and maintenance cost needed to perform annual preventative maintenance on the weather stations projected to be installed.

VM-05 – Pole Clearing:

The increase in the cost is based on actual expenditures being higher than forecasted to perform pole clearing on a similar number of units.

VM-07 – Clearance – Transmission:

With the inclusion of the HFRA areas described as an outcome of the risk model updates in Section 1.1, the costs are forecasted to increase.

WP-01 – Wildfire Mitigation Strategy Development:

The increase is based on actual expenditures realized as well as the inclusion of costs for an independent evaluator that were previously not included in WP-01.

WP-02 – Identifying and Evaluating Mitigation Initiatives:

The cost has been updated to reflect ongoing work to pursue grant opportunities.

3 QUARTERLY INSPECTION TARGETS FOR 2025

The electrical corporation must define quarterly targets (end of Q2 and end of Q3) for 2025 asset and vegetation inspection targets established as end-of-year targets in its approved 2023-2025 Base WMP. The electrical corporation must use the format established by Table 3-1 to report these quarterly targets. Changes to end-of-year 2025 targets must be reported and explained pursuant to Section 2: Changes to Targets, Objectives, and Expenditures, above.

For its redlined and clean 2023-2025 Base WMP, the electrical corporation must add columns for end of Q2 2025 and end of Q3 2025 targets to its asset inspection and vegetation inspection target tables.

Table 3-1 below presents the 2025 quarterly inspection targets for end of second and third quarters 2025.

Table 3-1: 2025 Quarterly Inspection Targets

Initiative Activity	Tracking ID	Target End of Q2 2025 & Unit	Target End of Q3 2025 & Unit	X% Risk Impact 2025
Transmission Patrol inspections	AI-01	5,942 Inspections	9,735 Inspections	TBD
Distribution Patrol Inspections	AI-02	13,020 Inspections	36,062 Inspections	TBD
Transmission Detail Inspections	AI-03	90 Inspections	361 Inspections	TBD
Distribution Detail Inspections	AI-04	3,811 Inspections	7,617 Inspections	TBD
Transmission Intrusive Pole Inspections	AI-05	0 Inspections	754 Inspections	TBD
Distribution Intrusive Pole Inspections	AI-06	0 Inspections	1,907 Inspections	TBD

Initiative Activity	Tracking ID	Target End of Q2 2025 & Unit	Target End of Q3 2025 & Unit	X% Risk Impact 2025
Enhanced IR Inspections in transmission lines	AI-07	0 Line-miles	700 Line-miles	TBD
Substation Inspections (Minor, Major, Security, and Infrared)	AI-11	225 Inspections	393 Inspections	TBD
Quality assurance / quality control	AI-12	303 Inspections	530 Inspections	TBD
Detailed Inspection - Distribution	VM-01	375 Circuit Miles	800 Circuit miles	TBD
Detailed Inspection - Transmission	VM-02	259 Line-miles	280 Line-miles	TBD
Patrol Inspection - Distribution	VM-03	1100 Circuit miles	1182 Circuit miles	TBD
Patrol Inspection - Transmission	VM-04	417 Line-miles	417 Line-miles	TBD

4 NEW OR DISCONTINUED PROGRAMS

The electrical corporation must report on the creation of a new program, or the discontinuance of a program described in its approved 2023-2025 Base WMP. Each change must be justified by lessons learned, internal policy changes, new laws or regulations, corrective actions resulting from Energy Safety’s compliance process, or other explanations for the change.

An electrical corporation’s discussion on new or discontinued programs must be limited to 20 pages total. Figures and tables are excluded from the 20-page limit.

PacifiCorp seeks to discontinue two programs and add one new program as summarized in Table PAC 4-1 and described in further detail below.

Table PAC 4-1: New or Discontinued Programs

Program Status	Tracking ID	Section	Table or Figure	Page Number(s)	Description of Redline
Discontinue	RA-04	6.7	N/A	114	This program will be removed from future WMP filings.
Discontinue	SA-03	8.3.4.1	Table 8-30	242	The program will be removed from the table and no future targets will be installed.
New	GH-12	8.1.27	N/A	160	Adding program to complete feasibility studies.

RA-04 – Enterprise System for Risk Assessment:

As described in Section 6.7 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP under “Implement Fire Incident Tracking Database”, the objective of this initiative was to improve ignition data collection processes to ensure the collection of additional information so that PacifiCorp could analyze trends and areas of concern. This initiative was implemented, and employees are receiving updated training by the end of Q2 2024, on reporting outages and ignitions to reinforce data collection practices to support trend analysis of outage events and ignitions associated with the events to support the current root cause analysis outage investigation process.

SA-03 – Smoke and Air Quality Sensors:

The installation of smoke and air quality sensors, as mentioned Section 8.3.4.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP , was to support the Department of Homeland Security’s Smart Cities Internet of Things Lab’s wildland fire sensor program. The technology is still being developed and is not currently at a stage for implementation. The currently installed sensor will be removed, and the program will not continue further.

GH-12 – Microgrids:

PacifiCorp previously stated in the 2023-2025 Base WMP that it did not have any microgrids. However, there is a change in scope as PacifiCorp will be completing feasibility studies to determine if there are certain areas where microgrids could be utilized.

5 PROGRESS ON AREAS FOR CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT

The electrical corporation must report on progress required by the areas for continued improvement identified in Energy Safety’s Decision on the electrical corporation’s 2023-2025 WMP.15 The electrical corporation must provide narrative responses to each required progress that specified reporting in the 2025 WMP Update. This narrative response must include:

- *Code and title of the area for continued improvement,*
- *Description of the area for continued improvement,*
- *Required progress, and*
- *The electrical corporation’s response to the required progress.*

The electrical corporation may refer to other sections of its 2025 WMP Update when reporting on areas for continued improvement if there is a duplication of reporting.

5.1 RISK METHODOLOGY AND ASSESSMENT

PC-23-01. Cross-Utility Collaboration on Risk Model Development

- **Description:** PacifiCorp and the other IOUs have participated in past Energy Safety-led risk modeling working group meetings. The risk modeling working group meetings facilitate collaboration among the IOUs on complex technical issues related to risk modeling. The risk modeling working group meetings are ongoing.

- Required Progress: PacifiCorp and the other IOUs must continue to participate in all Energy Safety-led risk modeling working group meetings.
- Discussed in Section 6, “Risk Methodology and Assessment”.

PacifiCorp’s Response

As discussed in Section 6.1.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp engages with other utilities through forums like the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety’s (OEIS’s) Risk Modeling Working Group (RMWG) to collaborate and share best practices regarding risk. PacifiCorp will use learnings from the workshops as an input to evaluating if there are additional risk variables that are impacted by climate change, and the feasibility of integrating them into wildfire risk models.

In addition, as explained in Section 6.2.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp expects to participate in joint IOU workgroups or sessions on climate change, which were identified as an outcome of a July 23, 2023, Energy Safety-led scoping meeting with California IOUs. The meeting concerned how utilities can best learn from each other, external agencies, and outside experts regarding the integration of climate change into projections of wildfire risk.³ PacifiCorp will use learnings from the workshops as an input to evaluating whether there are additional risk variables impacted by climate change, and the feasibility of integrating them into wildfire risk modeling.

PacifiCorp also takes note of the May 23, 2023, Energy Safety workshop on “Community Vulnerability in Wildfire Mitigation Planning” and, as explained in Section 6.2.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, expects to participate in joint IOU workgroups or sessions on community vulnerability and risk modeling. If there are learnings or recommendations from these workgroups, PacifiCorp will evaluate them for potential integration into risk models.

PC-23-02. Calculating Risk Scores Using 95th Percentile Values

- Description: PacifiCorp’s use of 95th percentile values, as opposed to probability distributions, to aggregate risk scores is not aligned with fundamental mathematical standards and could lead to suboptimal mitigation prioritization decisions.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must:
- Provide a plan with milestones for transitioning from using 95th percentile values to probability distributions in its 2026-2028 Base WMP when aggregating risk scores for the following:
 - Mitigation evaluation.

³ California Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety. “Scoping Meeting: Climate Change and Fire Risk-Consequence.” Sourced October 19, 2023.

- Cost/benefit calculations.
- Risk Ranking.
- If PacifiCorp is unable to transition to using probability distributions, it must:
 - Propose an alternative strategy or demonstrate that its current methodologies are providing accurate outputs for calculating known risk. PacifiCorp must provide concrete validations, including estimations for usage of percentiles and probability distributions where possible. Explain why or how it is unable to move toward the use of probability distributions when calculating and aggregating risk scores. This must include discussion of any existing limitations or potential weaknesses.
 - Provide an explanation for each calculation of risk scores where PacifiCorp is calculating or aggregating risk scores in which percentiles were used.
 - Describe any steps PacifiCorp is taking to explore the use of probability distributions in the future.
- Discussed in Section 6, “Risk Methodology and Assessment”.

PacifiCorp’s Response

On April 2, 2024, PacifiCorp met with Energy Safety to discuss PC-23-02 and obtain clarification on the background of the recommendation. Energy Safety expressed that they want to ensure that utilities are developing risk models that do not result in unfeasible results and are aligned with the mathematical laws of uncertainty and statistical principles of extremes in distribution models.

Based on this meeting, PacifiCorp is discussing this required progress with the FireRisk model vendor to better understand their plan and will update Energy Safety with the vendor’s plan and timeline.

PC-23-03. PSPS and Wildfire Risk Trade-Off Transparency

- Description: PacifiCorp does not provide adequate transparency regarding PSPS and wildfire risk trade-offs, or how it uses risk ranking and risk buy-down to determine risk mitigation selection.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must describe:
 - How it prioritizes PSPS risk in its risk-based decisions, including trade-offs between wildfire risk and PSPS risk.
 - How the rank order of its planned mitigation initiatives compares to the rank order of mitigation initiatives ranked by risk buy-down estimate, along with an explanation for any instances where the order differs.
- Discussed in Section 6, “Risk Methodology and Assessment”; Section 7, “Wildfire Mitigation Strategy Development”.

PacifiCorp's Response

PacifiCorp has three initiatives to better understand long term PSPS risk to support and inform the prioritization of mitigation initiatives. PSPS Risk Assessment Solution and Annual Mitigation Selection Planning Process are detailed in the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP in Section 6.7. Risk Spend Efficiency is discussed in Section 7.1.4.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP. The three initiatives are described below:

- **PSPS Risk Assessment Solution:** PacifiCorp is developing a PSPS risk assessment solution to quantify long-term PSPS risk in its service territory. The methodology will align with OEIS guidance and the best practices from other IOUs. The solution is anticipated to be a technical implementation incorporated into advanced data analytics tool described already described.
- **The Annual Mitigation Selection Planning Process** provides a standard framework to evaluate and prioritize all the work proposed for the wildfire mitigation portfolio such as grid hardening, situational awareness, emergency preparedness, PSPS, and community outreach.
- **Risk Spend Efficiency (RSE)** will help PacifiCorp determine which mitigation efforts to focus on while reducing the most risk per dollar spent. PacifiCorp plans to calculate RSE for grid hardening initiatives such as: covered conductor (spacer cable and tree wire), undergrounding, and other mitigations like the large IOUs in California.

PC-23-04. Collaboration Between Vendor and Utility Risk Teams

- **Description:** PacifiCorp has not shown how its internal team and risk model vendor will share risk modeling duties.
- **Required Progress:** In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must:
 - Demonstrate how PacifiCorp differentiates between activities completed by the internal staff and vendor staff throughout risk modeling narratives. This includes processes, procedures, methodologies, flow charts, schematics, and any explanations that describe collaboration with a risk modeling vendor.
 - Demonstrate how PacifiCorp identifies activities that require vendor discretion and state whether final approval from the PacifiCorp risk team is required. This includes any decisions that need to be made, such as mitigation selection.
 - Indicate the source of the data where a description of data is required, specifically indicating whether the data are internally generated, or vendor generated. If PacifiCorp cannot indicate the source of the data, it must explain why.

- Discussed in Section 6, “Risk Methodology and Assessment”.

PacifiCorp’s Response

As documented in Section 6.2.2.3 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, Technosylva, the model vendor, performs the calculation of the model attributes PacifiCorp selects the attributes, percentiles, and weightings used in the fuel-driven and wind/terrain-driven ignition risk calculation and the Asset Risk Department performs the composite (ignition) risk calculations for fuel-driven, wind/terrain-driven, and combined composite risk. The attributes, percentiles, and weightings PacifiCorp selects, creates, and calculates the composite risk score with are shown in Figure 5 Figure 2: Inputs and Weightings for Fuel/Terrain-Driven and Wind-Driven Ignition Risk Calculations below and are also on page 92 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP.




Figure 5: Attributes, Percentiles and Weightings Selected for Risk Calculations

PC-23-05. Independent Review Plan Transparency

- Description: PacifiCorp does not currently solicit external independent review of the data used by its risk models.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must present actionable tasks it will complete by its 2026-2028 Base WMP to ensure it is fully compliant with the independent review requirements outlined in Section 6.6.1 of the Technical Guidelines. This must include:
 - A chronological list of tasks and estimated completion dates per task.
 - An explanation of any foreseeable complicating factors and how it will address each factor.

- Procedures PacifiCorp expects to apply for the following review activities once its model implementation is complete:
 - Independent review (data collected, generated through risk models).
 - Additional review triggers.
 - Routine review schedule.
- Discussed in Section 6, “Risk Methodology and Assessment”.

PacifiCorp’s Response

PacifiCorp has identified two internal projects to meet this requirement that are described in detail in Section 6.7 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP:

- Develop Policy and Procedures for Review of Internal Planning Models to create and implement policy and procedures to regularly review planning models used for wildfire and PSPS risk modeling. The benefit is to understand how planning risk models are performing and adjust as necessary to ensure they are identifying the areas of highest risk.
- Independent Review of Planning Risk Models will engage a third-party reviewer to perform an independent review of the data collected and generated through risk models to ensure that planning risk models assessing risk are aligned with risk modeling best practices and industry practices.

5.2 WILDFIRE MITIGATION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

PC-23-06. Vendor Fire Risk Model Implementation Milestones and Dates

- Description: PacifiCorp’s operational and planning models may experience many changes once the vendor model implementation is complete. Energy Safety needs more information regarding improvements PacifiCorp expects in its operational and planning models along with expected milestones and dates to ensure PacifiCorp is being transparent about the state of its model maturity.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must describe how it will use the new vendor risk modeling software to improve operational and/or planning risk analysis and provide a plan with milestones and dates for achieving those improvements.
- Discussed in Section 7, “Wildfire Mitigation Strategy Development.”

PacifiCorp’s Response

The WFA-E models used for operational risk analysis, as described in Section 8.3.4.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, were implemented in Q3 2022. They are being used to validate weather forecasts and to understand the impacts if there is an ignition.

After the 2024 wildfire season, Meteorology will assess the performance of the metrics output by models and evaluate if there are opportunities to use WFA-E to improve risk-informed, decision-making operational practices. This evaluation will begin with scoping in Q4 2024.

The FireSight planning model discussed throughout Section 6 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP was implemented in 2023 and the resulting data on risk is being used to:

1. Identify the HFRA
2. Apply the asset inspection and vegetation management programs discussed in the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP Sections 8.1.3 and 8.2, respectively, in the new HFRA consistent with the program practices in the HFTD.
3. Inform its prioritization and planning of future grid hardening initiatives, as described in Section 7.1.3 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP. PacifiCorp prioritizes circuits for mitigation within the HFTD or HFRA, based on the maximum fuel/terrain ignition risk score on the circuit.

PC-23-07. Cross-Utility Collaboration on Best Practices for Inclusion of Climate Change Forecasts in Consequence Modeling, Inclusion of Community Vulnerability in Consequence Modeling, and Utility Vegetation Management for Wildfire Safety

- Description: PacifiCorp and the other IOUs have participated in past Energy Safety-sponsored scoping meetings on these topics but have not reported other collaboration efforts.
- Required Progress: PacifiCorp and the other IOUs must participate in all Energy Safety-organized activities related to best practices for:
 - Inclusion of climate change forecasts in consequence modeling.
 - Inclusion of community vulnerability in consequence modeling.
 - Utility vegetation management for wildfire safety.

PacifiCorp must collaborate with the other IOUs on developing the above-mentioned best practices. In their 2025 Updates, the IOUs (not including independent transmission operators) must provide a status update on any collaboration with each other that has taken place, including a list of any resulting changes made to their WMPs since the 2023-2025 WMP submission.

- Discussed in Section 7, “Wildfire Mitigation Strategy Development”; 8.2, “Vegetation Management and Inspections.

PacifiCorp's Response

As discussed in Section 6.1.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp engages with other utilities through forums like OEIS's RMWG to collaborate and share best practices regarding risk modeling.

PacifiCorp also participates in the Covered Conductor Joint Utility Working Group to share learnings regarding: (1) the effectiveness of cover in the field in comparison to alternative initiatives; and (2) how covered conductor installation compares to other initiatives in its potential to reduce PSPS risk. All the utilities met regularly on all workstreams in 2023 and addressed all of the commitments identified in the 2023-2025 Joint IOU Covered Conductor Effectiveness Report.

As explained in Section 6.2.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp expects to participate in joint IOU workgroups or sessions, identified as an outcome of the July 23, 2023, Energy Safety-led scoping meeting with California IOUs, regarding how utilities can best learn from each other, external agencies, and outside experts on the topic of integrating climate change into projections of wildfire risk.⁴ PacifiCorp will use learnings from the workshops as an input to evaluating if there are additional risk variables impacted by climate change, and the feasibility of integrating additional variables into wildfire risk modeling. PacifiCorp also takes note of the May 23, 2023, Energy Safety workshop on "Community Vulnerability in Wildfire Mitigation Planning" and, as explained in Section 6.2.1 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, expects to participate in joint IOU workgroups or sessions on community vulnerability and risk modeling. If there are learnings or recommendations from these workgroups, PacifiCorp will evaluate them for potential integration into risk models.

5.3 GRID DESIGN, OPERATIONS, AND MAINTENANCE

PC-23-08. Covered Conductor Installation Progress

- **Description:** PacifiCorp has historically failed to meet its covered conductor targets and has made only limited progress towards its 2023 target. PacifiCorp's Base WMP does not demonstrate that its targets are feasible, nor that PacifiCorp has appropriately accounted for its past implementation barriers.
- **Required Progress:** In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must provide:
 - An update on the progress PacifiCorp has made thus far in meeting its covered conductor targets, both past and future, including any changes made in resources and availability of labor. This must include an assessment of third-party contractors hired for covered conductor installation.

⁴ California Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety. "Scoping Meeting: Climate Change and Fire Risk-Consequence." Sourced October 19, 2023.

- An updated spreadsheet with the locations and mileage for covered conductor broken out by year for 2023 to 2025. This should also include project status (engineering, design, etc.) and planned completion date.
- A list of constraints that have prevented PacifiCorp from timely reaching its covered conductor targets and PacifiCorp's plan to address each constraint.
- Discussed in Section 8.1, "Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance" (8.1.2 "Grid Design and System Hardening").

PacifiCorp's Response

PacifiCorp recognizes the feedback in PC-23-08, regarding the covered conductor targets, and supplies the following narrative update in response. PacifiCorp completed 101 line-miles of line rebuild as of January 1, 2024, meeting 67 percent of the targeted work. In 2025, PacifiCorp's target increased from 80 to 120 line-miles. In the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, Attachment CA Line Rebuild Data 2023-2025.xlsx provides details regarding the locations and mileage of covered conductor, broken out by year for 2023 to 2025, including project status and planned completion dates.

The third-party contractor hired for installation brings a significant expansion in resources including 15 engineering staff, eight project management staff, and 60 construction staff. The additional resources represent a doubling in project management resources and a 50 percent increase in construction staff. PacifiCorp increased the 2025 target for this initiative. To manage the completion of the covered conductor installations moving forward, the contracting company will now handle the various aspects of line rebuild projects, including project management, project controls, project reporting, engineering, estimating, permitting, surveying, material management, and construction.

PacifiCorp encountered the following constraints:

- Resources.
- Permitting.
- Material.

To address these constraints, PacifiCorp:

- Hired a contractor to manage the various aspects of the projects.
- Plan to identify and pursue permitting earlier in the project process.
- Plans to order additional material when feasible.

PC-23-09. QA/QC Pass Rate Targets for Rural Areas

- Description: PacifiCorp achieved a QA/QC pass rate of 97 percent in 2022 for both detailed and intrusive inspections. PacifiCorp has set its QA/QC pass rate targets for these inspections significantly lower for 2023-2025, with rural and urban targets of 80 and 90 percent, respectively.

- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must set asset inspection QA/QC pass rate targets that align with its current maturity and the California industry standard of between 95 and 100 percent.
- Discussed in Section 8.1, “Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance” (8.1.3 “Asset Inspections”).

PacifiCorp’s Response

While Section 8.1.3 – Asset Inspections in the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, describes the appropriate inspection programs, PacifiCorp has provided a response to this ACI in Section 8.1.6 – Quality Assurance and Quality Control, beneath Table 8-7 in the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, where the targets are set which is quoted below:

“PacifiCorp will be considering updates to the targets in Table 8-7. PacifiCorp, of course, strives for inspection results to be as accurate as possible and, in that sense, always has a target goal to accomplish a QA/QC pass rate of 100%. PacifiCorp manages its QA/QC process with this goal in mind. For WMP initiative reporting, PacifiCorp currently uses a target, and then reports on, a QA/QC pass rate that was developed in reference to managing the independent inspection contractors who perform the detailed and intrusive inspections. Having a higher required pass rate can be beneficial, assuming that the QA/QC process itself remains a constant, but it can also be problematic if it deters improvements in the QA/QC process itself. A QA/QC process which seeks to evolve the audit and impose more exacting standards can improve the overall quality of the inspection program, even if the recorded “pass rate” is lower (because of a higher frequency of noted exceptions). Having a slightly higher margin for exceptions, prior to triggering contractual remedies, can be useful when imposing new requirements and standards through the QA/QC process, especially because condition identification and prioritization often implicates some degree of subjective judgment. Thus, PacifiCorp is hesitant to remove this margin, which implicates other policy and procedural issues. PacifiCorp will explore with its contractors the potential of amending current contractual requirements relative to the QA/QC process and possibly increasing the required pass rate. In conjunction with that negotiation, PacifiCorp will also consider whether a different QA/QC process and resulting pass rate, separate from the current process used for contract management, might be appropriate for WMP reporting purposes.”

PC-23-10. Covered Conductor Inspections and Maintenance

- Description: PacifiCorp does not incorporate checks in its inspection programs that address failures specific to covered conductor. PacifiCorp must tailor its inspection practices to address failure modes specifically related to covered conductor.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must discuss how failure modes unique to covered conductor will be accounted for in its inspections, including water intrusion, splice covers, and surface damage. If PacifiCorp determines any or all the preceding changes are unnecessary, then it must

- discuss how its current inspection and maintenance processes adequately address covered conductor failure modes.
- Discussed in Section 8.1, “Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance” (8.1.3 “Asset Inspections”).

PacifiCorp’s Response

Current inspection and maintenance processes described in Section 8.1.3 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, allow for PacifiCorp to capture Covered Conductor failure modes. For example, there are specific condition codes for conditions associated with covered conductor, and PacifiCorp reviews and updates those condition codes on an annual basis. In application of these condition categories, a detailed inspection identifies any damage with the covered conductor, such as splice covers and surface damage. A detailed inspection also identifies symptomatic conditions resulting from water intrusion, such as conductor sag, corrosion, or insulation damage.

PC-23-11. Distribution Detailed Inspection Frequency

- Description: PacifiCorp performs the minimum frequency of detailed inspections required by GO 95 and 165. PacifiCorp must strive to adopt a risk-based approach by increasing the frequency of detailed inspections on assets that have the highest risk according to its risk model.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must either:
 - Outline a plan to update its detailed inspections in higher risk areas, including:
 - An analysis for determining the updated frequency for performing detailed inspections.
 - Prioritization of higher risk areas based on risk analysis and risk model output, including HFTD Tier 3 lands.
 - Updates to inspection checklists to account for equipment or configurations that may pose greater wildfire risk.
 - A plan to obtain any needed workforce for performing more frequent inspections; OR
 - Demonstrate that its existing inspection program adequately addresses risk. This must include analysis of the following:
 - Number of Level 1 or critical issues found during detailed inspections.
- Discussed in Section 8.1, “Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance” (8.1.3 “Asset Inspections”).

PacifiCorp's Response

In Section 8.1.3.2 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP are described PacifiCorp's practices regarding detailed inspections of transmission and distribution electric lines and equipment. Detailed inspections are completed on a five-year cycle in accordance with GO165. As stated in section 8.1.3 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, the inspections within a current cycle are prioritized by completing the areas within the HFTD and HFRA prior to the non-HFTD areas. Patrol inspections (Visual Assurance) are also completed on an annual basis within the HFTD and HFRA and, starting in 2025, will also be performed annually in Non-HFTD and Non-HFRA areas. PacifiCorp performed a review of the number of Priority A conditions as shown in Table PAC 5-1 below, which includes Level 1 conditions, and found that detailed inspections found more conditions than patrol inspections. Therefore, PacifiCorp is planning to perform detailed inspection on all Tier 3 locations in 2025. Inspection results will be evaluated to determine if the detailed inspection frequency should be updated within the Tier 3 or Tier 2 locations or the HFRA.

Table PAC 5-1: California Detailed Inspection Priority A Conditions Found

Priority A Conditions	2020	2021	2022	2023
Detailed Inspections	183	130	257	224
Visual Assurance Inspections	-	-	7	19

PC-23-12. Priority A/Level 1 Remediation and Imminent Threat Designation

- Description: PacifiCorp's Revised 2023-2025 Base WMP has not demonstrated that PacifiCorp has a plan or approach that consistently and properly identifies Level 1 conditions as imminent threats, or that its remediation timeframe for Level 1 conditions not deemed imminent threats effectively mitigates the associated risk. PacifiCorp is not able to reliably track Level 1 conditions that have been identified as imminent threats.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must:
 - Provide a plan to have third-party external audits performed on all Level 1 conditions identified in the HFTD from 2020 to 2023. For each condition, the audit must evaluate:
 - If the condition should have been classified as an imminent threat.
 - If the initially assigned remediation timeframe was appropriate given the condition.
 - If the actual remediation timeframe was appropriate given the condition.

- Create and implement a record keeping category to track Level 1 conditions identified as imminent threats, and update asset management procedures to reflect the new record keeping category.
- Discussed in Section 8.1, “Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance” (8.1.4 “Equipment Maintenance and Repair”).

PacifiCorp’s Response

In Section 8.1.6 – Quality Assurance and Quality Control, of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP , PacifiCorp has provided narrative discussing implementation of record keeping tracking all Level 1 conditions separately from Priority A conditions.

PacifiCorp is actively working with OEIS to engage a third-party auditor to perform the audit on Priority A/Level 1 conditions identified from 2020-2023. A timeline has not been established, but the company will continue to pursue engagement with a third-party auditor to perform this function.

PC-23-13. Priority A/Level 1 Condition Remediation Delays

- **Description:** PacifiCorp states that it has identified access, material, permitting, and resource constraints as the root causes of Level 1 conditions that are not remediated within the required timeframe. PacifiCorp states that it is developing tools and implementing changes to mitigate delays associated with the constraints but does not provide sufficient detail.
- **Required Progress:** In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must describe the specific tools and/or process changes that will address each constraint (access, material, permitting, and resource).
- Discussed in Section 8.1, “Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance” (8.1.4 “Equipment Maintenance and Repair”).

PacifiCorp’s Response

The delays related to access are largely due to weather conditions including snow and wet/muddy access roads. Material delays continue to be an issue for special order items that are not kept in inventory, but this accounts for a small number of conditions on the transmission system. Delays related to permitting have been mitigated to some extent by moving the permitting process into a parallel path with job design. This allows for our environmental and Right of Way teams to work with the permitting agencies (i.e., National Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and various Tribal Governments) as far in advance as possible to secure the necessary permits. However, the company is still subject to the timelines and processes of these external entities which do not always align with internal goals. In an effort to avoid as many of these potential delays as possible, the company

continues to address condition corrections at an accelerated rate throughout the service territory. This is also discussed in Section 8.1.6 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP.

PC-23-14. Asset Management and Enterprise Systems

- Description: PacifiCorp does not have a consolidated asset management and enterprise system and does not intend to develop one.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must provide an analysis demonstrating that its current combination of contemporary and legacy systems comprehensively and efficiently covers its asset inventory, inspections, and maintenance. The analysis must discuss:
 - The system/systems that contain asset inventory information for substations, distribution lines, and transmission lines.
 - How asset inventory information is used to generate inspections, and which system/systems generate and track inspections for substations, distribution lines, and transmission lines How inspection findings are tracked, and if the work order system/systems are capable of associating pictures and inspector comments with specific findings.
 - o How the asset inventory system/systems are updated to reflect assets that have changed because of hardening and repair work.
- Discussed in Section 8.1, “Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance” (8.1.4 “Equipment Maintenance and Repair”).

PacifiCorp’s Response

In Section 8.1.5 – Asset Management and Inspection Enterprise Systems(s) of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp has provided the following narrative discussing the analysis of its multiple asset management systems:

“PacifiCorp uses a combination of multiple asset management systems for the inspection and maintenance of both substation and wires assets. The purpose of the facility inspection program is to maintain the integrity of PacifiCorp’s power delivery system through a systematic program of inspections to identify and correct deficiencies before they cause an outage or create a safety hazard. Substation assets/locations have been migrated to IBM Maximo. Maximo is an industry leading Enterprise Asset Management (EAM) software application suite. Maximo autogenerates substation inspection orders based upon a pre-determined frequency of inspections specific to each substation. PacifiCorp’s most critical substations are inspected monthly. When a deficiency is found inside a substation, a service request is generated in Maximo to document the deficiency. Work orders are generated in Maximo to correct deficiencies and are prioritized based on the criticality of the deficiency. Each distribution circuit and transmission line are represented in SAP, PacifiCorp’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software. Inspection work orders are auto generated from SAP, based on the preventive maintenance frequency associated with the

transmission line or distribution inspection zone. Transmission lines are inspected as a line segment, while distribution assets are inspected as part of a grid. Individual poles, pad mounted transformers, secondary boxes, etc., are tracked in a mainframe system called Facility Point Inspection (FPI). FPI is updated any time an asset/location is added or removed.

“For wires assets, National Electric Safety Code (NESC) deficiencies or conditions are identified during inspections and then tracked against the specific location in FPI. If an external contractor performs the inspection, PacifiCorp has an IT gateway that allows the contractor to export their inspection data directly into FPI, after undergoing specific data checks. Deficiencies found internally are entered directly in the FPI database. PacifiCorp utilizes a tool called Geographic Information Systems Maintenance Organizer (GISMO) to provide operations managers, field inspection support personnel, and work planning with a way to extract outstanding conditions all together for any geographic area. GISMO and FPI also assign a suggested correction date for the condition based on the condition’s severity, location, and potential to release energy. GISMO allows one to see the comments associated with the inspection and tracks the assignment of the condition correction through completion. Once a condition has been corrected, the correction date is entered into FPI. GISMO is integrated with a tool called PowerMap. PowerMap allows one to visualize conditions geographically. PowerMap also provides pictures of the location where the condition was found as well as a detailed picture of the outstanding condition. After conditions are identified and entered into FPI, they are placed in a mobility tool for operations personnel, so they can visualize the outstanding conditions geographically. The mobility tool allows one to see the severity of the condition, so the highest priority conditions can be addressed first. Geographically grouping conditions together helps field personnel use their time efficiently by addressing any outstanding conditions near their current location.

“PacifiCorp is currently in the process of replacing its mainframe systems. The implementation of Maximo will be extended to wires assets/locations in the second phase of the implementation. Once Maximo is fully implemented, all substation and wires assets/locations will reside in the same EAM software. All wires assets/locations currently stored in FPI will be migrated into Maximo. Concurrent with the Maximo implementation is the replacement of PacifiCorp’s Retail Construction Management System (RCMS). RCMS is currently utilized to generate tabular construction estimates and designs. RCMS is also a part of the same mainframe application as FPI and contains all of PacifiCorp’s compatible construction units. Compatible units will be migrated from RCMS to Maximo and a new graphical work design tool will be implemented that will enhance estimator’s abilities to more quickly design replacement projects to correct outstanding conditions. Once the RCMS and FPI data has been migrated to Maximo, the mainframe will be retired.”

PC-23-15. Continued Monitoring of Enhanced Fire Risk (EFR) Settings

- Description: PacifiCorp does not currently have quantitative data to assess the effectiveness or impact of its implementation of EFR settings.

- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must provide:
 - The following data relating to when EFR settings are enabled:
 - Number of outages.
 - Duration of outages.
 - Frequency of outages per circuit.
 - Number of customers impacted.
 - Response time for outages.
 - An updated plan of actions being taken based on the data provided above to reduce reliability impacts and safety impacts of EFR settings.
 - An update on how PacifiCorp has evaluated the effectiveness of EFR settings implementation.
 - A description of how PacifiCorp has consulted with other electrical corporations to learn about best practices, including which settings to use, thresholds for setting implementations, and impact reductions for related outages.
- Discussed in Section 8.1, “Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance” (8.1.5 “Grid Operations and Procedures”).

PacifiCorp’s Response

In Section 8.1.8 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP , PacifiCorp has provided narrative discussing the implementation of equipment settings to reduce wildfire risk, which has been updated to further address PC-23-15. Responses were provided in “Reliability Impacts of EFR Settings” subsection of Section 8.1.8 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP for required progress on bullets one and two above and quoted below:

“In the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp provided Attachment 1: EFR Outage Summary and 2023 Data which includes supplemental data on the number of outages, duration of outages, frequency of outages per circuit, number of customers impacted, and response time for outages for circuits where EFR settings are enabled. It is important to note that the settings themselves do not cause outages and outages can be caused by a variety of factors. As a result, it can be difficult to draw definitive conclusions from the data alone without incorporating consideration for the number of devices, climatology, and other dynamic weather and environmental factors. For example, a single calendar year may include more weather-related outages than the preceding years when EFR settings are enabled due to abnormal winds or storm patterns.

“PacifiCorp initiated an annual evaluation of circuits placed into EFR settings and their reliability impact to identify targeted short-term mitigation projects to support reducing the total number of outages and outage duration experienced on these circuits. This evaluation includes a review of the outage history, completed outage investigations, fault

circuit indicator locations, and existing planned projects to determine projects that can be implemented. Examples of projects that may be implemented as a result of this evaluation include upgrading cutouts, fuses, crossarms, and insulators.”

In Section 8.1.8 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, there is discussion of “Effectiveness of EFR Settings” to address required progress on bullets three and four above. This is also described below:

“Currently, PacifiCorp does not have any specific calculations or quantitative assessment of effectiveness for EFR settings. As discussed above, use of EFR Settings implicates the need to balance reliability concerns against wildfire mitigation goals. PacifiCorp continues to engage with peer utilities to identify opportunities to quantify the effectiveness of EFR settings at reducing wildfire risk, including joint IOU working meetings and direct benchmarking discussions. In general, PacifiCorp believes that selective application, based on specific daily risk assessments accomplishes a greater degree of effectiveness, because it better balances the competing objectives.

“PacifiCorp’s EFR settings were developed through internal experience and research published by other utilities. The Company also attends different events such as the Centre for Energy Advancement through Technological Innovation (CEATI) meeting in 2024 in which other utilities discussed their settings and implementation strategies. PacifiCorp is continually monitoring research and collaborative event opportunities available to learn from others about available enhancements that could improve outage notifications and functionality.”

5.4 VEGETATION MANAGEMENT AND INSPECTIONS

PC-23-16. Vegetation Management Priority Tagging

- Description: While PacifiCorp sequences inspections based on risk-related criteria (HFTD tier, last scheduled work, predominant species, etc.), its Red Dot priority tagging system does not adequately communicate varying degrees of priority of work identified during inspections.
- Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, PacifiCorp must provide:
 - Risk-based criteria for determining and assigning priority to work locations, including remediation timelines for each priority level. GO 95, Rule 18(A)(2) and Liberty’s “Work Priority Levels” should serve as examples.
 - A plan to operationalize the risk-based criteria that includes milestones that are specific, measurable, relevant, and timebound.
- Discussed in Section 8.2, “Vegetation Management and Inspections.

PacifiCorp’s Response

PacifiCorp plans to provide an update on PC-23-16 within the 2026-2028 Base WMP.

5.5 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND FORECASTING

PC-23-17. Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration

- Description: PacifiCorp reports having approximately 100 weather stations in its network but does not report on the annual maintenance and calibration of those weather stations. Frequent calibration and maintenance of weather stations is critical for ensuring accurate, reliable, and high-quality data. As PacifiCorp performs its annual weather station maintenance and calibration, Energy Safety will need PacifiCorp to report on the following to verify the integrity of the data collected from its weather station network.
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must provide documentation indicating the number of weather stations that received their annual calibration and the number of weather stations that were unable to undergo annual maintenance and/or calibration due to factors such as remote location, weather conditions, customer refusals, environmental concerns, and safety issues. This documentation must include:
 - The station name and location.
 - The reason for the inability to conduct maintenance and/or calibration.
 - The length of time since the last maintenance and calibration.
 - The number of attempted but incomplete maintenance or calibration events for these stations in each calendar year.
- Discussed in Section 8.3, "Situational Awareness and Forecasting."

PacifiCorp's Response

As discussed in Section 8.1.4 – Weather Station Maintenance of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp's weather station maintenance is completed on an annual basis, and the status is tracked within the quarterly filings to OEIS under initiative ID MA-01. Within the reporting, PacifiCorp has reported that, in 2023, weather station maintenance was conducted to plan, and there was no incomplete maintenance, as well as the station name and location.

5.6 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

PC-23-18. Emergency Resources Availability

- Description: PacifiCorp did not provide an analysis of its response times regarding its emergency resources associated with recent PacifiCorp-reported catastrophic wildfires as required by a 2022 area for continued improvement (PC-22-19). It also did not provide an evaluation of its deployment and storage

of resources within California, required by this area for continued improvement depending on the results of the analysis.

- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must fully respond to all required progress listed in Energy Safety's 2022 area for continued improvement PC-22-19 by providing the following:
 - An analysis of PacifiCorp's response times regarding its emergency resources associated with recent PacifiCorp-reported catastrophic wildfires (as reported in Table 5-4).
 - Depending on the results of this analysis, an evaluation of PacifiCorp's deployment and storage of resources within California.
- Discussed in Section 8.4, "Emergency Preparedness."

PacifiCorp's Response

As discussed in Section 8.4 – Emergency Preparedness of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp invests in and stages fire suppression tools and equipment for use throughout its California service territory. However, these resources are not used to respond to wildfires. Instead, they are dispatched to the field with field personnel to proactively mitigate wildfire risk in conditions that are identified as elevated, significant, or extreme. For example, water truck resources are strategically assigned to accompany field personnel working in wildland areas during fire season. Depending on local conditions, dry vegetation in the immediate vicinity of a work area may be sprayed with water before conducting work as a preventative measure. In the extremely unlikely event that an ignition does occur while field crews or other PacifiCorp personnel are working in the field, they are also equipped with basic tools to extinguish small fires. For this reason, PacifiCorp does not evaluate deployment and storage of resources dispatched to the field by response time to wildfire, as described in PC-23-18 – Emergency Resources Availability.

PacifiCorp also engages with customers via direct call, text, or by other methods such as social media, its website, the PacifiCorp app, and partnerships with local media during emergencies. 24/7 real time situation updates are also utilized as appropriate.

Additionally, during a wildfire and/or PSPS event PacifiCorp engages in communications with local emergency management agencies (via the County Office of Emergency Services), tribal partners, telecommunications infrastructure providers, large customers, and other local partners through the duration of the event as described in the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP in Section 8.4.2.1 – Overview of Protocols, Policies and Procedures and quoted below:

"PacifiCorp processes for wildfires and PSPS events generally follow the same overall flow shown in Figure 5-6 (revised 2023-2025 Base WMP). The company utilizes weather forecasts and other situational awareness information to identify when a potential public safety power shutoff event may be warranted. Based on the best available weather forecast and other relevant situational awareness information, senior management can

initiate a public safety power shutoff event. There is no operational flow diagram at the time of this writing, however the process map below illustrates key components of wildfire and PSPS emergency response procedures.




Figure 5-6: Process Flow Diagram Overview (revised 2023-2025 Base WMP)

“Upon agreement by executive management to initiate Public Safety Power Shutoff actions, the Emergency Coordination Center (ECC) will be activated (if it has not already been activated).

“The ECC Staff will then prepare a Public Safety Power Shutoff Plan, which at a minimum shall include:

- Forecasted date and time that the de-energization event will start.
- Estimated duration of the event.
- Date and time that affected customers will be notified under a proposed customer notification plan.
- Critical customers and facilities on the circuit such as hospitals, emergency centers, and water/water treatment plants that will be impacted.
- With respect to each circuit or portion of a circuit planned for de-energization, a description of the circumstances that give rise to the need to de-energize with specific focus on how it creates an “imminent and significant risk to persons and/or property;”
- A description of measures considered as an alternative to de-energization and why such measures alone are insufficient.
- A description of the public safety benefits the company hopes to achieve by de-energizing the applicable electrical facilities.
- A description of proposed efforts to mitigate the adverse impacts on customers and communities impacted by de-energization; and
- The proposed date and time for notifying the appropriate commission staff.
- Additional information may be required as part of a specific state event mitigation

plan.

“PacifiCorp actively monitors real-time weather conditions and tries to provide customers with additional notifications if de-energization is likely. When real-time observations and weather forecasts indicate that the three triggers for “de-energization watch” have been evaluated, and the Wildfire Risk Index is elevated, a de-energization watch protocol is initiated. The protocol includes activation of an Emergency Coordination Center (ECC), communication with local public safety partners, and implementation of additional monitoring activities.

“The ECC is staffed by specialized staff who assemble during de-energization warning and implementation to provide critical operations support through the collection and analysis of data. The ECC, under direction of the Operational Leadership Branch (OLB) makes decisions to maintain the safety and reliability of the transmission and distribution system and helps facilitate cross-organization incident coordination. The ECC is led by an ECC Executive and has the support of a safety officer, a joint information team, emergency management, meteorology and operational stakeholders representing field operations, system operations, vegetation management, engineering, and other specialties.

“When the ECC is activated, PacifiCorp emergency management gathers input from public safety partners to properly characterize and consider impacts to local communities and send notifications to the operators of pre-identified critical facilities, partner utilities, and adjacent local public safety partners. The PacifiCorp customer service team then coordinates through the ECC to confirm customer lists for the area to develop a communication plan for those customers potentially impacted.

“Local patrol and inspection of lines during a PSPS watch can include a variety of methods depending on the accessibility of locations, the reliability of the line, area conditions and other factors. The ECC reviews these factors to determine necessary tasks such as the deployment of crews or remote monitoring by system operations.

“Because of the public desire for reliable electric service, together with public safety concerns associated with de-energization, a PSPS is a measure of last resort. Nonetheless, consistent with existing regulations and the general mandate to operate the electrical system safely, the ECC has discretion to determine when a PSPS is appropriate. “The OLB and ECC Executive considers all available information, including real-time feedback and input from other ECC participants and field operations to determine whether PSPS should be executed. Additionally, the OLB and ECC Executive may decide to further refine the PSPS areas described above. As a matter of practical reality, the ECC Executive cannot know whether a PSPS will prevent a utility-related ignition. If a PSPS is not implemented and an ignition occurs, the ignition itself is not proof that a PSPS should have been implemented. Likewise, if a PSPS is implemented, the event itself does not prove that an ignition that would have otherwise occurred was prevented”

5.7 LESSONS LEARNED

PC-23-19. Lessons Learned Narratives

- Description: While PacifiCorp provides information on lessons learned in tabular form, it does not provide the narrative summaries required for Section 10 “Lessons Learned.”
- Required Progress: In its 2025 Update, PacifiCorp must provide all required information on lessons learned in both tabular and narrative form, as required by Section 10 of the Technical Guidelines.
- Discussed in Section 10, “PacifiCorp’s Process for Continuous Improvement” (10.3 “Areas for Continued Improvement”).

PacifiCorp’s Response

In Section 10 of the revised 2023-2025 Base WMP, PacifiCorp provided all required information on lessons learned in tabular form in Table 10-1 and added a narrative summary.

PC-23-20. Lessons Learned from Past Wildfires

- Description: In response to a 2022 area for continued improvement (PC-22-06), PacifiCorp states that it is planning to implement fire incident tracking and expects to perform trend and root cause analysis for ignitions by the end of 2024. Given this timeline, PacifiCorp has not yet investigated the causes of its ignitions or PacifiCorp-reported wildfires and does not provide any associated lessons learned within its WMP.
- Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, PacifiCorp must provide an update on its fire incident tracking database as it relates to PacifiCorp’s analysis of the root causes of its ignitions and PacifiCorp-reported catastrophic wildfires as well as associated lessons learned. This update must provide information on and a response to all required progress listed in Energy Safety’s 2022 area for continued improvement PC-22-06.

PacifiCorp’s Response

PacifiCorp plans to provide an update on PC-23-20 within the 2026-2028 Base WMP regarding on its fire incident tracking database as it relates to PacifiCorp’s analysis of the root causes of its ignitions and PacifiCorp-reported catastrophic wildfires as well as associated lessons learned.

APPENDIX A – REFERENCE TO CHANGED TABLE/FIGURE NUMBERS AND/OR LOCATION IN REVISED 2023-2025 BASE WMP

Title of Changed Figure or Table	From	To
Summary of Plan Objectives	Not labeled	Table PAC 4-1
PacifiCorp's Baseline Risk Assessment Framework	N/A	Figure 6-1
Record temperatures from the National Weather Service's NOW Data for representative weather stations across PacifiCorp's service territory in California	Not labeled	Table PAC 5-1
PacifiCorp's Percentage Distribution of Urban, Rural, and Highly Rural Customers	Not labeled	Table PAC 5-2
PacifiCorp's Distribution of Urban, Rural, and Highly Rural Customers	Not labeled	Table PAC 5-3
Distribution of AFN customers in the HFTD	Not labeled	Table PAC 5-4
Subdivisions to be Evaluated as part of OFSM Subdivision Review Plan	Not labeled	Table PAC 5-5
Distribution of PacifiCorp's Assets in the HFTD	Not labeled	Table PAC 5-6
Timeline for implementation of PSPS risk assessment solution	Figure 6-1	Figure 6-2
High-Level Risk Assessment Approach	Figure 6-2	Figure 6-3
PacifiCorp Risk Assessment Model	Figure 6-3	Figure 6-4
FireSight Model Components	Figure 6-4	Figure 6-5
Outage Causes with Possible Correlation to Ignition Potential	Table 6-2	Table PAC 6-1
Historic Ignition Risk Drivers During Fire Season	N/A	Figure 6-6
Historic Ignition Risk Drivers During Non-Fire Season	N/A	Figure 6-7
Probability of Outage from Ground Level Wind Gusts	Figure 6-5	N/A
Probability of Fault from Ground Level Wind Gusts at Circuit 5G83	Figure 6-9	Figure 6-8
FireSight Calculation Schematic	N/A	Figure 6-6

Title of Changed Figure or Table	From	To
Illustrative Example of Fuel/Terrain-Driven Composite Risk Compared to the Wind Driven Composite Risk in Seiad Valley, CA	Figure 6-13	Figure 6-12
Illustrative Example of Fuel/Terrain-Driven Composite Risk Compared to the Wind Driven Composite Risk in Montague, CA	Figure 6-14	Figure 6-13
Calculation of Wind-Driven and Fuel/Terrain-Driven Composite Risk	Figure 6-15	Figure 6-14
Combined Composite Risk Score Calculation	Figure 6-16	Figure 6-15
Risk Modeling Assumptions and Constraints/Limitations	Table 6-2	Table 6-2
Design Basis Scenarios	Table 6-3	Table 6-3
Extreme-Event Scenarios	Table 6-5	Table 6-4
HFTD and HFRA Overhead Line Miles	N/A	Table PAC-6-2
2024 HFTD and HFRA	Figure 6-17	Figure 6-16
Ignition Risk Values in the HFRA	Figure 6-18	Figure 6-17
HFRA Establishment and Update Plan	Figure 6-8	N/A
Timeline for the Establishment and Implementation of HFRA	Figure 6-9	N/A
Summary of Top-Risk Circuits, Segments, or Spans	Table 6-5	Table 6-5
California Cumulative Ignition Risk Drivers and Wire Downs Outside of Fire Season	Figure 6-10	N/A
California Cumulative Ignition Risk Drivers and Wire Downs During Fire Season	Figure 6-11	N/A
Analytics Platform Implementation Timeline	Figure 6-12	N/A
Key Metrics Statistical Frequency	Table 6-8	Table 6-6
Validation and Independent Review of PacifiCorp's Data	Not Labeled	Table PAC 6-3
Risk Assessment Improvement Plan	Table 6-7	Table 6-7
Prioritized Areas in PacifiCorp's Service Territory Based on Overall Utility Risk	Table 7-3	Table PAC 7-1
PacifiCorp Mitigations	Table 7-4	Table PAC 7-2
PacifiCorp's WMP Mitigation Initiatives for 3-year and 10-year Outlooks	Table 7-5	Table PAC 7-3
Example of Summary of Risk Reduction for Top-Risk Circuits	N/A	Table 7-4
Weather Station Maintenance and Frequency	Not Labeled	Table PAC 8-1
Current EFR Mode Configurations	Table 8-9	Table PAC 8-2
Modifications to Work Practices Based on Wildfire Risk	Table 8-10	Table PAC 8-3

Title of Changed Figure or Table	From	To
Workforce Planning, Asset Inspections	Table 8-11	Table 8-9
Workforce Planning, Grid Hardening	Table 8-12	Table 8-10
Workforce Planning, Risk Event Inspection	Table 8-13	Table 8-11
Vegetation Management Implementation Objectives (3-year plan)	Table 8-14	Table 8-12
Vegetation Management Implementation Objectives (10-year plan)	Table 8-15	Table 8-13
Vegetation Management Initiative Targets by Year	Table 8-16	Table 8-14
Vegetation Inspections and QA/QC Targets by Year	Table 8-17	Table 8-15
Vegetation Management and Inspection Performance Metrics Results by Year	Table 8-18	Table 8-16
Vegetation Management Inspection Frequency, Method, and Criteria	Table 8-19	Table 8-17
Vegetation Management QA/QC Program	Table 8-20	Table 8-18
Number of Past Due Vegetation Management Work Orders Categorized by Age	Table 8-21	Table 8-19
Vegetation Management Qualifications and Training	Table 8-22	Table 8-20
Situational Awareness Initiative Objectives (3-year plan)	Table 8-23	Table 8-21
Situational Awareness Initiative Objectives (10-year plan)	Table 8-24	Table 8-22
Situational Awareness and Forecasting Performance Metrics Results by Year	Table 8-25	Table 8-23
Example of Situational Awareness and Forecasting Performance Metrics Results by Year	Not Labeled	Table 8-24
Environmental Monitoring Systems	Table 8-26	Table 8-25
Planned Improvements to Environmental Monitoring Systems	Table 8-27	Table 8-26
Grid Operation Monitoring Systems	Table 8-28	Table 8-27
Planning Improvements to Grid Operation Monitoring Systems	Table 8-29	Table 8-28
Fire Detection Systems Currently Deployed	Table 8-30	Table 8-29
FireRisk and FireSim Weather Inputs	Table 8-31	Table PAC 8-4
Example of Planning Improvements to Fire Detection and Alarm Systems	Not Labeled	Table 8-30
Planned Improvements to Weather Forecasting Systems	Table 8-32	Table 8-31
Example of Fire Potential Index Features	N/A	Table 8-32
Overview of Notification and Communication	Table 8-37	Table PAC 8-5

Title of Changed Figure or Table	From	To
Key Gaps and Limitations in Integrating Wildfire- and PSPS-Specific Strategies into Emergency Plan	Table 8-38	Table 8-37
Emergency Preparedness Staffing and Qualifications	Table 8-39	Table 8-38
PacifiCorp’s Personnel Training Program	Table 8-40	Table 8-39
Contractor Training Program	Table 8-41	Table 8-40
Internal Drill, Simulation, and Tabletop Exercise Program	Table 8-42	Table 8-41
External Drill, Simulation, and Tabletop Exercise Program	Table 8-43	Table 8-42
Wildfire-Specific Updates to the Emergency Preparedness Plan	Table 8-44	Table 8-43
State and Local Agency Collaboration(s)	Table 8-45	Table 8-44
Key Gaps and Limitations in Collaboration Activities with State and Local Agencies	Table 8-46	Table 8-45
High-Level Communication Protocols, Procedures, and Systems with Public Safety Partners	Table 8-47	Table 8-46
Key Gaps and Limitations in Communication Coordination with Public Safety Partners	Table 8-48	Table 8-47
High-Level Mutual Aid Agreement for Resources During a Wildfire or De-Energization Incident	Table 8-49	Table 8-48
Protocols for Emergency Communication to Stakeholder Groups	Table 8-50	Table 8-49
Key Gaps and Limitations in Public Emergency Communication Strategy	Table 8-51	Table 8-50
Internal Drill, Simulation, and Tabletop Exercise Program for Service Restoration	Table 8-52	Table 8-51
External Drill, Simulation, and Tabletop Exercise Program for Service Restoration	Table 8-53	Table 8-52
Community Outreach and Engagement Initiative Objectives (3-year plan)	Table 8-54	Table 8-53
Community Outreach and Engagement Initiative Objectives (10-year plan)	Table 8-55	Table 8-54
Community Outreach and Engagement Initiative Targets by Year	Table 8-56	Table 8-55
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