Southern California Edison
2023-WMPs – 2023-WMPs

DATA REQUEST SET O E I S - P - W M P _ 2 0 2 3 - S C E - 0 0 6

To: Energy Safety
Prepared by: Cullen Armet
Job Title: Sr. Manager, Business Resiliency
Received Date: 6/2/2023

Response Date: 6/7/2023

Question 01:
Regarding National Incident Management System Positions:
a. From Section 8.4.2.2, Table 8-38 (page 541) what National Incident Management System (NIMS) positions is SCE training for and anticipate staffing during an emergency event?
i. Is each position listed in Table 8-38?
ii. If not, please list any additional positions with the information required in Table 8-38.

Response to Question 01:

SCE's Incident Management Team program follows National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS) methodology including all core incident management team positions. Over 800 SCE employees are assigned to over 30 different IMT positions that are aligned with the NIMS model. SCE has five functional IMTs (Electrical Services, IT, Generation, Security/Facilities and PSPS) that include discipline-specific Incident Commanders and Operations Section Chiefs and Branch Directors.

i. The positions listed in Table 8-38 represent the core PSPS positions used for PSPS activations and would be supported by additional Command and General Staff positions such as Public Information Officer, Safety Officer, Liaison Officer and other All Hazard support positions as needed. All IMT members undergo initial qualification training which includes FEMA's NIMS/ICS courses, position-specific training and an operations-based exercise/simulation. All IMT members are required to maintain their qualification annually via a combination of curriculum based courses and complete one operations-based exercise.
ii. See response above.

Southern California Edison
2023-WMPs – 2023-WMPs

DATA REQUEST SET O E I S - P - W M P _ 2 0 2 3 - S C E - 0 0 6

To: Energy Safety
Prepared by: Donna Boston
Job Title: Principal Manager
Received Date: 6/2/2023

Response Date: 6/8/2023

Question 02:
Regarding Emergency Preparedness After Action Reports:
a. Following the June 1, 2023 Call to Discuss the 2023 WMP, please provide Emergency Preparedness AARs for Calendar Years 2021, 2022 and 2023 (if applicable), including any updates to Corrective Action Plan measures.

Response to Question 02:
Please see following attachments for the After Action Reports (AAR) from 2023, 2022 and 2021. Please note that AARs are broken down by year and by incidents and Exercises/Drills/Tabletops. SCE has removed employee names from the documents.

AAR 2022 – PSPS Incidents
2022.06.17 PSPS Incident AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2022.07.22 - PSPS Incident Event - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2022.09.09 - PSPS IMT Incident - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2022.10.22 - PSPS IMT Event - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2022.11.18 PSPS IMT Event - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2022.11.24 - PSPS IMT Event AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF

AAR 2022 – PSPS Exercises / Drills / Tabletops
2022.05.16 - PSPS FE SERIES AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2022.08.03-04 - PSPS Central Data Platform Stress Test - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF

AAR 2021 - PSPS Incidents
2021.04.12 AAR PSPS Incident – AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
PSPS IMT 6.13 AAR PSPS IMT Incident.pdf
2021.09.30 PSPS IMT Event - After Action Report.PDF
2021.10.08 PSPS IMT Event - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2021.10.13 AND 2021.10.16 PSPS IMT EVENT - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2021.10.22 PSPS IMT EVENT - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2021.11.18 PSPS IMT EVENT - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF
2021.11.24 PSPS IMT EVENT - AFTER ACTION REPORT.PDF

AAR 2021 - Exercises / Drills / Tabletops
RG VIII AAR Final.PDF

ATTACHMENT

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Business Resiliency After Action Report

Event Name	Event - 06.17.2022 **PSPS Activation**	Event Date	06.15.22 – 06.17.22
Event Type	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary:

This PSPS event began when SCE activated its Emergency Operations Center on June 15, 2022 at 12:00pm. During that event, SCE's meteorologists identified the potential for fire weather conditions in localized portions of Inyo on the Birchim circuit beginning on June 17 with a final period of concern from 9:00am June 17th to 6:00pm June 17th.

Given this forecast, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts maintained close communication with the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)[1] to evaluate the potential fire weather. During this communication, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast of elevated fire weather. SCE activated its PSPS Dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) remotely on June 15th at 12:00pm to manage this event. Leveraging observed real-time weather station data and information from live field observers monitoring prevailing environmental conditions, such as potential damage from wind gusts, airborne vegetation, or flying debris, SCE was ultimately able to avoid de-energizing the Birchim circuit during this event.

Strengths:

Operations:

- There were no injuries to the public or SCE personnel.
- There were no ignitions caused by SCE equipment.
- Pre-patrols on potentially impacted circuits were performed and hardware damage was able to be repaired prior to the period of concern.
- Field resources were able to be re-located to patrol additional sections of circuits and the narrow scope of this event allowed for added flexibility.
- The Rules of engagement were visible for the team to review/execute

Technology:

- iPEMS/CDP worked well and the Planning section was able to quickly extract data for CalOES decks and forms.
- The use of new machine models enabled Weather Services to isolate circuits in scope for minimal customer impacts

Communication:

- The CDP functioned well and was able to provide broad situational awareness enabling improved cross functional communication.

Other:

- The 2022.6.17 PSPS activation provided an excellent opportunity for surge IMT team members to complete re-qualification in a real time activation.
- This incident provided the IMT with the opportunity to validate the CDP use cases in a small real-world activation.

Areas for improvement:

Operations:

- One weather station was not producing 10-minute reads in iPEMS and it was necessary to switch to use of the Western Weather dashboard for weather station information. This information was used at 30 second intervals instead of 10-minute intervals for weather reads to make potential de-energization decisions.
- The IMT experienced delays preparing the in-event risk calculator output during this event

Technology:

- Not all PSPS IMT Surge Team members have experience with the new Centralized Data Platform
- The Centralized Data Platform was not able to execute LNO event all-clear notifications.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON® An EDISON INTERNATIONAL® Company	**Business Resiliency After Action Report**		
Event Name	Event - 06.17.2022 **PSPS Activation**	**Event Date**	06.15.22 – 06.17.22
Event Type	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Lessons Learned/Corrective Actions Table

#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Date
1	High	One weather station was not producing 10-minute reads in iPEMS and it was necessary to switch to use of the Western Weather dashboard for weather station information. This information was used at 30 second intervals instead of 10-minute intervals for weather reads to monitor wind speed conditions.	Work with IT to evaluate and resolve the cause of the weather station delay. Conduct Joint IOU benchmarking on benefits of more frequent weather station reads for situational awareness awareness. Partner with PSPS Operations, Meterology and others to assess potential benefits to using more frequent weather station reads for decision making.	Technology	"employee name removed"	9/30/2022
2	High	IMT experienced delays preparing the in-event risk calculator output during this event	Automate the in event risk calculation process and provide refresher training to impacted IMT roles.	Technology (Palantir)	"employee name removed"	9/30/2022
3	High	The Centralized Data Platform was not able to execute LNO event all-clear notifications.	Determine why CDP was not able to execute all-clear notifications and make necessary corrections.	Technology (Palantir)	"employee name removed"	7/30/2022

4	High	Not all PSPS IMT Surge Team members have experience with the new Centralized Data Platform.	Perform additional CDP training for impacted PSPS IMT Surge Members.	Technology (Palantir)	"employee name removed"	9/30/22

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Business Resiliency After Action Report

Event/Exercise Name	Event - 07.22.2022 **PSPS Incident**	**Activation Dates**	07.22.22 – 07.23.22
Type / Category	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario:

At approximately 7 am on July 22nd, SCE began observing rapidly escalating wind speeds, decreasing humidity levels, and high Fire Potential Index (FPI) values in isolated portions of Kern and Los Angeles counties and made the decision to de-energize portions of the Tejon circuit at 8:13am to ensure public safety. Although SCE was aware of the potential for elevated fire weather prior to that morning, weather models were predicting a low probability (less than 25%) of meeting or exceeding PSPS criteria and below SCE's current threshold for activation of the Dedicated IMT. Therefore, SCE did not activate its Dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) until the first de-energization on July 22nd. SCE activated its Emergency Operations Center at approximately 9am on July 22 nd to manage this event and de-energized additional customers on the Tejon circuit at 10:55am and on the Kinsey circuit at 11:26am in response to rapidly escalating fire weather conditions. SCE was able to reduce customer impacts through mitigation as detailed in Section 10 and ultimately de-energized 209 customers on two circuits in Kern and Los Angeles counties on July 22nd through 23rd.

During this event, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts consulted the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)2 for forecast alignment, and the GACC's published forecast was aligned on elevated fire weather potential for Kern and Los Angeles counties. In addition, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag Warnings on the morning of July 22nd, which stayed in effect through 6 am on July 23rd for Southern California, including those portions of Kern and Los Angeles counties where SCE was observing elevated fire weather conditions and had de-energized customers.

On the morning of Saturday, July 23rd, weather conditions began to improve in some areas and SCE was able to restore portions of both the Tejon and Kinsey circuits. However, actual fire weather conditions continued to be observed in de-energized areas, and SCE meteorologists extended the period of concern from 9am to 12pm that morning. As elevated fire weather conditions continued to abate over the course of the

day on July 23rd, SCE was able to patrol circuits and re-energize customers, with all customers restored by 3:06 pm on July 23rd.

Due to the rapidly escalating fire weather conditions that had not been forecasted in advance, SCE was unable to provide all pre-event notifications to some public safety partners, critical infrastructure, or customers prior to de-energization on the Tejon circuit. SCE did provide required in-event notifications to customers at de-energization initiation, before re-energization, and after completion of restoration. SCE also inadvertently notified five customers in Ventura County that were out of scope for this event due to incorrect mapping of these customers to circuits.

Strengths:

1. There were no ignitions, safety concerns, or injuries during this PSPS event
2. Weather Services was able to successfully overcome the weather station reporting outage by utilizing live field observers with handheld kestrels to accurately report out on live field conditions to inform re-energization decisions.
3. In the absence of automation during this event there were no delays in delivering notifications. Once the notifications were produced and transmitted, customers received the notifications within 5 mins.
4. All required notifications were sent, with the exception of 27 customers who were either not enrolled for PSPS notifications or who have not provided contact information

Areas for improvement:

1. SCE was not able to send pre-event notifications for this event due to sudden onset of unexpected weather conditions
2. Some de-energized customers could not be notified during this event because they were not enrolled in PSPS notifications
3. Some de-energized customers could not be notified because they did not have validated contact information on file.
4. The Public Safety Partner Portal was not immediately available for situational awareness at the beginning of this PSPS event.
5. Circuit to customer mapping errors were found in SCE's source system databases.
6. Approximately 50% of all Satellite-based weather stations stopped receiving updated weather reads.

Lessons Learned/Corrective Actions Table

#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Due Date
1	High	The PSPS IMT was not activated because weather models 12 hours ahead of this event showed a relatively low probability (less than 25%) of reaching PSPS criteria.	SCE will examine current protocols for activating the PSPS IMT for marginal weather conditions to determine if changes to activation criteria should be made.	Operations	"employee name removed"	10/31/22
2	High	Some customers in High Fire Risk Areas have not enrolled in or opted out of SCE's PSPS alerts. As a result, they could not be notified during this event.	SCE is in the process of auto-enrolling all customers that live in the High Fire Risk Area not currently enrolled to receive PSPS alerts. In October, SCE will also discontinue the customer opt-out feature for PSPS alerts.	Notifications	"employee name removed"	10/31/22
3	High	Some customers in High Fire Risk Areas have not provided validated contact information to SCE. As result, they could not be notified during this event.	SCE is in the process of enhanced outreach to these customers to confirm their contact information and enroll them in PSPS notifications.	Notifications	"employee name removed"	10/31/22
4	High	There is an inherent lag between PSPS activation and when in-event management and	To the extent possible, SCE is evaluating options to pre-stage event management and situational	Notifications	"employee name removed"	10/31/22

#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Due Date
		situational awareness tools are available for use on the Portal. This lag translated to delays in the availability of event specific information on the Portal during this PSPS event.	awareness tools when marginal (low probability) fire weather conditions are expected to reduce lag time for establishing situational awareness during events.			
5	High	Source data discrepancies (circuit to customer mapping) resulted in erroneous notifications to 5 customers in Ventura County that were not in scope.	SCE has launched an ongoing effort to identify and proactively correct these types of errors on circuits that could be subject to PSPS.	Notifications	"employee name removed"	10/31/22
6	High	There was a satellite network failure that impacted some weather stations being used to monitor real time fire weather conditions and guide reenergization decisions. The team was able to place live field observers in the field to support re-energization decision-making.	SCE is in the process of converting select weather stations to both cellular and satellite coverage to mitigate these issues and has established an escalation process with the vendor for quick resolution of issues.	Operations	"employee name removed"	10/31/22

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Business Resiliency After Action Report

Event/Exercise Name	Event 2022.09.09 PSPS IMT Activation	Activation Dates	09.07.22 – 09.09.22
Type / Category	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario:

On September 7th, SCE's meteorologists identified the potential for fire weather conditions in portions of Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, Orange, Los Angeles, and Kern Counties due to elevated fire weather conditions associated with incoming Tropical Storm Kay off the pacific coast. While the incoming moisture associated with the Tropical Storm was forecasted to alleviate fire weather concerns beginning early Saturday morning, there were still elevated fire weather concerns ahead of that moisture as the weather system moved through for portions of the SCE territory beginning on the morning of September 9th. During this high threat event, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, Orange, and Los Angeles Counties had a forecasted Period of Concern from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm on September 9th and Kern County had a forecasted Period of Concern from 6:00 am September 9th to 9:00 am on September 10th.

Given this forecast, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts consulted the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)[1] for forecast alignment to evaluate potential fire weather impacts. During this communication, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast of elevated fire weather. In addition, the National Weather Service issued high wind warnings for Riverside and San Bernardino Counties, as well as excessive heat warnings for Fresno, Los Angeles, Inyo, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara, Tulare, and Ventura Counties. Flood watches were in effect for Inyo, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura Counties on September 8th which stayed in effect through the afternoon of September 9th.

In response to this forecasted fire weather, SCE remotely activated its PSPS dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) to the Emergency Operations Center on September 7th at 2:30 pm to manage this event. Ultimately, precipitation from Tropical Storm Kay alleviated fire weather conditions and SCE meteorologists were able to shorten the Period of Concern based on actual observed weather conditions from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm to 6:00 am to 3:00 pm on September 9th for Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, Orange, and Los Angeles Counties. The Period of Concern for Kern County was also shortened from 6:00 am to 9:00 am on September 10th, to 6:00 am to 7:00 pm on September 9th. SCE did not de-energize any customers during this high threat event.

[1] The GACC is the physical location of an interagency, regional operation center for the effective coordination, mobilization, and demobilization of federal state and local wildland fire agencies through logistical coordination of resources throughout the geographic area, as well as with other geographic areas.

During this event, SCE inadvertently notified 7 customers in Tulare County that were out of scope due to incorrect mapping of these customers to circuits. See also Section 5 (1-7): Notifications for additional details related to notifications during this event.

Strengths:

1. There were no ignitions, safety concerns, or injuries during this PSPS event
2. During this high threat event SCE did not have to de-energize any customers

Areas for improvement:

1. Circuit to customer mapping errors exist in SCE's source system databases.
2. Some customers could not be notified during this event because they were not enrolled or have opted out of SCE's PSPS alerts.
3. Some customers could not be notified because they did not have validated contact information on file.

Corrective Actions Table						
	Lessons Learned					
#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Date
1	High	Source data discrepancies resulted in an erroneous county being reported externally (Tulare)	SCE continues its efforts to identify and proactively correct these types of data errors on circuits that could be subject to PSPS.	Operations	"employee name removed"	Dec 30, 2022
2	High	Some customers in High Fire Risk Areas have not enrolled in or opted out of SCE's PSPS alerts. As a result, they could not be notified during this event.	SCE is in the process of auto-enrolling all customers that live in the High Fire Risk Areas but are not currently enrolled to ensure they receive PSPS alerts. In December 2022, SCE will also discontinue the customer opt-out feature for PSPS alerts and begin auto-enrolling customers during account sign-up	Notifications	"employee name removed"	Dec 30, 2022
3	High	Some customers in High Fire Risk Areas have not provided validated contact information to SCE. As result, they could not be notified during this event.	SCE is in the process of enhanced outreach to these customers to confirm their contact information and enroll them in PSPS notifications.	Notifications	"employee name removed"	Nov 30, 2022

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Business Resiliency After Action Report

Event Name	2022.10.22 SCE PSPS Event	Activation Dates	10.22.22 – 10.24.22
Type / Category	PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions		

Activation Summary, Scenario:

This high-threat event began when SCE remotely activated its Emergency Operations Center on October 19th at 12:00 pm in response to a weather system that was forecasted to move across the SCE service territory from October 22nd through October 24th, 2022, impacting Inyo, Mono and Tuolumne Counties in the first phase of the event, and portions of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura Counties in the second phase of the event. On October 19th, SCE's meteorologists initially identified the potential for fire weather conditions in localized portions of Inyo, Mono and Tuolumne Counties in the Eastern Sierra due to gusty downslope winds, low relative humidity, and dry fuels, with the potential for additional impacts later in the week in the Southern California mountains and valleys as the weather system moved through the SCE service territory. On October 22nd, SCE's meteorologists confirmed these additional fire weather conditions for Sunday October 23rd in portions of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura Counties due to gusty Santa Ana winds and dry conditions from the same weather system as it moved through the southern portion of the SCE service territory. During this event, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts maintained close communication with the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)[1] to evaluate the potential fire weather impacts to multiple circuits. During this communication, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast of elevated fire weather for the two phases of this high threat event.

In response to this forecasted fire weather, SCE activated its PSPS dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) on October 19th at 12:00 pm to manage this event. Ultimately, fire weather conditions did not materialize during either phase of this high threat event and SCE meteorologists ended the PSPS event earlier than anticipated at 3:00 pm on October 24th based on actual observed weather conditions. As such, no circuits or customers were ultimately de-energized.

[1] The GACC is the physical location of an interagency, regional operation center for the effective coordination, mobilization, and demobilization of federal state and local wildland fire agencies through logistical coordination of resources throughout the geographic area, as well as with other geographic areas.

Strengths:

1. There were no ignitions, safety concerns, or injuries resulting from this PSPS event
2. There was solid collaboration, coordination and communication between all PSPS IMT positions.
3. This was the very first event where the Customer Service Branch assumed responsibility for local government notifications and the transition went well.

Areas for improvement:

1. Core event metrics were inconsistent between individual CDP uses cases and core applications (e.g. CDP, sce.com and the public safety partner portal. Additionally, some notification actions required manual intervention and were therefore delayed.
2. Lack of detailed generator connection procedures resulted in delays in installing generators to support two Community Resiliency Zones (CRZs).
3. Manual intervention was necessary to produce in-event risk calculator results for sub-transmission circuits.

	Corrective Actions Table					
#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Date
1	High	Core event metrics were inconsistent between individual CDP uses cases and core applications (e.g. CDP, sce.com and the public safety partner portal, which delayed updates of external briefing materials and inquiries from state agency staff. Additionally, some notification actions required manual intervention and were therefore delayed.	See attachment 'A' for a detailed description of each issue and the corresponding corrective action and timeline for addressing each identified gap. **Attachment A:** 2022 CDP Tracker	CDP	"employee name removed"	Q1
2	High	SCE deployed mobile generators to predetermined Resiliency Zones in two communities during this event. Lack of detailed generator connection procedures resulted in delays in installing generators to support two Community Resiliency Zones (CRZs).	Develop generator connection procedures with equipment specifications for applicable CRZ/CRC locations. Ensure appropriate environmental permitting is in place for each location. Provide connection procedure and generator permit (if applicable) to TSD and responsible District Manager.	Customer Outreach and Engagement	"employee name removed"	Q1

3	High	Manual intervention was necessary to produce in-event risk calculator results for sub-transmission circuits, which resulted in delays in populating in-event risk calculation output.	Modify in-event risk calculator to account for sub-transmission circuit impacts and make necessary updates to the Post Event Report narrative to reflect these enhancements.	Event Mgmt	"employee name removed"	Q1

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Business Resiliency After Action Report

Event	Event - 11.18.2022 PSPS IMT Event	Activation Dates	11.16. 22 – 11.20.22
Type	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario:

On November 16, 2022 SCE's meteorologists identified the potential for dangerous fire weather conditions starting on Wednesday, November 19, 2022 in northern portions of Los Angeles and Ventura counties. Given this forecast, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts consulted the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) for forecast alignment to evaluate potential fire weather impacts. During this communication, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast of elevated fire weather.

In response to this forecasted fire weather, SCE activated its PSPS dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) on Wednesday, November 16th at 2:00 pm to manage this event. On November 16th, SCE began sending advance notifications of potential PSPS to Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Infrastructure customers, and other customers in scope. During the Period of Concern for this event, due to rapidly escalating wind conditions and elevated FPI levels, SCE had to de-energize customers on two circuits in Ventura County that were not originally in scope for this event. As a result, a majority of customers impacted during this event did not receive all advance notifications of de-energization. Ultimately, SCE de-energized 5,373 customers in Los Angeles and Ventura counties during the Period of Concern based on observed fire weather conditions. This PSPS event concluded on November 20, 2022 when the last of the de-energized customers were restored by 9:55 am.

Strengths:

1. There were no ignitions, staff safety concerns, or injuries resulting from this PSPS event
2. The PSPS IMT maintained effective communications and collaboration between the various IMT sections.

Areas for improvement:

1. GIS map provided in external briefing decks did not clearly delineate de-energized area vs. monitored area. De-energized area layer was hidden under the monitored area.
2. There was a delay between e-mail sent to the CPUC and data updates on SCE's Public Safety Partner Portal.
3. Data inconsistencies between UC6, SCE.com and REST service resulted in delays in populating external briefings materials and notifications to the CSWC and the CPUC.

Corrective Actions Table						
	Lessons Learned					
#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Date
1	High	GIS map layering on external briefing decks was not clear, resulting in confusion with external agency partners.	GIS layer sequence will be updated to make de-energized areas stand out above the monitored areas for additional clarity.	GIS	"employee name removed"	Q2
2	High	External alerts to some Public Safety Partners suggested updated data was available on the Public Safety Partner Portal when it had not yet been posted, resulting in confusion with external agency partners	Update alert release to coincide with data being posted on external platforms such as the Public Safety Partner Portal, and/or indicate potential for delay in manual e-mails sent to CPUC.	Technology	"employee name removed"	Q2
3	High	Data inconsistencies between UC6, SCE.com and REST service resulted in delays in populating external briefings materials and notifications to the CSWC and the CPUC.	See attachment 'A' for a detailed description of each issue and the corresponding corrective action and timeline for addressing each identified gap. **Attachment A:** 2022 CDP Tracker	Operations	"employee name removed"	Q2

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Business Resiliency After Action Report

Event Name	11.24.2022 SCE PSPS EVENT	Activation Dates	11.22.22 – 11.25.22
Type	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario:

On November 21, 2022 SCE's meteorologists identified the potential for dangerous fire weather conditions due to Santa Ana winds and low fuel moisture levels beginning on Thursday, November 24, 2022 in portions of Los Angeles and Ventura counties. Given this forecast, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts consulted the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) for forecast alignment to evaluate potential fire weather impacts. During this consultation, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast of elevated fire weather for both Los Angeles and Ventura counties. The National Weather Service also issued Red Flag and High Wind Warnings for portions of Los Angeles and Ventura counties for the same time period.

In response to this forecasted fire weather, SCE activated its PSPS dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) on Tuesday, November 21st at 12 pm to manage this event and began sending advance notifications of potential PSPS to Public Safety Partners, Critical Facilities and Infrastructure customers, and other customers in scope. On November 23rd, SCE's meteorologists identified additional fire weather concerns for Riverside County, and the National Weather Service (NWS) issued an additional Wind Advisory for that area. Ultimately, SCE de-energized 10,828 customers in Los Angeles, Riverside and Ventura counties on November 24th during the Period of Concern based on observed fire weather conditions. This PSPS event concluded on November 25th at 12:23 am when all but one de-energized customer in scope was restored.[1]

Because this PSPS event was forecast to potentially impact customers over the Thanksgiving holiday, SCE mobilized all available resources to provide enhanced customer support. Initial customer notifications were sent in advance of the normal 24-48-hour timeframe to ensure customers had awareness of the potential for de-energization as far in advance as possible. SCE also worked in partnership with the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) and the California Grocers Association to secure supermarket gift cards and vouchers for de-energized customers that were distributed at SCE's Customer Care locations on Thanksgiving Day.

Strengths:

1. There were no ignitions, staff safety concerns, or injuries resulting from this PSPS event.
2. Strategic pre-positioning of additional assets helped reduce outage duration – all power restored by midnight.
3. The installation of two (2) new weather stations between 11/18 and 11/24 helped to better inform re-energization decisions in locations with sparse real-time situational awareness data.
4. Thorough resource planning mitigated typical holiday staffing shortages.
5. Ops completed 13 load rolls involving 14 circuits, provisionally mitigating up to 14,451 customers.

Areas for improvement:

1. Portions of the Aviator circuit were restored before imminent restoration notices could be sent
2. Cancellation notices for portions of some circuits were not sent within two hours of the decision to cancel or remove those segments from scope
3. One customer on Aviator circuit was inadvertently not restored within 24 hours
4. PSPS notifications were sent to non-HFRA customers in error
5. The process to acquire and distribute gift cards was cumbersome
6. Logistics Unit experienced some challenges with on time departure of supplies and logistics resources resulting in delays
7. The PSPS IMT currently conducts four operational briefing calls per day during activations and, in some cases, our partners attend multiple calls. There may be opportunities to amplify and optimize engagement with public safety partners while reducing possible redundancy.

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Corrective Actions Table

#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Date
1	High	1,611 customers and 1 Public Safety Partner could not be notified before being restored due to the circuit being re-energized faster than expected and before notifications could be sent.	Evaluate process for sending imminent restoration notifications to identify possible opportunities to reduce end-to-end processing time.	Notifications	"employee name removed"	End Q2
2	High	2,807 were not sent cancellation notifications within two hours of the decision to cancel or remove from scope due to the complexity of segment-level decision making intended to minimize customer impacts.	Evaluate process for sending cancellation notices to customers on circuit segments removed from scope to reduce end-to-end processing time in situations where segment-level (and sub-segment level) decision making is necessary to minimize customer impacts.	Notifications	"employee name removed"	End Q2
3	High	One commercial customer on the Aviator circuit was not restored until November 27th due to an isolation device being inadvertently left open.	A cause evaluation is underway that will identify the root cause(s) of the switching error, and corrective action(s) will be implemented to help prevent this from occurring in the future.	Notifications	"employee name removed"	End Q2
4	High	504 customers on a non-HFRA circuit and not in scope for de-energization received Prepare to Restore notices in error. This was due to a process error related to the way the outage code was	A cause evaluation is underway that will identify the root cause(s) of the notification error, and corrective action(s) will be	Notifications	"employee name removed"	End Q2

		interpreted. This circuit was not de-energized.	implemented to help prevent this from occurring in the future.			
5	High	The process to acquire and distribute gift cards was cumbersome, resulting in inefficiencies and delays in distributing gift cards to our customers.	Evaluate a more efficient options for gift cards distribution.	Procedure	"employee name removed"	End Q2
6	High	Logistics Unit experienced some challenges with on time departure of supplies and logistics resources resulting in delays.	Scale up Logistic unit based on size of event to ensure adequate support for logistical related items including but not limited to CRC/CCV's and supplies needed to support locations.	Procedure	"employee name removed"	End Q2
7	Med	The PSPS IMT currently conducts four operational briefing calls per day during activations and, in some cases, our partners attend multiple calls, resulting in possible inefficiencies.	There may be opportunities to amplify and optimize engagement with public safety partners while reducing possible redundancy.	Planning	"employee name removed"	End Q2

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2022 PSPS Functional Exercise
After Action Report / Improvement Plan
DATE: 06.10.2022

Name	**PSPS - IMT Functional Exercise**	**Activation Dates**	**05.16.22 - 05.19.22**
Type / Category	**PSPS FSE – Santa Ana Elevated Weather Event/PSPS Threshold Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario:

Exercise Summary:

The operations based functional exercise series provided a forum for participants to enhance their knowledge, understanding, and ability to implement appropriate actions to mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover from a PSPS event. The seven-hour exercise was conducted four times between May 16 to May 19, 2022 and was designed to allow participants to exercise Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) de-energization, re-energization, planning and monitoring, delivery of notifications and other pertinent activities as outlined in existing company PSPS protocols.

The exercise included dedicated PSPS IMT members, rostered surge IMT personnel, and external entities and stakeholders. In total more than 500 participants, including support staff and Simulation Cell personnel, participated over the four days. The scenario used in the exercises was designed to help prepare SCE personnel to respond to PSPS events and to fulfill California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) regulatory requirements. The following capabilities were assessed as part of these exercises: Operational Coordination, Public Information and Warning, Public Safety Partner Coordination, and Community Resilience.

Scenario:

All four exercises were conducted using the following scenario:

In the days leading up to Start of Exercise (StartEx), SCE Meteorology has forecast a Santa Ana wind event that is projected to meet or exceed PSPS threshold levels across Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino Counties. Santa Ana conditions are expected to bring High Fire Danger to Southern CA Mountain areas, and Red Flag Warnings, Wind Advisories, and Fire Weather Watches are active in the impacted areas within SCE service territory.

The PSPS Incident Management Team (IMT) is activated, and SCE begins to send out notifications to impacted customers and public safety partners and set up customer care resources in these areas. Operations Section has been coordinating with Meteorology to identify the impacted circuits and subsequently informs the Customer Care Branch. The PSPS IMT continues to assess abnormal conditions and downstream impacts for potentially affected circuits to determine actions as the event progresses.

On the morning of StartEx, SCE Weather services validates the weather models as consistent, and predictions continue to indicate Elevated or Extreme Fire Weather conditions. At approximately E+2 hours, new forecasts indicate weather conditions exceeding PSPS thresholds in Santa Barbara County to occur at E+48 hours, triggering planning phases 2A-

2B to be initiated. By this point, weather conditions for the first PSPS area have dropped below the PSPS threshold and de-energizations are already underway.

Strengths:

- **Objective 1: Operational Coordination**
    - Player application of newer operational tools, specifically iPEMS and the Centralized Data Platform (CDP), improved the timeliness of decision making and information sharing
    - Use of iPEMS for determining nuanced circuit-by-circuit de-energizations heightened IMT-wide awareness and precision
    - Command staff demonstrated heightened situational awareness when factoring customer impacts and mitigation strategy
- **Objective 2: Public Information and Warning**
    - External Engagement players (PIOs, LNOs, AREPs, Customer Care) disseminated event information effectively, in a timely manner, and consistent with PSPS protocol expectations
- **Objective 3: Public Safety Partner Coordination**
    - AFN Supervisor players were proactive in coordinating with external partners, including by forwarding requests and information appropriately
- **Objective 4: Community Resilience**
    - Command Staff efficiently coordinated with Logistics and Customer Care personnel to discuss prioritization of restoration efforts for the most at-risk populations (Critical Care, Medical Baseline, Self-Certified, and Public Safety Partners)
    - Ventura Healthcare Coalition's participation in the exercise and subsequent coordination with the IMT promoted and strengthened SCE's partnership in furthering community resiliency efforts, particularly within the healthcare sector.

Areas for improvement:

- **Objective 1: Operational Coordination**
    - Surge team members were uncomfortable accessing and obtaining information from CDP and need further instruction/practice on the process
    - Each county had to be pulled separately in the CDP, creating delays in obtaining and synchronizing data between CDP, iPEMS, and SCE.com information
    - The RESL was unable obtain an accurate list of FSRs

- **Objective 2: Public Information and Warning**

  Further define the actions around coordinating with the Customer Contact Center to ensure they can tailor their messaging to customers who call into the call center.

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Lessons Learned/Corrective Actions Table

#	Exercise Objective	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Capability	Owner	Date
1	Operational Coordination	Medium	Some PSPS Surge Team members need additional proficiency in new CDP.	1. Will rely on dedicated PSPS IMT and fully trained surge team members to oversee PSPS execution using Foundry until all IMT members are qualified 2. Providing additional Surge team inclusion in drills; Enhancing position-specific training to include Foundry modules when applicable	Technology	"employee name removed"	12/30/22
2	Operational Coordination	High	CDP does not currently separate event metric data at the county level for in-event reporting and external engagement, resulting in manual and time-intensive data processing.	Enhance the CDP application to allow users to query situational awareness data by county	Technology	"employee name removed"	09/30/22
3	Operational Coordination	High	The Customer Contact Center needs situational awareness during PSPS events to ensure they can	The task of communicating and coordinating with the Customer Call Center needs to be codified in the Internal	Communications	"employee name removed"	09/30/22

#	Exercise Objective	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Capability	Owner	Date
			tailor their messaging to customers who call into the call center.	Engagement Specialist position description.			
4	Operational Coordination	High	The RESL was not able to obtain a fully accurate list of FSRs when the Customer Care Branch Director initially made the request to deploy door-knocks.	The Customer Care Branch Director needs to manage the end-to-end process for secondary verification. The RESL is only responsible for sending out the initial request to the FSR Supervisor for door knock request by district. This distinction needs to be codified within a procedure.	Communication	"employee name removed"	09/30/22

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Business Resiliency After Action Report

Event/Exercise Name	**Event - 08.03.2022 PSPS Drill**	**Drill Dates**	**08.03.22 – 08.09.22**
Type / Category	**PSPS Drill - Pressure Testing the Central Data Platform**		

Activation Summary, Scenario:

The purpose of this PSPS Drill was to stress test of the PSPS Central Data Platform (CDP) and Integrated PSPS Event Management System (iPEMS) was conducted with the following objectives:

- Test end-user proficiency in executing PSPS workflows, with focus on dispatching required notifications
- Test post-event reporting automation (still pending) by using CDP to populate applicable data tables in post-event reporting template (still pending)*
- Complex scenario (similar to November 2021) including 245 circuits and over 300,000 customers
- Included fringe customer impacts, emergent weather conditions resulting in incremental circuit impacts during period of concern and simultaneous overlapping de-energization and re-energization activity

Strengths:

- CDP automation significantly improved notification performance and is scalable for large events
- CDP has assisted in identification of underlying data issues

Areas for improvement:

- CDP highlighted source data discrepancies with the potential to result in notification failures, errors in external facing metrics and internal situational awareness inconsistencies across the IMT
- Post event reporting logic does not currently account for new missed notification metrics now available via CDP (e.g. opt-out, missing contact info, etc.)
- Exercise highlighted a continued need to increase recurring position specific training for both core CDP users and surge team members to maintain precision
- Manual intervention is still required to address inconsistencies in customer notification metrics throughout various sections of post-event report

- Post-event report Table 1 Event Summary, Table 5b Circuits De-Energized, and Table 9 Notification Failures are pending logic development and have not been fully automated in CDP

	Lessons Learned/Corrective Actions					
#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Date
1	High	Circuit to customer mapping across source system databases continues to be one of the primary challenges Source data discrepancies will result in errors and discrepancies in notifications, situational awareness data (sce.com, public safety partner portal, CalOES PSPS notification form), and overall situational awareness across the IMT	Partnering with EAD to developing a proposal to identify and remediate circuit to customer mapping discrepancies for HFRA circuits	Data	"employee name removed"	08/31/22
2	High	A subset of HFRA customers are not enrolled (or have opted out) of SCE's PSPS alerts Customer who are not enrolled in PSPS alerts will not receive notifications during events	The PSPS Data and Automation team has already auto-enrolled ~220K HFRA customers in PSPS alerts and will complete remediation for the remaining ~37K customers by 8/30/2022 PSPS data and automation team will continue to monitor un-enrollments and re-enroll customers on a recurring basis until "opt out" feature is disabled In October 2022, the customer opt-out feature for emergency alerts will be disabled	Data	"employee name removed"	08/31/22

3	High	Some customers in High Fire Risk Areas have not provided validated contact information to SCE. As result, they would not be notified during a real event ~5-6K customers have no contact information available and will require additional remediation to resolve if a corresponding BP level contact is not available.	BCD Operations will develop a proposal for accelerating remediation of missing contact information	Data	"employee name removed"	08/31/22
4	High	CDP did not correctly adjust customer and public safety partner metrics when circuits were partially restored due to improving conditions. The circuits were still under period of concern, but partial restored customer counts were not updated in the total customer counts. In a real event, this would result in errors on sce.com, the public safety partner portal and external engagement metrics (CalOES notification form and external briefing materials)	Discrepancy has been escalated to Palantir for priority remediation	Technology	"employee name removed"	08/31/22
5	High	Core CDP users require additional position specific training on CDP workflows to develop expert proficiency with the application PSPS surge team members who do not	Consult with OCM/Training experts to refine existing CDP training strategy to include development and routine maintenance of more formal position specific curriculum, job aids, assessments, etc.	People	"employee name removed"	10/01/22

		perform critical tasks using CDP require additional CDP training to achieve baseline proficiency with situational awareness dashboard	Leverage Dedicated PSPS IMT leads to deliver focused CDP training to Dedicated PSPS IMT and impacted surge team members by 10/1/2022			

ATTACHMENT

Forecasted Fire Weather

PSPS Events 04.12.21

After-Action Report

INCIDENT SNAPSHOT

Name:	**Forecasted Fire Weather**	Event Dates:	**04/12/2021**
Type:	**Real World Event**		
Category:	**Potential Public Safety Power Shut-Off**		
Incident Summary:			
The Event Timeline is captured in the SCE PSPS Post Event Reporting document on SCE portal.			

PURPOSE

This After-Action Report (AAR) captures key Southern California Edison (SCE) activities during the PSPS activations that occurred 4.12.2021 to 4.13.2021. The information provided in this report is intended to recognize areas of success and strengths, which resulted in improving safety, time or cost efficiencies, better processes, or any other element of SCE activities. The importance of sharing these strengths is to ensure that as a company we recognize our accomplishments, and work to maximize the potential from best practices by replicating them when appropriate. The AAR also identifies areas for improvement, meaning specific observations made where a process, protocol, document, or other response element needs to be further reviewed and/or improved upon.

BACKGROUND

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Southern California Edison (SCE) is required to submit reports related to notifications to the SED in anticipation of the event. This report was submitted and verified by an Officer of SCE in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Based on this report, documentation submitted to the Commission is codified in the April 27, 2021 SCE PSPS Post Event Report document and maintained on the SCE portal site at: www.sce.com/wildfire under Reports to the PUC.

SCOPE

The strengths and areas for improvement discussed in this AAR are limited in scope to SCE activities conducted by the PSPS Incident Management Team.

METHODOLOGY

This document incorporates feedback and observations documented throughout the incident, as well as input from incident management personnel collected during hot-wash meetings or surveys.

OBSERVATIONS

Over the course of the EOC activation, many observations were made about preparation and response efforts. The strengths and areas for improvement listed below do not include every observation made by personnel involved, rather they are major observations with enterprise-wide or cross-functional impacts.

Appendix A includes the full Corrective Action Plan for this after-action report. The Corrective Action Plan includes additional information unique to each corrective action, such as who the task is assigned to and anticipated completion dates. This information will be monitored and evaluated by the Business Resiliency Department. Note that the Corrective Action Plan does not necessarily incorporate all issues or identified areas for improvement; informal recommendations that do not have enterprise-wide implications or that do not require monitoring may be omitted.

Findings:

The following findings were noted throughout the activation:

- The current PSPS IMT meeting scheduling process has resulted in the exclusion of key stakeholders receiving timely meeting invites to attend the appropriate PSPS IMT meetings.

- The current process to request FSR's requires Customer Service to have the Distribution Tech Specs contact the FSR department to request resources. This process takes away CS focus from operational activities, resulting in a delay.

APPENDIX A: CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

Event Specific Details:

- Event Name(s): PSPS Incident 04/12/2021
- Event Type: Real world event
- Event Cause: Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions
- Primary Event Impact: Resource Planning and Notifications

#	Priority	Issue to be Resolved	Corrective Actions Required	Assigned To	Date Assigned	Target Date
1.	High	The current PSPS IMT meeting scheduling process has resulted in the exclusion of key stakeholders receiving timely meeting invites to attend the appropriate PSPS IMT meetings.	• Review all meeting attendee lists for potential gaps in existing process • Take steps to update to ensure all key stakeholders are added to the invite list. • Establish a process to update the invitee list in a regular cadence.	"employee name removed"	4/23	09.30.22
2.	High	The current process to request FSR's during emergency events requires Customer Service to have the Distribution Tech Specs contact the FSR department to request resources. This process takes away CS focus from operational activities, resulting in a delay for resources.	• Emergency Operations to create, codify and train an appropriate FSR scheduling process and assess the practicability of having the RESL include FSR's in their resource management plan.	"employee name removed"	4/23	09.30.22

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PSPS Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions

After Action Report / Improvement Plan
DATE: 06.13.2021

Name	PSPS 6.13.2021 IMT Activation	**Activation Dates**	06.13.21 - 06.16.21
Type / Category	**PSPS - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario

SCE initiated the high threat event in response to forecasted winds and elevated fire potential across Santa Barbara County initially forecasted for Monday afternoon 6/14 through Tuesday 6/15 and ultimately arriving Tuesday, 6/15, from 3pm to 9pm. These Sundowner winds were forecasted to be strongest from late Monday afternoon through early morning Tuesday, again returning into Wednesday evening.

Sustained winds during this time were forecasted to be 20-35 mph with gusts near 50 mph. The National Weather Service issued a Red Flag Warning, Wind Advisory, High Wind Warning and Excessive Heat Watch and Warning for Santa Barbara County, causing the potential for fire risk to be elevated across the coastal slopes of the Santa Ynez mountains. Ultimately, actual humidity levels were higher than originally forecast and wind conditions that would necessitate de-energization did not materialize during the period of concern. No circuits or customers were de-energized during this high threat event.

Observations:

Several new processes were introduced prior to the 6/13/2021 event in support of SCE's PSPS Action Plan. Some examples include the new Situational Awareness Notification System, External Stakeholder Briefing deck and the new CALOES IOU Notification Form. All PSPS IMT staff worked closely together to ensure successful execution of these new capabilities.

Strengths:

Please refer to Observations.

Areas for improvement:

- New CalOES State Executive Briefing deck introduced new data requirements that resulted in delays in populating information in a timely manner.

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Corrective Actions

	Area for Improvement	Recommended Solution	Owner	Resolution Date
1.	New CalOES State Executive Briefing deck introduced new complexities that resulted in delays in populating information in a timely manner	• Interim step to develop job aids and corresponding SLA's for manually populating deck to hold JIT with leads. • Add a Palantir use case to develop automation, where possible, to populate State Executive Briefing Deck.	"employee name removed"	09/01/2021

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PSPS Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions

After Action Report / Improvement Plan

DATE: 09.29.2021

Name	PSPS 9.29.2021 IMT Activation	**Activation Dates**	09.29.21 - 09.30.21
Type / Category	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario

On the afternoon of September 29th, SCE was alerted to the potential for fire weather in localized portions of the SCE service territory by our meteorologists. We were monitoring a potential mild Santa Ana wind event prior to this date and time, although in-house house weather models were consistently forecasting wind speeds below PSPS activation criteria. SCE's meteorology and fire science experts were in close communication with the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) and the National Weather Service lead up to the afternoon of 9/29/21, and both agencies indicated that they were not seeing the potential for prolonged elevated fire weather threat conditions associated with this event.

On the afternoon of 9/29/21, SCE's new machine learning model, which was trained using historical weather data from a weather station located on a localized portion of the Sand Canyon circuit. This indicated the potential increased wind speed intensity and indicated a strong probability of exceeding PSPS activation thresholds for the higher elevation areas on this circuit during the period of concern.

Given the low relative humidity and fuel moisture levels, there existed potential for a significant fire in the 10,000-acre range in that area during the period of concern. In response, SCE activated its PSPS Dedicated IMT on September 29th at 5:04pm. The period of concern for potential de-energization was 3:00am to 12:00pm on September 30th. SCE ultimately de-energized 9 customers on the Sand Canyon circuit in Los Angeles county at 06:00 am on September 30th. Service to all customers was restored on the same day at 15:51.

Strengths:

1. All PSPS IMT staff were engaged, communicated well, and acted with a strong sense of urgency to ensure successful execution of the PSPS activation process.

Areas for improvement:

1. De-energization may occur at either the circuit activation or de-energization threshold value, contingent on the rules of engagement. For this event, there was confusion on which value to use.

2. Only a portion of the Sand Canyon was forecast to reach PSPS criteria and subject to monitoring and notifications. The process for limiting notifications to the impacted customers and public safety partners was manual and inefficient.

3. The public safety partner portal and LNO notifications display customer count at the circuit level even when only a portion of a circuit is forecast to reach PSPS criteria.

4. Wind speeds increased abruptly minimizing the timeframe between the imminent de-energization and de-energization notice.

5. The IMT encountered technical challenges with the Public Safety Partner Portal that required escalation to informational technology management.

Corrective Actions:

	Area for Improvement	Recommended Solution	Owner	Resolution Date
1.	De-energization may occur at either the circuit activation or de-energization threshold value, contingent on the rules of engagement. For this event, there was confusion on which value to use	Rules of engagement instructions for weather thresholds must be further refined to provide clarity and specificity on which value to use	"employee name removed"	11/30/21
2.	Only a portion of the Sand Canyon was forecast to reach PSPS criteria and subject to monitoring and notifications. The process for limiting notifications to the impacted customers and public safety partners was manual and inefficient	Increase automation and/or refine processes to efficiently address situations where only a portion of a circuit is forecast to reach PSPS criteria and subject to monitoring and notifications due to grid hardening and/or isolated weather conditions	"employee name removed"	11/30/21
3.	The public safety partner portal and LNO notifications display customer count at the circuit level even when only a portion of a circuit is forecast to reach PSPS criteria	Enhance Public Safety Partner Portal and LNO notifications to report the actual number of customers in scope in instances where only a portion of a circuit is under consideration for de-energization or de-energized	"employee name removed"	11/30/21

4.	Wind speeds increased abruptly minimizing the timeframe between the imminent de-energization and de-energization notice	Assess wind speed thresholds for sending imminent notifications to provide a larger window of time between imminent de-energization and de-energization notifications to account for situations where wind speeds increase abruptly	"employee name removed"	12/30/21
5.	The IMT encountered technical challenges with the Public Safety Partner Portal that required escalation to informational technology management	Review existing IT and vendor support models for newly implemented technology enhancements and adjust where necessary to ensure Incident Management Team has access to 24/7 escalated support for critical applications (e.g., Public Safety Partner Portal)	"employee name removed"	11/30/21

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PSPS Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions

After Action Report / Improvement Plan
DATE: 10.08.2021

Name	PSPS 10.08.21 IMT Activation	**Activation Dates**	10.08.21 – 10.12.21
Type / Category	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario

On October 11th, SCE's meteorologists identified the potential for fire weather conditions in localized portions of Los Angeles and Ventura County. Given this potential, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts maintained close communication with the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) to evaluate the potential fire weather. During this communication, both agencies indicated agreement with SCE's forecast. In response to this, SCE activated its PSPS Dedicated IMT on October 8th at approximately 2:00pm to manage this event. SCE ultimately de-energized 40 customers on the Energy and Tuba circuits in Los Angeles and Ventura County during the period of concern on October 11th to October 12th. Service to all customers was restored on October 12th at 2:30pm.

Strengths:

SCE has instituted an engagement survey process to capture feedback from State and County public safety partners and critical infrastructure customers during PSPS events. SCE encourages these stakeholders to provide survey feedback in daily coordination calls and also emails links to the engagement survey once the event has concluded. Four participants completed SCE's engagement survey; of those four, all rated the engagement with SCE as positive.

Areas for improvement:

- Coordinating notifications for customers who are served by circuits that have shared ownership between two IOU's presented some complexities during this event.

- In some cases, customers may experience a momentary outage during PSPS events while manual switching actions are performed to minimize customer impact. Existing notification protocols may not fully address this nuanced scenario which could create confusion for these customers.

- In the recent October events, SCE triaged two escalated requests for support received from SCE's Consumer Affairs department. SCE identified an opportunity to collect after-hours contact(s) information from CBO partners to assist in identifying escalated support solutions.

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Corrective Actions

	Area for Improvement	Recommended Solution	Owner	Resolution Date
1.	Coordinating notifications for customers who are served by circuits that have shared ownership between two IOU's introduces complexities.	Coordinate with adjacent IOU's to optimize existing notification protocols for situations where PSPS actions occur on circuits with shared ownership between two IOU's.	"employee name removed"	May 31, 2022
2.	In some cases, customers may experience a momentary outage during PSPS events while manual switching actions are performed to minimize customer impact. Existing notification protocols may not fully address this nuanced scenario which could create confusion for these customers.	Review existing notification protocol to determine if notification protocol can be refined to better address scenarios where a customer is momentarily de-energized pending manual switching action to minimize customer impacts during PSPS events.	"employee name removed"	March 31, 2022
3.	SCE partners with Community Based Organizations (CBO's) during PSPS events to provide support for Medical Baseline customers (including Critical Care) who may be de-energized. In the recent October events, SCE triaged two escalated requests for support received from SCE's Consumer Affairs department. SCE identified an opportunity to collect after-hours contact(s) information from CBO partners to assist in identifying escalated support solutions.	Coordinate with CBO partners to identify after hour contact(s) for addressing escalated AFN requests during events. Develop a protocol to intake and triage requests received after hours into the IMT structure when the AFN liaison role is is not activated into a night shift.	"employee name removed"	March 31, 2022

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PSPS Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions

After Action Report / Improvement Plan
DATE: 10.13.2021 and 10.16.2021

Name	PSPS IMT Activation - Multiple	Activation Dates	10.13.21 – 10.15.21 10.16.21 – 10.18.21
Type / Category	PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions		

Activation Summary, Scenario

10.13.21 Activation Summary

On October 13th, 2021, SCE meteorologists identified the potential for fire weather conditions in localized portions of Los Angeles County. Locally gusty Santa Ana winds were expected to start in the early morning October 15th and continue through midday. On October 14th, SCE meteorologists identified additional areas of concern for fire weather in Riverside and Ventura counties. Peak winds were forecasted during the period of concern for these areas from 6 am to 3 pm on October 15th. Peak winds were also experienced outside of this period of concern in Los Angeles County on the evening of October 15th.

Given the potential for fire weather, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts maintained close communication with the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) to evaluate the developing weather conditions. During this communication, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast. SCE activated its PSPS Dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) on October 13th at approximately 12:00 pm to manage this event. There were initially 4,305 customers in scope for potential de-energization during the period of concern for this event. Leveraging real-time weather station data, switching playbooks, live field observers, and sectionalizing devices, SCE reduced the number of impacted customers and ultimately only proactively de-energized 67 customers during this event for portions of the Steel, Energy,2 and Sand Canyon circuits in Riverside and Los Angeles counties. SCE had to again de-energize the same portions of the Energy circuit outside of the period of concern on October 15th at 10:58 pm, due to observed rapidly escalating wind conditions. Service to all customers was restored on October 16th at 8:57 am

10.16.21 Activation Summary

This PSPS event began when SCE activated its Emergency Operations Center on October 16, 2021, at 8 am. SCE had been actively managing another ongoing PSPS event forecasted to be concluded on October 15th at 3 pm. During that event, SCE's meteorologists identified the additional potential for fire weather conditions in localized portions of Inyo County on the Birchim circuit and Mono County on the Tufa circuit beginning on October 17th with a final period of concern from 3 pm on October 17th to 9 am on October 18th.

Given this forecast, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts maintained close communication with the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)3 to evaluate the potential fire weather.

During this communication, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast of elevated fire weather. SCE activated its PSPS Dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) on October 17th at approximately 8 am to manage this event. The Tufa circuit, with only one customer in scope, was removed from scope prior to the period of concern for that circuit on October 17th, leaving only the Birchim circuit with 3 customers in scope for potential de-energization on one segment during the period of concern. Given observed rapidly escalating wind conditions close to de-energization thresholds during the period of concern, an additional segment of the Birchim circuit came into scope, and 405 customers on that segment were notified of the imminent potential for proactive de-energization. Leveraging observed real-time weather station data and information from live field observers monitoring prevailing environmental conditions, such as potential damage from wind gusts, airborne vegetation, or flying debris, SCE was ultimately able to avoid de-energizing any circuits during this event.

Strengths:

- SCE has instituted an engagement survey process to capture feedback from State and county public safety partners and critical infrastructure customers during PSPS events. SCE encourages these stakeholders to provide survey feedback in daily coordination calls and emails links to the engagement survey once the event has concluded.
    - **10.13 PSPS Event:** Five participants completed SCE's engagement survey for the 10.13 event; of those five, all rated the engagement with SCE as positive.
    - **10.16 PSPS Event:** Three participants completed SCE's engagement survey for the 10.16 event; of those three, all rated the engagement with SCE as positive.
- Internal collaboration and communication continue to be a strength for recent PSPS activations. It was noted the respective teams have demonstrated excellent follow up and have effectively utilized the tools and resources provided for a successful activation.

Areas for improvement:

- For smaller events, it may be more efficient to forego the Statewide Executive Briefing and communicate situational awareness updates via the PSPS notification form.
- To minimize false positive notifications for this event, in some instances, PSPS notifications were sent to customers and public safety partners only when the circuit or circuit segment was forecast to breach the PSPS activation AND de-energization threshold. This practice should be evaluated for consideration as an official protocol.

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Corrective Action:

	Area for Improvement	Recommended Solution	Owner	Resolution Date
1.	The current CalOES Standard Operating Guideline (SOG) requires a full daily Statewide Executive Briefing session irrespective of the number of circuits/customers in scope. For smaller events, it may be more efficient to forego the Statewide Executive Briefing and communicate situational awareness updates via the PSPS notification form.	Work with the CalOES California State Warning Center (CCWC) to discuss options and corresponding thresholds for determining when a Statewide Executive Briefing call is warranted.	"employee name removed"	March 21, 2022
2.	To minimize false positive notifications for this event, in some instances, PSPS notifications were sent to customers and public safety partners only when the circuit or circuit segment was forecast to breach the PSPS activation AND de-energization threshold. This practice should be evaluated for consideration as an official protocol.	Assess options for minimizing false positives by excluding customers from notification in instances where a circuit (or circuit segment) is forecast to meet or exceed the activation threshold but not the de-energization threshold.	"employee name removed"	May 31, 2022

ATTACHMENT

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON®
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PSPS Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions

After Action Report / Improvement Plan
DATE: 10.22.2021

Name	PSPS 10.22.21 IMT Activation	**Activation Dates**	10.22.21
Type / Category	**PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions**		

Activation Summary, Scenario

This PSPS event began when SCE activated its Emergency Operations Center on October 22nd, 2021, at 9 am. Before October 22nd, SCE's meteorologists were aware of potentially elevated fire weather for portions of Central and Southern California. However, in-house and external weather models were consistently forecasting relative humidity levels would remain high enough to prevent Fire Potential Index2 (FPI) ratings from reaching PSPS criteria in the SCE service territory. At approximately 8:30 am on October 22nd, SCE began observing rapidly escalating wind speeds, lower humidity levels and higher FPI values than forecast in portions of Mono County, which ultimately required the use of proactive de-energization. Given this observed fire weather, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts consulted the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC). 3 The GACC indicated they did not foresee prolonged elevated fire weather concerns but did agree with SCE's assessment of the potential for elevated fire weather in the local area. As observed, these fire weather conditions met SCE's established PSPS thresholds for proactive de-energization.

In response, SCE activated its PSPS Dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) on the morning of October 22nd at approximately 9 am to manage this event. SCE ultimately de-energized 112 customers on the Tufa circuit in Mono County during the period of concern at 9:26 am on October 22nd. After patrolling the circuit for damage (and remediating one identified instance of damage), service to 111 customers was restored on the same day at 4:29 pm. One remaining de-energized customer was not restored in accordance with a long-standing agreement with that customer to disconnect electric service during times of year when the customer's seasonal business is closed.

Strengths:

- SCE Weather Services quickly escalated the sudden onset of dangerous unexpected weather conditions. The Dedicated PSPS mobilized quickly to manage the de-energization event in accordance with the PSPS protocol.

Areas for improvement:

- Continue to refine weather and fuel forecasting capabilities consistent with identified WMP activities to minimize instances of sudden onset of unexpected weather conditions to the extent possible.

Corrective Actions

	Area for Improvement	Recommended Solution	Owner	Resolution Date
1.	Consistent with public/external weather forecasts, SCE's weather models forecasted FPI values below PSPS thresholds because relative humidity levels were expected to be higher than actual observed humidity levels in the areas of concern on the day of this event.	Continue to refine weather and fuel forecasting capabilities consistent with identified WMP activities to minimize instances of sudden onset of unexpected weather conditions to the extent possible.	"employee name removed"	12/31/2022

ATTACHMENT

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON®
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PSPS Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions

After Action Report / Improvement Plan
DATE: 11.18.2021

Name	PSPS 11.18.21 IMT Activation	Activation Dates	11.18.21 – 11.21.21
Type / Category	PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions		

Activation Summary, Scenario

This PSPS event began when SCE activated its virtual Emergency Operations Center on November 18, 2021, at 12:30 pm. SCE meteorologists had forecasted the potential for fire weather conditions in localized portions of Los Angeles and Ventura counties. Locally gusty Santa Ana winds were expected to start in the early morning November 21st and continue through early morning November 22nd.

On November 19th, SCE meteorologists identified additional areas of concern for fire weather in Ventura, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, Kern, and Orange counties. Peak winds were forecasted during the period of concern for these areas from 12 am to 9 pm on November 21st. Given the potential for fire weather, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts maintained close communication with the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) to evaluate the developing weather conditions. During this communication, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast. There were initially 125,996, customers in scope for potential de-energization during the period of concern for this event. Leveraging real-time weather station data, switching playbooks, live field observers, and sectionalizing devices, SCE reduced the number of impacted customers in scope and ultimately only proactively de-energized 5,235 customers during this event in portions of Ventura, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Los Angeles counties. Service to all customers was restored on November 22nd at1:45 pm.

Strengths:

1. SCE has instituted an engagement survey process to capture feedback from State and county public safety partners and critical infrastructure customers during PSPS events. SCE encourages these stakeholders to provide survey feedback in daily coordination calls and emails links to the engagement survey once the event has concluded.

    - One participant completed SCE's engagement survey for the 11.18 event; of which, the participant rated the engagement with SCE as positive.

Areas for improvement:

1. To minimize unnecessary notification of customers who will not be de-energized if their circuits do not meet de-energization criteria. However, those customers could potentially need to be de-energized with no prior notification if actual wind speed conditions in the field exceed forecasted values.

2. Analyze delays in processing updated weather forecasts and determining real-time circuits status and associated customer counts, which are required inputs for supporting in-event external reporting and briefing requirements.

Corrective Actions

	Area for Improvement	Recommended Solution	Owner	Resolution Date
1	To minimize potentially notifying customers who were not likely to be de-energized, SCE did not send pre-event notifications for covered conductor circuits unless the forecast was expected to meet or exceed the de-energization threshold.	SCE continues to assess options for striking the right balance between providing enough notice for customers to prepare for potential de-energizations with not unnecessarily notifying customers who are unlikely to be de-energized. These options include potentially adding a buffer to help account for forecast bias and minimize the need to de-energize customers with short or no notice.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022
2	Access to situational awareness data was delayed during this event, which in some cases resulted in inconsistent reporting to public safety partners during external briefings	As described in its Action Plan, SCE continues to work with Palantir to reduce processing time through automation of core PSPS processes ahead of 2022 PSPS events.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022

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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON®
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PSPS Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions

After Action Report / Improvement Plan
DATE: 11.24.2021

Name	PSPS 11.24.21 IMT Activation	Activation Dates	11.22.21 – 11.25.21
Type / Category	PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions		

Activation Summary, Scenario

SCE activated its Emergency Operations Center on November 22, 2021, at 2:15 pm after SCE's meteorologists became aware of the potential for elevated fire weather for portions of Central and Southern California beginning November 24th.Over the next few days, successive weather models continually increased the strength of the event and this ultimately brought more circuits into scope. The expected peak wind gusts predicted by the weather models on November 22nd were around 55- 60 MPH. However, on November 24th, the first day of the event, new weather model guidance was suggesting that wind gusts could be up to 75-80 MPH in some isolated locations. This same increase in intensity was also observed in successive runs of the external weather models, such as those used by the National Weather Services (NWS). As a result, the number of circuits in scope increased from about 77 circuits on the 22nd to about 154 circuits (including downstream circuits) on the 24th. In the end, winds ended up being much higher than originally forecasted, but weather models were correct in predicting the increasing strength of the event with the highest wind gust recorded at 89 MPH.

At approximately 10:00 am on November 24th, SCE began observing rapidly escalating wind speeds, decreasing humidity levels, and high Fire Potential Index (FPI) values in portions of Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura counties. As part of SCE's scope of work and as a best practice, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts consulted the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC). GACC personnel indicated that due to the anticipated severity, widespread nature and duration (potentially longest of the year) of the weather event, a High Risk would be entered on the GACC's 7-Day Significant Fire Potential product that assesses the chance for a large fire, along with a Moderate rating on the Santa Ana Wildfire Threat Index (SAWTI). GACC personnel also confirmed that there was potential for a large fire due to the historically dry Energy Release Component (ERC) levels for the time of year and extreme dryness of the vegetation in the areas of concern. These same concerns were also amplified by SCE's Fire Scientist who also alerted the Dedicated PSPS IMT to extreme conditions as a result of the wind speed intensity, the state of the fuels and the potential extended duration of the event. Additionally, SCE also took into consideration when calling this event, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag Warnings beginning the morning of November 24th and continuing through 6 pm on November 26th for most of Southern California, including Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura Counties.

By the afternoon on that day, actual fire weather conditions in the areas of concern met or exceeded SCE's established PSPS thresholds for proactive de-energization. SCE ultimately de-energized 78,514 customers on

102 circuits in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura Counties on November 24th and November 25th. SCE was able to reduce customer impacts through mitigations, as detailed in Section 10.

Weather conditions began improving and SCE began re-energizing customers in some of the impacted areas by late afternoon of Wednesday, November 24th, continuing through Friday, November 26th. After patrolling the de-energized circuits and remediating identified damage, service to customers on all but one circuit segment was restored by November 26th at 4:15 pm. Service to the remaining customers was restored on November 26th by 7:48 pm.

The notification process was impacted by the fast-moving weather and SCE's commitment to minimize de-energizations through partial circuit de-energizations. Despite these challenges, approximately 95% of customers received at least one notification prior to de-energization. SCE remains committed to improving notification performance, and as detailed later, this performance should be notably improved with the completion of a fully automated system, scheduled for early 2022.

Strengths:

The dedicated PSPS IMT Team continues to work diligently to ensure the communities we serve are protected from the potential of dangerous wildfires, by safeguarding the importance of strong communications, teamwork, and collaboration across the various sections/branches.

- No injuries
- No fire starts from our equipment
- Virtual EOC environment continues to work well for PSPS activations

Areas for improvement:

SCE has instituted an engagement survey process to capture feedback from State and county public safety partners and critical infrastructure customers during PSPS events. SCE encourages these stakeholders to provide survey feedback in daily coordination calls and emails links to the engagement survey once the event has concluded.

- Nine participants completed SCE's engagement survey; five participants rated the engagement as fair or better; four rated it as poor

Three overarching issues were core to most of the gaps during this event:

1) **Operational complexity outmatched the legacy system used to manage data and communications.** Relying on systems that were not talking to each other, i.e. the Beckerboard (in-house event management system) to manage the event, Microsoft Teams for communication, OMS to verify customer data, and

separate notification systems for CS and LNO meant that actions were not automatically aligned, creating significant notification delays, gaps, missed information and inconsistent counts.
Cascading issues included:

a. Delayed issuance of the MCL/POC, which in turn delayed notifications and reporting to CalOES.
b. Reduced ability to track or notify at the circuit segment level, leading to operational misses (e.g. Sebastian circuit re-energization) and lack of bandwidth to notify at the segment level (e.g. pre-event and next day notifications)

2) **Resource issues:** Across work groups, it was difficult to bring on additional resources on Thanksgiving Day, night, and following day. This contributed to slow overnight restoration, inability to restock CRC/CCV locations, delayed reporting to CalOES, and system inaccuracy.
3) **Restoration delays:** Delays caused by protocols and potentially resource planning hampered speedy restoration, leading to a 9-hour average restoration time

Lessons Learned / Corrective Actions					
	#	Discussion	Recommended Solution	Owner/Date	
Notification and Stakeholder Engagement	1	The complexity of this event (fast moving weather, # of circuits, segmentation) led to some delayed and missed customer and public safety partners notifications and inconsistent reporting to state agencies. New automation tools to handle the complexity are not yet implemented across all workstreams.	SCE to accelerate adoption of Foundry automation tools (use cases 1-4) across workstreams.	"employee name removed"	Q4/21-Q1/22
	2	IMT did not have access to situational awareness data for circuits de/re-energized, including counts of customers impacted (e.g. residential, MBL, CC, CI, etc.). This resulted in delayed and missed customer and public safety partners notifications and inconsistent reporting to state agencies. Need one source of truth for all situational awareness.	Add and implement a Foundry use case to provide IMT with near real-time access to circuit status, including corresponding counts of customers impacted.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022
	3	Inability to efficiently filter pre-event notifications to account for higher thresholds on circuits and circuit segments with covered conductor resulted in processing delays and led to over-notification when this practice was paused for expediency.	Add a Foundry use case to bypass customers from pre-event notifications on circuits / circuit segments with covered conductor unless forecast is expected to exceed higher thresholds.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022

	4	Notification issues included: •We did not have pre-developed notifications for situations where the POC had ended but patrol had not started. Ad hoc notifications were not feasible because they would have to be produced in multiple languages. •Typical restoration language (3-8 hours) did not anticipate extended overnight delays. • Continued shutoff notification was unworkable due to segmentation.	Translate and implement additional "special use notifications." Evaluate current restoration language and adjust wording to account for situations where restoration patrols may be delayed due to darkness; evaluate ways to provide more precise estimates for circuits with known restoration delays, such as canyon areas (that take longer to patrol) and circuits that must be patrolled during daylight hours. Develop capability and implement required automation to efficiently manage continued shutoff notifications for circuits that are partially re-energized.	"employee name removed"	6/30/2022
	5	There was internal confusion on when a secondary verification is needed for undelivered notifications to MBL and SS customers. This led to calls being made to these customers that where unnecessary during this event.	Evaluate current strategy for performing secondary verification calls for MBL and SS customers and make adjustment to documentation and provide training as necessary.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022
Operations	6	Missing circuit segment: Sebastian 4 kV Line % Rubidoux Sub remained de-energized beyond RAR 5735 after upstream circuits Larch and Limonite 33 kV Lines % Calectric Sub were released around 0530 on 11/26/2021.	Need to understand whether new Foundry tools would catch this, and if not, find a failsafe solution for future events.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022
	7	ICs felt unfamiliar with availability and rules for handling generator requests.	Provide PSPS IMT ICs with training on PSPS generator protocol	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022

Restoration Planning	8	Approximately 30,000 customers, or 60% of the circuits, that were cleared overnight when POC ended (at 10 pm) remained off at daybreak and some even into the afternoon. SCE received complaints from stakeholders that restoration did not meet expectations and that air patrols did not start until after 8am and should have started at sunrise.	Conduct end-to-end assessment of the PSPS restoration strategy used for this event to identify potential opportunities to expedite restoration. Implement appropriate process changes to optimize restoration strategies based on identified best practices. Update air ops process and timing for wings up time, fueling and overnight positioning, and test with tabletop exercise to confirm increased efficiency	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022
Customer	9	CRC/CCV deployment was limited by resource constraints during event expansion: 3 additional CRCs/CCVs were requested during the event; one was provided. Additionally, logistics delays led to supply shortages on Friday. After-event reports from deployed staff indicated that they had safety concerns after threats from site visitors.	Short-term: Use rostered IMT resources to augment customer care staffing for large events Mid-term: Transition volunteer customer care roster to official BR IMT Roster Compare established Logistics SLAs to identified customer care business requirements. Identify and remediate any discrepancies. Additional safety training, including de-escalation training and reinforcing stop work authority, will be provided to all customer care staff.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022

	10	Anecdotal complaints about wait times on 211 referral service lines.	Determine if existing 211 contract contains SLAs for response time. Compare 211 performance against established SLAs Make required contract changes (if necessary) to ensure acceptable response times.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022
	11	SCE automated customer contact center messaging (IVR) seemed to suggest the call center was closed for the holiday	SCE will change messaging protocol for IVR messages over holidays to clarify that contact center is open 24/7 for outages and emergencies, including PSPS.	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022
Communications	12	Telco coordination: we need better answers for customers on why telecom does not have back-up generation (in areas where cell service goes out during de-energizations (e.g. Silverado, Kegel Canyon)	Corp comm to develop messaging and fact sheet to deploy in customer communications across channels	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022
	13	Need to have clear messaging and set reasonable expectations for customers for claims process and outcomes	Refine One Voice Messaging. Corp comm to develop messaging and deploy in customer communications across channels	"employee name removed"	3/31/2022

ATTACHMENT



September 1, 2021

Resilient Grid VIII Functional Exercise

Emergency Operations Center After-Action Report

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Exercise Overview

Exercise Name	Southern California Edison (SCE) Resilient Grid VIII (RGVIII) Functional Exercise (FE)
Exercise Date	August 19, 2021, 8:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m. PDT
Scope	This exercise provided an opportunity for SCE personnel with Incident Support Team (IST), Incident Management Team (IMT), and Business Continuity Team (BCT) roles, along with SCE personnel with other incident responsibilities, to exercise their roles and responsibilities. The exercise also provided an opportunity for personnel to evaluate company preparedness, coordination, and response capabilities. Further, the exercise assisted in building cooperative relationships among internal and external partners.
Objectives	1. Demonstrate SCE's ability to effectively coordinate and execute the response to a complex and multi-incident event in multiple locations throughout the service territory. 2. Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and accurate communications, both internally and externally to SCE, in accordance with established SCE plans and guidelines. 3. Evaluate the capability of the Dedicated Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Team to fully integrate and operate in SCE's response structure during a complex incident. 4. Demonstrate the ability to activate and execute the SCE Storm Plan and the Electricity Emergency Action Plan, as well as established PSPS protocols and procedures. 5. Evaluate SCE mutual assistance protocols in response to multiple-incident events in multiple locations throughout the service territory.
Scenario	Complex wildfires with Public Safety Power Shutoffs and rotating outages during a heat storm.
Points of Contact	[Employee Name Removed]

Exercise Summary

This was the eighth annual exercise in the Resilient Grid series held by SCE. As in previous Resilient Grid exercises, this exercise provided an opportunity to evaluate overarching company preparedness, coordination, and response capabilities as well as specific roles and responsibilities of participating SCE personnel. In addition to exercising roles and responsibilities, the exercise also assisted in building cooperative relationships among and between internal and external partners during a complex wildfire scenario with PSPS and heat storm conditions.

The simulated hazards threatened different facets of SCE infrastructure and challenged players to respond in real-time to solve operational concerns. In particular, this exercise used a regional heat wave weather scenario that resulted in rotating outages, public safety power shutoffs, and wildfires. This required participants to respond to power outages, load shed directions, proactive mitigation to avoid sparking fires, and responding to structural impacts from wildfires and heat. In addition to operational impacts, the scenario drove public and customer messaging, inter-agency coordination, and resource allocation.

Participants worked through the established incident command process, utilizing all pertinent plans, policies, and procedures in response to the proposed scenario.

Due to COVID-19, personnel participated virtually in this exercise via Microsoft Teams.

The exercise was designed and developed at the direction of the SCE Business Resiliency Department and in close consultation with trusted agents from organizations within SCE. Feedback and input was solicited from several state agencies, communications providers, representatives of the Access and Functional Needs (AFN) community and other public safety partners within the SCE service area, and to the extent possible incorporated into exercise play.

Exercise Control and Evaluation

Evaluators were assigned to each section to evaluate whether critical objectives were met. All primary staff sections in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) were assigned controllers from SCE and evaluators from Hagerty Consulting. The exercise had a SimCell led by a team from Prestige Analytics. Exercise observation and evaluation assessed the flow of information, coordination, and communication between IMTs and completion of exercise objectives.

Scenario Overview

This complex exercise scenario included four simulated wildfires, a simulated PSPS event involving approximately 72 distribution and transmission level circuits, a simulated significant heat storm, and simulated rolling power outages. The start of the exercise (StartEx) took place 48 hours into a simulated significant heat storm event. At StartEx, teams engaged with a power outage task force due to warnings issued by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). The first simulated fire started in Ventura County 24 hours after the simulated heat storm began. The simulated heat storm and wildfire affected 16 SCE districts and triggered evacuations

when 2,000 acres burned. The second simulated fire, the Highland Fire, occurred in the San Gorgonio Pass in the Southeast portion of SCE's territory. In the early afternoon of the exercise, a third simulated fire, the Cherry Fire, erupted in Los Angeles and caused disruption to power lines. An hour later, the simulated Hook Creek fire in San Bernardino County was reported, which led to evacuations in Lake Arrowhead. Additionally, simulated PSPS events and additional power outages occurred, adding to the complexity of the scenario.

Exercise Assumptions and Artificialities

As in any exercise, assumptions and artificialities were necessary to complete play in the time allotted and to account for logistical limitations. Participating teams and OUs had to balance exercise play with extenuating circumstances and prioritize real-world emergencies.

Assumptions

Assumptions constitute the implied factual foundation for the exercise and were in place before the exercise started. The following assumptions applied to the exercise:

- The exercise was conducted in a fully evaluated environment wherein teams' capabilities, plans, and processes were assessed.
- The exercise scenario was plausible, and events occurred as they were presented.
- Exercise simulation was realistic and plausible and contained sufficient detail from which players could respond as if the simulated incident were real.
- Timelines and duration of specific scenario events were condensed to accomplish exercise objectives.
- All SCE personnel operating remotely or away from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) had power and access to the resources they needed to respond and participate while operating in a virtual environment.
- Unless specified through a scenario inject, simulated healthcare facilities, supply chains, and essential services were operating at real-world capacity.

Artificialities

During this exercise, the following artificialities applied:

- Exercise communication and coordination was limited to designated participating exercise agencies/organizations, venues, individuals, and the Simulation Cell (SimCell).
- Certain SCE-related disruptions/impacts were simulated and did not affect real-world operations in any way.

Exercise Analysis

Analysis Overview

The following sections were evaluated during the RGVIII FE and are addressed in this AAR:

- Logistics Section and Finance & Administration Section
- Operations Section – Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) Branch
- Operations Section – Storm Response
- Operations Section – Rotating Outage Task Force
- Planning Section
- Unified Command and Command Staff

Evaluation Disclosure

Throughout the exercise there were several actions taken by exercise players that may have been unobservable due to virtual platform accessibility restrictions for some evaluators. The following analysis of exercise play was performed by assessing the actions that were able to be observed by evaluators.

Analysis Format

There are two primary components of feedback provided for each functional area or topic covered in this report: observed strengths and identified areas for improvement. The strengths are highlighted to ensure the elements that led to successful response operations are not unintentionally changed while pursuing improved performance for response activities. Areas for improvement are provided to be used in the implementation of the improvement plan following the exercise. Each area for improvement includes observations and an analysis of the issue.

Observed Strengths

Logistics and Finance & Administration Sections

Strength 1: The Finance & Administration Section properly utilized organizational concepts and skills and exhibited strengths working with internal plans and serving in roles for the good of the team. Team members were all given roles and tasks for which they were responsible, and plans were made for specific follow up at given times and places. All team members consistently worked together to gather information, share information they possessed with the group, and identify other parties with which communication was necessary. The section appeared capable of managing their complex tasks, especially following group brainstorming sessions that allowed for learning opportunities.

Operations Section – Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) Branch

Strength 2: The PSPS IMT displayed strong response capabilities reflecting their training and activation frequency.

Operations Section – Storm Response

Strength 3: Players addressed problems and challenges by coordinating and working together. The team effectively determined objectives and developed a strategy to address the challenges presented to them. Additionally, the Branch effectively coordinated with other organizations to gather data related to the status of SCE facilities, changing weather conditions, impacts to generation, transmission, and distribution, and other pertinent incident information.

Operations Section – Rotating Outage Task Force

Strength 4: The Rotating Outage Task Force members communicated well as a group and appeared comfortable and familiar with their roles. When the Task Force Leader approached each person on the team, there was no hesitation relaying their actions for the given scenario. The Rotating Outage Task Force identified which blocks were next for rotating outages, and the Storm Chief confirmed at the DOC level that no priority customers needed to be skipped on the identified circuits. The team accurately identified what notifications would be made when, along with how they would be delivered. The team was proactive in identifying future actions and preparing for further load shed directions.

Strength 5: The team appropriately recognized the need to abide by the FERC Standards of Conduct while sharing information given that a market function employee was part of the group.

Unified Command

Strength 6: The IST Incident Commander (IC) effectively and appropriately assigned roles and responsibilities to Deputy ICs, which resulted in evenly distributed workloads across the team.

Strength 7: The Unified Command staff utilized a collaborative and proactive approach to messaging. The PIOs demonstrated strengths utilizing their existing SCE Plans to accomplish their roles and showed significant transparency and collaboration in the process. The PIOs were active, extremely responsive, and engaged throughout the exercise, providing a steady stream of "one voice" messaging to address the incident.

Areas for Improvement

Incident Leadership

Area for Improvement 1: Functional areas such as the Rotating Outage Task Force and groups/ teams dealing with PSPS and Storm Response tended to silo response activities and could have shared information more broadly across the response structure.

> **Analysis:** This shortcoming reduced the effectiveness of the broader team in managing the overall incident.

Planning Section Efficiency

Area for Improvement 2: The Planning Section was overly focused on producing an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the following operational period.

> **Analysis:** The Planning Section should have invested more time in creating and sharing a common operating picture as the incident unfolded. Had the Planning section done this, the IMT would have been more effective.

Process

Area for Improvement 3: The generator request process was not properly followed.

> **Analysis:** This could have resulted in requests being misdirected or delayed, neither of which is beneficial nor supportive to the requesting organization.

Appendix A: Improvement Plan

Issue/Area of Improvement	Corrective Action	Primary Group Responsible	Group POC	Start Date	End Date
Incident Leadership Functional areas such as the Rotating Outage Task Force and groups/ teams dealing with PSPS and Storm Response tended to silo response activities and could have shared information more broadly across the response structure. This shortcoming reduced the effectiveness of the broader team in managing the overall incident.	During training and requalification reinforce the importance of effective Command and General Staff meetings and expectation setting. During training and requalification share best practices for managing remote operations.	Business Resiliency	[Employee Name Removed]	10/1/2021	3/31/2022
Planning Section The Planning Section was overly focused on producing an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the following operational period and should have invested more time in creating and sharing a common operating picture as the incident unfolded. Had the Planning section done this, the IMT would have been more effective.	Drive greater consistency and quality in the Planning Section by staffing it with personnel from Business Resiliency who are both trained and practiced in executing this role.	Business Resiliency	Employee Name Removed	10/1/2021	3/31/2022

Issue/Area of Improvement	Corrective Action	Primary Group Responsible	Group POC	Start Date	End Date
Process The generator request process was not followed. This could result in requests being misdirected or significantly delayed.	Brief the new process at the Dedicated PSPS IMT staff meeting.	Business Resiliency	[Employee Name Removed]	10/6/2021	10/6/2021

Southern California Edison
2023-WMPs – 2023-WMPs

DATA REQUEST SET O E I S - P - W M P _ 2 0 2 3 - S C E - 0 0 6

To: Energy Safety
Prepared by: James Peterson
Job Title: Senior Advisor
Received Date: 6/2/2023

Response Date: 6/7/2023

Question 03:
Regarding Emergency Preparedness PSPS Resource Booklet:
a. Following the June 1, 2023 Call to Discuss the 2023 WMP, please provide the PSPS Resource Booklet that is shared with local agencies in support of the Access and Functional Needs community.

Response to Question 03:
Please see attachment titled *2023 PSPS Resource Guide for Local and Tribal Governments.pdf,* which was distributed on May 22, 2023.

ATTACHMENT

2023 SCE PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF (PSPS) RESOURCE GUIDE FOR LOCAL AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

SECTION 1 - REQUESTING YOUR INPUT	
IDENTIFY ACCESS AND FUNCTIONAL NEEDS* (AFN) POPULATIONS	SCE recognizes the importance of reaching individuals and households with Access and Functional Needs (AFN)* in advance of and during PSPS events. We request your recommendations on identifying and contacting individuals and households with AFN in your community, including the community-based organizations that serve them, so that we can ensure our customers with AFN are signed up for PSPS notifications and receive important information to help them prepare for PSPS. SCE's AFN plan is available for your review at Microsoft Word - Cover Pleading for 2023 AFN Plan and 2022 Q4 Update.docx (ca.gov) Please add any recommendations for identification on the attached survey or send to **AFNIMT@sce.com** SCE is seeking partnerships with Tribal Governments to identify customers with access and functional needs on Tribal Lands. If you are interested in conducting an AFN Self Identification Survey with your members, please contact [employee name removed] * The CPUC has defined AFN populations as: "individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency, or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant."
MULTI-FAMILY BUILDING OUTREACH	Every year, SCE conducts outreach to owners of multi-family residential buildings in High Fire Risk Area to educate them on PSPS and request they provide information to their tenants. If you have any recommendations on how SCE can partner with owners of multi-family buildings, please provide it using this link 2023 Wildfire Engagement - Local/Tribal Government

	External Survey (sce.com)
PSPS COMMUNI-CATIONS	SCE utilizes several methods for informing Public Safety Partners such as your agency and its customers about PSPS events. These include the following • Advance notifications to Public Safety Partners • Phone, Text, Email to customers • "Door Knock" to Medical Baseline customers if they did not respond to the PSPS notifications • Social Media • Zip Code Notifications – Customers can sign up to receive notifications if a particular zip code is impacted • Providing Social Media messages to stakeholders to stakeholders to use during PSPS events Details on notifications are included in the 2022 Pre-season Report (appendix C) Misc - SCE_PRESR_7-1-2022.pdf - All Documents (cpuc.ca.gov) Do you have any recommendations on additional outreach tools especially on how to reach visitors to the area who are not SCE customers? If so, please provide your recommendation using this link 2023 Wildfire Engagement - Local/Tribal Government External Survey (sce.com)
WILDFIRE MITIGATION PLANNING	Does your organization conduct wildfire mitigation? If so, please provide contact information of the staff member responsible for the mitigation work using this link 2023 Wildfire Engagement - Local/Tribal Government External Survey (sce.com)

COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER (CRC) LOCATIONS	In support of our communities and to reduce the impact of PSPS events, SCE provides customer care resources during events where customers can obtain the latest information on the PSPS event, get water and ice/ice vouchers, charge their portable devices, and update their contact information. This is in addition to the Community Crew Vehicles (CCVs), which will continue to be a resource for customers during PSPS events. A copy of SCE's CRC plan is available in the 2022 Pre-season Report (appendix A) Misc - SCE_PRESR_7-1-2022.pdf - All Documents (cpuc.ca.gov) **If you are open to making one of your facilities available, know of other facilities in the area that meet the criteria below or have suggestions on services the community may need during a PSPS event, please let us know in the attached survey or contact [employee name removed]** The current list of CRC locations is available at **POTENTIAL SCE COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTERS DURING PSPS EVENTS**. Preferred facilities are those that already serve as a public community gathering place. Minimum amenities should include: • Space to comfortably accommodate at least 15 people. • Compliant with the American Disabilities Act or handicap accessible • Air conditioning and heating • Access to nearby restrooms • Adequate electrical outlets that can charge multiple electronics • A parking lot • Cellular/Wi-Fi connectivity • 2 egress routes Non-critical but desired amenities include TV and DVD player, Wi-Fi, a refrigerator, children's play area, EV charging stations, games and entertainment, and a backup generator. SCE offers compensation for the use of these facilities. Facilities serving as CRCs that are interested in SCE's **Self-Generation Incentive Program** may also qualify for the equity incentive payment. The target operating hours of a CRC is 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. However, SCE is open to the facility's available operating hours.

SECTION 2: PSPS RESOURCES FOR LOCAL AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS

ACCESSING PSPS CIRCUIT MAPS	**Public Safety Partner Portal** SCE launched a Public Safety Partner Portal for local and tribal government officials and public safety partners to access information before and during PSPS events. The Portal includes information on the potential and actual de-energizations with maps. For selected qualified partners, depending on their emergency response role as defined by the CPUC, the portal also contains lists of medical baseline and/or critical infrastructure customers potentially impacted by a PSPS event The Portal requires registration and the acceptance of a user agreement, as well as setting up multi-factor authentication depending on the level of access you request. GIS layers and other info is typically updated the first Tuesday of the month. Please visit monthly to ensure your organization has the latest information. If your organization is not already signed up for portal access, please do so in advance of fire season at **requestaccess.publicsafetyportal.sce.com**. Contact the PSPS Portal team at **publicsafetyportal@sce.com** for more information. **REST site** The REST site is SCE's legacy map retrieval site. All material on the REST site is also available on the Portal. The REST site contains GIS files related to a current PSPS incident. To use the SCE REST, you must first identify authorized ArcGIS-trained staff and have them enroll with SCE. Those wishing to enroll should contact us to request an account at **SCERestInfo@sce.com**. SCE will process the username access upon receiving an ArcGIS request. **Note – SCE no longer publishes maps at www.sce.com/maps** . That information is available at both the PSP Portal and REST service.

PSPS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS	Information on how SCE determines to described in the PSPS Decision making fact sheet which is available on our website: Public Safety Power Shutoff: Decision-Making (edison.com) A video which details the decision-making process is also available at PSPS Decision-Making | Energized by Edison SCE Decision Making Video
PSPS SOCIAL MEDIA KIT	To assist local and tribal governments to share information about potential and actual PSPS events, we have developed a social media kit. The attached Social Media Kit includes messages that you can use on your social media platforms.
UPDATED WEBSITES	SCE has updated and added new information on its Wildfire website. Please share on your website. **Wildfire Safety Page** - Earlier this year, SCE redesigned the Wildfire Safety Page Wildfire Safety to make it easier to navigate and understand. From this page customers can easily sign up for PSPS notifications and get information about SCE customer programs. **Situational Awareness Page** SCE recently launched a new situational awareness map on SCE.com. Weather and Fire Detection (sce.com) This page provides the latest situational awareness across the SCE service territory, including live weather data, fires captured by satellite, and ALERT Wildfire HD Camera live views. Learn more about the tool **HERE.** **PSPS 5 Day Outlook –** This page provides a five-day outlook by county of potential PSPS events PSPS Weather Awareness (sce.com) **Circuit Enhancements –** View the circuits that will be or are already hardened to reduce wildfire threat. Circuits are viewable by county or by entering individual addresses. Circuit Upgrades Help Reduce PSPS Outages (sce.com) **County Grid Hardening Update -** This page displays the statistics of Grid Hardening activities including covered conductor, cameras, and weather stations by county Grid Hardening by county **Outage Center Page –** Last year, SCE redesigned its outage center website Outage Center to consolidate all types of outages including PSPS, Repair, Maintenance, and Rotating Outages in a single map that allows customers to enter an address to see if they are or may be impacted by an outage

SCE RELIABILITY REPORTS	SCE provides annual circuit reliability reports for every city, county, and tribe in our service area. These reports have information about PSPS circuits located in the jurisdiction, SCE infrastructure work, and historical information on unplanned outages, including PSPS. Reports are available at **on.sce.com/reliabilityreports**
SCE MAINTAINANCE OUTAGE LOOK AHEAD	Authorized local and tribal government personnel may learn about planned maintenance outages in their area by reviewing their community's Critical Work Report. The purpose of the report is to provide local/tribal governments a 14-day look-ahead for SCE projects within their jurisdiction that require critical work. This information is intended for operational use and may not be shared with the media or the public. Data is continuously updated. Please contact your local SCE Government Relations Manager to request access for your designated user(s).
SCE PSPS POST-EVENT REPORTS	SCE's PSPS post-event reports are available at Utility Company PSPS Reports: Post-Event, Post-Season and Pre-Season (ca.gov). We continue to work on improving these reports to make them more transparent and clearer.

COMMUNICATING WITH SCE DURING PSPS EVENTS	During a PSPS incident, local and tribal governments can reach SCE through:
	
	- These numbers should not be shared with the public
	
	• **First Responders and Emergency Managers:**
	  ○ Phone: Business Resiliency Duty Manager 24/7 hotline: **(800) 674-4478**
	  ○ Email: Business Resiliency Duty Manager/emergencies: BusinessResiliencyDutyManager@sce.com-- Only monitored during emergency activations.
	
	• **Government/tribal officials:**
	  ○ Phone: Liaison (government relations) 24/7 hotline: 800-737-9811. Only monitored during emergency activations.
	  ○ Email: SCELiaisonOfficer@sce.com. Note: Only monitored during emergency activations.
	
	• **Access and Functional Needs issues:**
	  ○ Email: AFNIMT@sce.com. Note: Only monitored during emergency activations.
	
	Please continue to refer customers to our Customer Contact Center at 800-611-1911 and www.sce.com/PSPS for outage-specific inquiries.

SCE RESOURCES FOR CUSTOMERS PLEASE PROMOTE ON YOUR WEBSITE AND SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS	
SCE WILDFIRE RESOURCES FOR CUSTOMERS	Customers can sign up for PSPS alerts, view a map of areas impacted by PSPS and customer resources, learn how to be prepared for outages and emergencies, sign up for customer programs, see the schedule of upcoming community meetings, and other useful resources at **sce.com/wildfire**
OUTAGE NOTIFICATIONS	SCE customers can receive notifications for outages including PSPS and repair outages at Get Outage Alerts (sce.com)
SIGN UP FOR SCE'S MEDICAL BASELINE PROGRAM	**SCE Medical Baseline Program:** Customers who use electrically operated medical devices in their homes are eligible for the Medical Baseline program, and those enrolled will receive additional electricity per day at a discounted rate. If a PSPS outage occurs, we'll know to send a representative to these customers home to make contact if we are unable to reach them by email, voice call or text. More information about the program, requirements, and application process at **sce.com/medicalbaseline**
SIGN UP FOR CUSTOMER AND NON-CUSTOMER PSPS ALERTS	**SCE PSPS Alerts:** Address-signups for PSPS are now available for any address, and do not require an SCE account. This is useful for caregivers, landlords, non-metered tenants, and frequent visitors to addresses that could be impacted by PSPS. Customers can still sign up for customer alerts via phone, text, or email. For more details, visit: **sce.com/pspsalerts** **Please encourage your residents and businesses to sign up for notifications.**

SIGN UP FOR CUSTOMER PROGRAMS AND REBATES	SCE offers programs and rebates to help customers prepare for emergencies. **Please feel free to share this information with your residents and businesses:** **Rebates for portable batteries to keep critical power energized:** • $150 power station rebate available to residents and small business customers to power small/medium devices and appliances: **marketplace.sce.com/portable-power-stations/** • $200 (or a $600 rebate for income qualified or medical baseline customers) generator rebates to power household appliances such as refrigerators, water pumps, and garage doors: **marketplace.sce.com/portable-generators/** **Those who rely on electrically powered medical equipment:** • Get a free backup battery to operate your medical device during an outage. Learn about the Critical Care Backup Battery Program at **sce.com/customerresources**.
SIGN UP FOR SCE'S WILDFIRE NEWSLETTER	Keep informed about SCE's most recent wildfire mitigation efforts by signing up for our monthly ***Energized by Edison wildfire email newsletter.***
MOBILE APP	"My SCE" is SCE's mobile new mobile app where customers can look up outages by address and get other information for their account

Southern California Edison
2023-WMPs – 2023-WMPs

DATA REQUEST SET O E I S - P - W M P _ 2 0 2 3 - S C E - 0 0 6

To: Energy Safety
Prepared by: Christine Angulo
Job Title: Senior Advisor
Received Date: 6/2/2023

Response Date: 6/7/2023

Question 04:
Regarding Working Group Report Submissions:
a. Following the June 1, 2023 Call to Discuss the 2023 WMP, please provide URLs to the 2021, 2022, and 2023 (if applicable) public partner safety partner Working Group Reports submissions that were mentioned.

Response to Question 04:

Please see the links below for the Working Group and Advisory Group Reports for 2023, 2022 and 2021.

2023

2023.05.09 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2023.04.14 SCE's Quarterly Progress Report on PSPS Advisory Board and Working Groups

2023.04.06 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2023.03.09 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.01.26 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022

2022.12.30 SCE's Quarterly Progress Report on PSPS Advisory Board and Working Groups

2022.12.27 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.11.30 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.10.31 SCE's Quarterly Progress Report on PSPS Advisory Board and Working Groups

2022.10.28 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.10.06 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.09.06 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.08.09 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.08.01 SCE's Quarterly Progress Report on PSPS Advisory Board and Working Groups

2022.07.12 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.06.14 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.05.19 SCE's Quarterly Progress Report on PSPS Advisory Board and Working Groups

2022.05.11 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.03.10 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2022.02.15 SCE's Quarterly Progress Report on PSPS Advisory Board and Working Groups

2022.02.22 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2021

2021.12.29 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2021.11.03 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2021.10.22 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2021.09.29 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2021.07.21 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E

2021.02.01 Joint Working Group Report of SCE, PG&E and SDG&E