ENERGY SAFETY
DATA REQUEST: OEIS-P-WMP-2024- SDGE-01
SDG&E RESPONSE

Date Received: April 17, 2024
Date Submitted: April 22, 2024

I. GENERAL OBJECTIONS

1. SDG&E objects generally to each request to the extent that it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or evidentiary doctrine. No information protected by such privileges will be knowingly disclosed.

2. SDG&E objects generally to each request that is overly broad and unduly burdensome. As part of this objection, SDG&E objects to discovery requests that seek "all documents" or "each and every document" and similarly worded requests on the grounds that such requests are unreasonably cumulative and duplicative, fail to identify with specificity the information or material sought, and create an unreasonable burden compared to the likelihood of such requests leading to the discovery of admissible evidence. Notwithstanding this objection, SDG&E will produce all relevant, non-privileged information not otherwise objected to that it is able to locate after reasonable inquiry.

3. SDG&E objects generally to each request to the extent that the request is vague, unintelligible, or fails to identify with sufficient particularity the information or documents requested and, thus, is not susceptible to response at this time.

4. SDG&E objects generally to each request that: (1) asks for a legal conclusion to be drawn or legal research to be conducted on the grounds that such requests are not designed to elicit facts and, thus, violate the principles underlying discovery; (2) requires SDG&E to do legal research or perform additional analyses to respond to the request; or (3) seeks access to counsel's legal research, analyses or theories.

5. SDG&E objects generally to each request to the extent it seeks information or documents that are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

6. SDG&E objects generally to each request to the extent that it is unreasonably duplicative or cumulative of other requests.

7. SDG&E objects generally to each request to the extent that it would require SDG&E to search its files for matters of public record such as filings, testimony, transcripts, decisions, orders, reports or other information, whether available in the public domain or through FERC or CPUC sources.

8. SDG&E objects generally to each request to the extent that it seeks information or documents that are not in the possession, custody or control of SDG&E.

9. SDG&E objects generally to each request to the extent that the request would impose an

undue burden on SDG&E by requiring it to perform studies, analyses or calculations or to create documents that do not currently exist.

10. SDG&E objects generally to each request that calls for information that contains trade secrets, is privileged or otherwise entitled to confidential protection by reference to statutory protection. SDG&E objects to providing such information absent an appropriate protective order.

II. EXPRESS RESERVATIONS

1. No response, objection, limitation or lack thereof, set forth in these responses and objections shall be deemed an admission or representation by SDG&E as to the existence or nonexistence of the requested information or that any such information is relevant or admissible.

2. SDG&E reserves the right to modify or supplement its responses and objections to each request, and the provision of any information pursuant to any request is not a waiver of that right.

3. SDG&E reserves the right to rely, at any time, upon subsequently discovered information.

4. These responses are made solely for the purpose of this proceeding and for no other purpose.

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III. RESPONSES

QUESTION 1

Q01. Regarding SDG&E's NDVI Cameras:

On p. 40 of its 2025 Update, SDG&E states, "The Weather Station Network and NDVI Cameras (WMP.447) is evolving into a new program: Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration (WMP.1430)."

a. Will SDG&E continue to use NDVI cameras?
   i. If so, under what initiative number can Energy Safety find updates on SDG&E's use of NDVI cameras in the future, given that WMP.447 has been retired?

RESPONSE 1

Yes, SDGE will continue to use NDVI cameras. Updates on the use of these cameras will be provided under WMP.450 Fire Potential Index (FPI) because NDVI is a critical component of the FPI.

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QUESTION 2

Q02. Regarding SDG&E's Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration:

In response to SDGE-23-19 "Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration" SDG&E was required to provide in its 2025 Update specific information about the calibration and annual maintenance performed on its weather stations.

According to SDG&E's 2025 Update, Appendix B "Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration," for Station Name 5158 the "Notes" column indicates "Cal[i]bration performed 1/24." SDG&E provides the same indication under "Notes" for Station Name 5192.

a. Are these two stations the only stations in SDG&E's network that have received any calibration since installation?
   i. If yes, please provide an explanation why the other stations have received no calibration since installation.
   ii. If no, please indicate which other stations have received calibration since installation and when.

According to SDG&E's 2025 Update, Appendix B "Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration," and p. 110, Table 20 "Weather Stations Unable to Undergo Annual Maintenance," SDG&E last performed maintenance on Station Name 5176 on June 15, 2021, and on Station Name 1915 on March 7, 2022.

b. Have these two stations in fact received no maintenance or calibration since the above dates?
   i. If yes, are these stations still being used in data collection for situational awareness and forecasting?
   ii. If no, please provide the dates of the most recent maintenance and calibration.

c. Are these the only stations in SDG&E's network that have not received annual maintenance or calibration?

   i. If no, provide the most recent dates of calibration and maintenance for all other stations.

d. How many other SDG&E structures, equipment, and assets have not been inspected along these segments due to the stated access issues?
   i. Please provide the number, type, and quantity of line miles that have not received inspections due to the stated access issues.

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RESPONSE 2

a) No, all other stations with a "Last Maintenance Date" identified in Appendix B received their annual calibration on that date. Notes are included for Stations 5158 and 5192 because calibration was performed 20 days after the initial site visit recorded in the "Last Maintenance Date."

b) Yes, Stations 5176 (Poomacha) and 1915 (Cuca Ranch) have received no calibration or maintenance in 2023 and are still being used in data collection for situational awareness. The stations are inaccessible due to washed out roads. We are actively pursuing a new accessible station location (Diamond Hill) between these two inaccessible stations.

c) Yes, Stations 5176 (Poomacha) and 1915 (Cuca Ranch) are the only stations in SDG&E's network that did not receive annual maintenance or calibration in 2023.

d) Zero. The access issues preventing SDG&E from accessing the 2 weather stations mentioned above are specific to the weather stations and are unrelated to other SDG&E equipment. Maintenance and inspection of SDG&E equipment is reported through the QDR process.

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QUESTION 3

Q03. Regarding SDG&E's Infrared Inspections:

According to SDG&E's 2025 Update, SDG&E is planning to increase transmission infrared inspections (WMP.482) by 18 percent in 2025 but is planning to decrease distribution infrared inspections (WMP.481) by 97 percent in 2025 (p. 20, Table 6 "Qualifying Changes in Targets and Expenditures"). SDG&E's rationale for decreasing its distribution infrared inspections in 2024 is provided in SDG&E's 2023 Change Order Request[1] and its Jan. 24, 2024, response to the Energy Safety data request on the topic.[2]

a. What is SDG&E's rationale for increasing transmission infrared inspections in 2025 given that SDG&E expects to decrease its 2024 distribution infrared inspections because of a low inspection findings rate and is planning to further decrease it in 2025?

RESPONSE 3

As stated in Section 2.2.1.15 of the 2025 WMP Update, the increase in target for transmission infrared inspections is solely due to incorporating reporting SDG&E's existing practice of performing these inspections in the WUI into the WMP. It is not necessarily an increase in the planned work scope and is unrelated to the finding rate for distribution infrared inspections.

[1] SDG&E 2023 Change Order Report (Dec. 2023) (https://efiling.energysafety.ca.gov/eFiling/Getfile.aspx?fileid=56078&shareable=true, accessed April 16, 2024).
[2] Data Request OEIS-P-CO 2024-SDGE-001, Question 2 (https://efiling.energysafety.ca.gov/eFiling/Getfile.aspx?fileid=56206&shareable=true, accessed April 16, 2024).

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QUESTION 4

Q04. Regarding SDG&E's Risk Reduction Target for Undergrounding and Covered Conductor:

According to SDG&E's 2025 Update, the WiNGS-Planning model "incorporates wildfire risk into a RSE framework to determine cost effective applications of strategic undergrounding and covered conductor with a risk reduction target of approximately 80%" (p. 56, response to SDGE-23-06 "Demonstration of Proper Decision Making for Selection of Undergrounding Projects").

a. Describe the process by which SDG&E arrived at an 80 percent target.
   i. Is this 80 percent target related to the 77 percent combined efficacy of mitigations SDG&E found in its 2023 internal analysis (2025 Update, p. 65)?

RESPONSE 4

a) SDG&E prepared its analysis of various wildfire mitigation scenarios while developing its first three-year Wildfire Mitigation Plan in response to the catastrophic wildfires of 2017-2018 and the passage of SB 901 and AB 1054. Based upon the data available at the time and its analysis, SDG&E ultimately opted for a risk mitigation and hardening strategy that reflected the inflection point between maximizing potential risk reduction while avoiding estimated exponential cost increases. SDG&E's wildfire mitigation efforts are continually reassessed based upon revisions to regulatory requirements, realized cost efficiencies and new technologies, and stakeholder input through the wildfire mitigation plan process. Based on available information, SDG&E continues to pursue an overall approximate 80% reduction of wildfire risk through infrastructure hardening to promote community safety, increase reliability, and mitigate against PSPS impacts.
   i) No, 80 percent is SDG&E's overall risk reduction target for hardening programs, while 77 percent is the efficacy of covered conductor with combined mitigations as stated in the 2025 WMP Update, section 5.6.3, page 64.

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QUESTION 5

Q05. Regarding SDG&E's Covered Conductor Sensitivity Analysis:

According to SDG&E's 2025 Update, SDG&E used a sensitivity analysis "to study how increasing the efficacy of covered conductor installation by means of mixed mitigations affected individual proposed mitigations as well as the complete portfolio" (p. 67, response to SDGE-23-07 "Third-Party Recommendations for Model Improvements").

a. Has SDG&E used this sensitivity analysis to inform its risk buy-down estimates?
   i. If so, please describe how.
b. Has SDG&E used this sensitivity analysis to inform its PSPS models?
   i. If so, please describe how.

RESPONSE 5

SDG&E objects to the request to the extent it is vague and ambiguous, particularly with regard to the term "PSPS models." SDG&E's response assumes that Energy Safety is requesting information regarding wind speed thresholds. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, SDG&E responds as follows:

a. SDG&E has assessed the impacts to the grid hardening portfolio using a covered conductor efficacy rate of 77% with a cost per mile of 1.6 million dollars. SDG&E did not adjust its wildfire risk reduction target of roughly 80%. The impact of this change is discussed in sections 5.5.6 Adjustment to Hardening Scope and 5.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis of the 2025 WMP Update. While the increased covered conductor efficacy rate is still being deliberated, future releases of the WiNGS will consider the adoption of an updated covered conductor efficacy rate based on this analysis and other informative studies.

b. As stated above, the sensitivity analysis described above is still in deliberation and has only been used in an exploratory capacity. It is anticipated that a combination of studies will inform PSPS models by potentially increasing the PSPS windspeed threshold for covered conductor from 55 mph to 58 mph.

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QUESTION 6

Q06. Regarding SDG&E's WiNGS-Planning Model Limitations:

SDG&E states in its 2025 Update that "[m]itigations outside of grid hardening initiatives are not assessed" in Version 3.0 of its WiNGS-Planning model (p. 67, response to SDGE-23-07 "Third-Party Recommendations for Model Improvements").

a. Explain when mitigations outside of grid hardening will be assessed.

RESPONSE 6

To clarify, the WiNGS Planning model currently assesses and informs SDG&E's grid hardening efforts, and recommends either installation of covered conductor, strategic undergrounding of electrical infrastructure, or no hardening mitigation. If a segment is not recommended for grid hardening (i.e. the WiNGS Planning model does not recommend covered conductor or undergrounding), SDG&E still considers the segment for other mitigations outside of the model. SDG&E is currently exploring non-grid hardening initiatives, such as additional weather station locations, SCADA sectionalizing devices, vegetation management, and microgrids, combined with applications of covered conductor to increase the efficacy of covered conductor, but stand-alone non-grid hardening mitigations are not anticipated to be incorporated into the WiNGS Planning model for the 2024 and 2025 roadmap.

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QUESTION 7

Q07. Regarding the Joint Working Sessions on Woody Debris and Vegetation:

SDG&E's 2025 Update mentions that it participated in two joint working sessions with SCE and PG&E in 2023 on "disposing and recycling woody debris and vegetation" (p. 52, response to SDGE-23-05 "Cross-Utility Collaboration on Best Practices for Inclusion of Climate Change Forecasts in Consequence Modeling, Inclusion of Community Vulnerability in Consequence Modeling, and Utility Vegetation Management for Wildfire Safety").

a. Provide the following information about these two joint working sessions:
   i. Each working session's date, time, and host organization
   ii. The agenda for each working session
   iii. What, if any, entities other than SDG&E, PG&E, and SCE participated in these working sessions

RESPONSE 7

i. June 20, 2023; 12:30pm -1:00pm; Host utility: SCE
ii. The stated purpose of the meeting was to have an initial working session to discuss the different types of programs and practices each IOU has in place for disposing and recycling woody debris and vegetation.
iii. Only SDG&E, PG&E, and SCE participated in this working session.

i. August 11, 2023; 12:00pm -1:00pm; Host utility: PG&E
ii. The agenda for this meeting continued the discussion from the previous joint IOU session regarding wood management practices including controls in place for operations, governance documents, agency requirements, and customer communications regarding wood disposal.
iii. Only SDG&E, PG&E, and SCE participated in this working session.

i.

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QUESTION 8

Q08. Regarding the Joint Meeting on Fuels Management:

SDG&E's 2025 Update mentions that it participated in a joint meeting with SCE and PG&E in 2023 "to discuss each utility's respective fuels management programs and began initial collaboration on a possible scoping study on best practices and efficacy of fuels management." (pp. 52-53, response to SDGE-23-05 "Cross-Utility Collaboration on Best Practices for Inclusion of Climate Change Forecasts in Consequence Modeling, Inclusion of Community Vulnerability in Consequence Modeling, and Utility Vegetation Management for Wildfire Safety").

a. Provide the following information about this joint meeting:
   i. The meeting's date, time, and host organization.
   ii. The meeting agenda.
   iii. What, if any, entities other than SDG&E, PG&E, and SCE participated in this meeting.

RESPONSE 8

i. Initial meeting began November, 9, 2023; 1:00pm –2:pm; Host utility SDG&E

ii. Agenda items included current IOU practices related to fuels management activities and the discussion of engaging a third-party to study the effectiveness of fuel management activities to prevent ignitions.

iii. Only SDG&E, PG&E, and SCE participated in this working session.

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QUESTION 9

Q09. Regarding the Typical Implementation Timeframe for Undergrounding and Covered Conductor:

SDG&E's 2025 Update provides the typical implementation timeframe for undergrounding as "24 to 36 months" and covered conductor as "20 to 35 months" (pp. 55, response to SDGE-23-06 "Demonstration of Proper Decision Making for Selection of Undergrounding Projects").

a. Describe how SDG&E calculates the timeframe (e.g., using SDG&E historic averages, benchmarking with California utilities) for:
   i. Undergrounding.
   ii. Covered conductor.

RESPONSE 9

i. For the typical implementation timeframe for SDG&E Strategic Undergrounding projects, we used the average duration from start of design to energization of historical projects in the program.

ii. For the typical implementation timeframe for SDG&E Covered Conductor projects, we used the average duration from start of design to energization of historical projects in the program.

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QUESTION 10

Q010. Regarding SDG&E's Residual Risk Calculation:

SDG&E's 2025 Update indicates its residual risk is 2.2 percent (pp. 56, Figure 4 "Effectiveness of Hardening Strategies to Wildfire Risk (Years 2007-2023)," response to SDGE-23-06 "Demonstration of Proper Decision Making for Selection of Undergrounding Projects").

a. Describe how SDG&E calculates its residual risk (e.g., which variables are included and how are they combined).

RESPONSE 10

1) Figure 4 represents an internal evaluation quantifying the efficacy of SDG&E Hardening mitigations from 2007 to 2023. The residual risk is estimated based on the following assumptions, consistent with SDG&E's RSE calculations:

#	Variable	Value	Description
1	Acres Burned	500,000	Subject Matter Expert assumption to estimate the potential maximum footprint (acres) of a catastrophic wildfire in SDG&E service territory.
2	Structures destroyed	4,375	This value is derived from the assumption of 500,000 acres burned and is based on a ratio of 0.00875 structures destroyed per acre burned. This ratio was estimated from an internal study conducted on CalFire's historical dataset from 2010 to 2020.
3	$/acre_burned	$1,766	This value is derived from a Subject Matter Expert assumption to estimate the financial amount of suppression and restoration activities.
4	$/Structure destroyed	$1,000,000	This value is a Subject Matter Expert assumption based on a review of a variety of publicly available data sources.

Given the assumptions provided, a baseline risk of $5.26 billion is estimated for the year 2007 and normalized to 100%.

2) System Hardening, Inspections, and Vegetation Management

A reduction in risk of 49% is estimated when considering the combined impact of System Hardening (including the deployment of covered conductor and strategic undergrounding), Inspections, and Vegetation Management activities.

#	Variable	Value	Description
1	System Hardening	48%	Subject Matter Expert assumption based on WiNGS-Planning projections
2	Inspections and Vegetation Management	1%	Subject Matter Expert assumption based on Vegetation Management RSEs

3) Sensitive Relay Profile and Sensitive Ground Fault

A risk reduction of 6.13% is estimated by considering the miles protected by these devices relative to the total number of miles exposed to wildfire risk in SDG&E's HFTD.

4) PSPS + Situational Awareness
A risk reduction of 42.7% is estimated based on the Subject Matter Expert assumption that PSPS and Situational Awareness are 95% effective.

5) Residual Risk
The 2.2% Residual Risk refers to the unmitigated risk that remains despite the mitigations implemented by SDG&E.

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QUESTION 11

Q011. Regarding SDG&E's Efficacy Assumption for Undergrounding:

SDG&E's 2025 Update indicates it assumes a 64 percent efficacy rate for covered conductor (described further in the Joint IOU Covered Conductor Working Group Report) and a 100 percent efficacy rate for undergrounding (p. 59, response to SDGE-23-06 "Demonstration of Proper Decision Making for Selection of Undergrounding Projects").

a. Describe how SDG&E calculates the 100 percent efficacy rate for undergrounding.

RESPONSE 11

The efficacy of the covered conductor, calculated at 64%, is derived from a comprehensive study conducted jointly by the large California IOUs. In the case of undergrounding efforts by SDG&E, there has been only one instance of an ignitions occurring on undergrounded circuits within the HFTD. This event occurred due to vehicle contact with pad mounted equipment. One ignition on undergrounded HFTD circuits across 1,597 outages that have occurred on undergrounded HFTD circuits between 2014 and 2023 is an effectiveness of 99.94%, which is rounded to 100% within the model.

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QUESTION 12

Q012. Regarding SDG&E's Approaches to its PSPS Customer Impact Study:
SDG&E's 2025 Update indicates it "attempted with varying results" three approaches to its 2023 PSPS customer impact study about how different grid hardening initiatives affect PSPS impact (p. 59, response to SDGE-23-06 "Demonstration of Proper Decision Making for Selection of Undergrounding Projects").

a. Describe SDG&E's three approaches to this study.
b. Explain how SDG&E arrived at these approaches.

RESPONSE 12

a) As stated in the 2025 WMP Update in section 5.5.5.2, all three approaches to the customer impact study are based on the conditions during SDG&E's most impactful PSPS de-energization event, which affected 73,000 customers in Dec. 2020. Using that baseline, SDG&E compares data with current system configuration and conditions to see how accomplishments from strategic undergrounding and covered conductor would reduce PSPS impacts to the same group of customers if the same weather event were to occur annually.

In the first approach, the PSPS likelihood in the WiNGS-Planning model was adjusted to get a subset of unique customers similar to the 73,000 customers that were impacted during the Dec. 2020 PSPS event. Next, strategic undergrounding and covered conductor accomplishments in 2021 and 2022 were considered for the impacted customer areas to assess the reduction in PSPS impacts. Future grid hardening projections were then considered to determine the future reduction in PSPS impacts. Preliminary results showed that between 2023 and 2031, PSPS impacts would be reduced for approximately 32% of the 73,000 affected customers. This means that if the same weather event occurred in 2031 and current and future hardening was accomplished, only about 49,000 customers would likely be affected by PSPS.

In the second approach, assets from 2020 were matched to the 2023 system, excluding any assets that did not have an exact match, then the most upstream device was identified and all customers downstream were summed to get an estimate of customer impact reduction. In this study, reductions were considered for only undergrounding and sectionalizing, and only reductions until 2023 were assessed. This approach showed a PSPS impact reduction for approximately 69% of the 73,000 customers. However, due to the number of segments that did not have an exact match to 2023 from segment sectionalizing, this reduction not considered to be as reliable as the other considered approaches. .

The third and most exact approach is described in the 2025 WMP Update under section 5.5.5.2. By using actual weather station data from the Dec. 2020 event, SDG&E was able to match the weather stations formerly paired to 2020 SCADA Sectionalizing devices with 2023 SCADA Sectionalizing devices, which allowed for a more precise customer and circuit segment matching and was able to show which modern devices would face the weather conditions prompting the de-energizations in 2020.

b) All three approaches were designed to quantify the estimated effect of hardening approaches on PSPS customer impacts. Since 2020 was the most impactful PSPS season in SDG&E's history, the circuit-segments and customers impacted by those events served as the study population for all three approaches. Each method approached challenges from different customer-segment associations due to SCADA sectionalizing since 2020 and weather factors.

The first approach addressed sectionalizing challenges by approximating the customers and segments. That is, it included a subset of the 2020 population and others, as described in response a.

The second approach was designed for 2023 alone and attempted to create a more like-for-like comparison. It strictly included matched devices from 2020 to 2023, and then measured undergrounding and sectionalizing effects on customer impact reduction.

The final approach in the 2025 WMP Update under section 5.5.5.2, was sought to address comparison challenges better than the other studies. As mentioned in part a, weather station mappings bypassed the sectionalizing challenge and captured devices that would have been impacted by real weather conditions.

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QUESTION 13

Q013. Regarding SDG&E's Delayed Expansion of Emergency Management Operations: According to SDG&E's 2025 Update, SDG&E changed the completion date for its objective 8.4.02 regarding expansion of Emergency Management Operations from June 30, 2023, to June 30, 2025 (p. 16, Table 5 "Changes in Objective Completion Dates"). SDG&E indicates this delay is to "further examine business strategy and associated initiative needs" (2025 Update, p. 18).

a. Describe what elements of SDG&E's business strategy and/or associated initiative needs SDG&E is examining in conjunction with this delay.

RESPONSE 13

As part of our commitment to customer affordability, SDG&E continues to examine our current business strategies as an opportunity to use innovative thinking to enhance our processes and increase efficiency. Strategies include:

- Opportunities to partner with other departments at SDG&E to expand the capacity for Emergency Management operations
- Partnership opportunities with external stakeholders
- Opportunities to leverage innovative technologies to increase efficiencies

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QUESTION 14

Q014. Regarding SDG&E's Delayed Expansion of its Incident Support Vehicle Fleet:
According to SDG&E's 2025 Update, SDG&E changed the completion date for its objective 8.4.11 regarding expansion of its incident support vehicle fleet from Dec. 31, 2023, to Dec. 31, 2025 (p. 16, Table 5 "Changes in Objective Completion Dates"). SDG&E indicates this delay is due to "vendor supply disruptions" (2025 Update, p. 18).

a. Describe SDG&E's interim plan to ensure its existing fleet meets its field incident response needs.

RESPONSE 14

SDG&E continually monitors current assets while evaluating capabilities for future vehicles.

In the interim, SDG&E emergency responders continue to utilize their personal vehicles to gain access to the emergency incident. In addition, SDG&E continues to deploy an existing mobile command trailer.

Regarding the two new state-of-the-art Incident Support Vehicles in objective 8.4.11, SDG&E is now in possession of the two vehicles, however, the delivery and installation of radios and data link systems, including necessary modifications for both vehicles, is still delayed.

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QUESTION 15

Q015. Regarding SDG&E's Delayed After Action Review Repository:

SDG&E's 2025 Update, SDG&E changed the completion date for its objective 8.4.12 regarding a new after-action review repository from Dec. 31, 2023, to Dec. 31, 2024 (p. 16, Table 5 "Changes in Objective Completion Dates"). SDG&E indicates this delay is to "examine future cost and staffing needs" (2025 Update, p. 18).

a. Describe SDG&E's current mechanisms (in lieu of the new repository) for:
   i. Evaluating its annual emergency management trainings and exercises.
   ii. Conducting after action reviews for continuous improvement and integrating lessons learned.
   iii. Sharing findings and feedback from the after-action reviews with Safety Services.

RESPONSE 15

i. SDG&E's current mechanisms for evaluating its annual emergency management trainings and exercises include:
   - Assigning evaluators to provide detailed feedback during and following exercises.
   - Distributing and analyzing survey results to all participants of training courses and exercises
   - Conducting post-exercise hotwash sessions to capture immediate feedback following exercises
   - Working closely with the AAR team to supply and support topics and action items from and for the Training & Exercise group in relation to training and exercise programs and identified training needs from the enterprise in relevant areas

ii. Following SDGE training and exercise After Action reviews there is an additional session devoted to identifying the corrective action and assigning the responsibility to a responsible party. These are tracked in a Smartsheet database for ease of sharing, tracking and filtering.

iii. All after action reviews include representation from Safety Services and the final AAR documents are shared with Safety Services.

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