

Link to Discovery Responses: https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan-discovery-data-requests-page																		
Count	Party Name	Data Set	Data Request	Question No.	Question ID	Question Text	Responses	Requestor	Date Rec'd	Final Due Date	Date Sent	Links	Number of Alerts	NDA Required	WMP Section	Category	Subcategory	
1	CaPA	Set WMP-07	CaPA_Set WMP-07	1	CaPA_Set WMP-07_Q1	In the review of PGE's WDRM v3 by Energy & Environmental Economics, Inc. ("E3 Review") the authors note: "There are also several references to PGE's asset data, now current to 2022-01-01, and inclusion of updated internally sourced meteorology datasets." a) Please confirm that no asset data collected after January 1, 2022 was used in the WDRM v3. b) If you are unable to confirm that no asset data was collected after January 1, 2022, please provide a list of the E3 Review includes a list of components included in the WDRM v3. c) Please confirm that the WDRM v3 was finalized. d) If the final list of components is different than what is listed in the E3 review, please provide updated and accurate list of components that are used in PGE's WDRM v3. e) For any items included in your response to Question 2b) that do not appear on Page 15 of the E3 review, please provide the latest date, on which each asset was used to inform the date that the WDRM v3 was finalized. f) Please provide a current list of components that are used in v4 of the WDRM model. g) Please state the date of PGE's asset data used in v4 of the WDRM model. If there are multiple dates, include the most recent date for any asset data used in the model, and also state on which date asset data was used in the model.	a) All distribution asset data utilized in the Wildfire Distribution Risk Model (WDRM) v3 were extracted from PGE's EDGIS system on January 1, 2022, with the exception of the transformer data which was extracted from EDGIS on February 2, 2022. b) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022. c) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022. d) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022. e) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022. f) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022. g) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022.	Joshua Borowski	3/27/2023	3/30/2023	3/30/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/CalAdvocates_D07.zip	0	NA	6.2	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Framework	
2	CaPA	Set WMP-07	CaPA_Set WMP-07	2	CaPA_Set WMP-07_Q2	Page 15 of the E3 Review includes a list of components included in the WDRM v3. a) Please confirm that the WDRM v3 was finalized. b) If the final list of components is different than what is listed in the E3 review, please provide updated and accurate list of components that are used in PGE's WDRM v3. c) For any items included in your response to Question 2b) that do not appear on Page 15 of the E3 review, please provide the latest date, on which each asset was used to inform the date that the WDRM v3 was finalized. d) Please provide a current list of components that are used in v4 of the WDRM model. e) Please state the date of PGE's asset data used in v4 of the WDRM model. If there are multiple dates, include the most recent date for any asset data used in the model, and also state on which date asset data was used in the model.	a) The asset groups listed on page 15 of the E3 Review are included in the WDRM v3 but are grouped into the sub-model included in the WDRM v3. b) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022. c) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022. d) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022. e) The WDRM v3 was finalized on January 1, 2022.	Joshua Borowski	3/27/2023	3/30/2023	3/30/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/CalAdvocates_D07.zip	0	NA	6.2	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Framework	
3	CaPA	Set WMP-07	CaPA_Set WMP-07	3	CaPA_Set WMP-07_Q3	Page 15 of the E3 Review includes a list of components included in the WDRM v3. a) Please confirm that the WDRM v3 was finalized. b) If the final list of components is different than what is listed in the E3 review, please provide updated and accurate list of components that are used in PGE's WDRM v3. c) For any items included in your response to Question 2b) that do not appear on Page 15 of the E3 review, please provide the latest date, on which each asset was used to inform the date that the WDRM v3 was finalized. d) Please provide a current list of components that are used in v4 of the WDRM model. e) Please state the date of PGE's asset data used in v4 of the WDRM model. If there are multiple dates, include the most recent date for any asset data used in the model, and also state on which date asset data was used in the model.	a) The asset data for the WDRM v4 was not finalized. Model review and approval is scheduled for Q2 2023. b) The WDRM v4 was finalized on January 1, 2022. c) The WDRM v4 was finalized on January 1, 2022. d) The WDRM v4 was finalized on January 1, 2022. e) The WDRM v4 was finalized on January 1, 2022.	Joshua Borowski	3/27/2023	3/30/2023	3/30/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/CalAdvocates_D07.zip	0	NA	6.2	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Framework	
4	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q1	Please provide for Asset Point data for Camera, Fuse, Support Structure, and Weather Station.	In response to this request, PGE is providing Camera and Weather Station data, as delivered in the 04/2022 OER GIS Data Standard Submission. PGE is also providing non-confidential data from the Support Structure feature class. PGE is not providing data for the Fuse feature class as this data is confidential critical energy infrastructure information (CEII).	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	1	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
4	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	1	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q1 SUPP	Please provide for Asset Point data for Camera, Fuse, Support Structure, and Weather Station.	In response to this request, PGE is providing Camera and Weather Station data, as delivered in the 04/2022 OER GIS Data Standard Submission. PGE is also providing non-confidential data from the Support Structure feature class. PGE is not providing data for the Fuse feature class as this data is confidential critical energy infrastructure information (CEII).	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/13/2023	4/13/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	4	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
5	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	2	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q2	Provide Asset Line data for Transmission Line (as permitted as non-confidential), Primary Distribution Line, and Secondary Distribution Line.	In response to this request, PGE is providing non-confidential data for the Primary and Secondary Distribution Line Feature Classes. PGE is not providing the Transmission Line feature class because it is confidential CEII.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
5	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	2	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q2 SUPP	Provide Asset Line data for Transmission Line (as permitted as non-confidential), Primary Distribution Line, and Secondary Distribution Line.	In response to this request, PGE is providing non-confidential data for the Primary and Secondary Distribution Line Feature Classes. PGE is not providing the Transmission Line feature class because it is confidential CEII.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/13/2023	4/13/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
6	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	3	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q3	Provide PPSV Event data. Include Event Log, Event Line, Event Polygon data. Provide Asset Customer meter data. Provide all PPSV Asset Damage data including photos.	In response to this request, PGE is unable to provide PPSV Event data, PPSV Event Damages data, and PPSV Damage photos since there were no PPSV Events that took place throughout 2022.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
6	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	3	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q3 SUPP	Provide PPSV Event data. Include Event Log, Event Line, Event Polygon data. Provide Asset Customer meter data. Provide all PPSV Asset Damage data including photos.	In response to this request, PGE is unable to provide PPSV Event data, PPSV Event Damages data, and PPSV Damage photos since there were no PPSV Events that took place throughout 2022.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/13/2023	4/13/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
7	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	4	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q4	Provide Risk Event Point data, including Wire Down, Ignition, Transmission Unplanned outage (as classified non-confidential), Distribution Unplanned Outage data, Distribution Vegetation Caused Unplanned Outage, Risk Event Asset Log	In response to this request, PGE is providing non-confidential data for the Wire Down, Ignition, Transmission Unplanned Outage, Distribution Unplanned Outage, Distribution Vegetation Caused Unplanned Outage, and Risk Event Asset Log feature classes and related table.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
7	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	4	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q4 SUPP	Provide Risk Event Point data, including Wire Down, Ignition, Transmission Unplanned outage (as classified non-confidential), Distribution Unplanned Outage data, Distribution Vegetation Caused Unplanned Outage, Risk Event Asset Log	In response to this request, PGE is providing non-confidential data for the Wire Down, Ignition, Transmission Unplanned Outage, Distribution Unplanned Outage, Distribution Vegetation Caused Unplanned Outage, and Risk Event Asset Log feature classes and related table.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/13/2023	4/13/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
8	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	5	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q5	Provide photo data for Risk Events.	PGE does not have any non-confidential or non-privileged data to provide in response to this request. The photos provided in this feature class may be subject to attorney client privilege or the work product doctrine and may be subject to an ongoing investigation. Additionally, PGE risk event photos are confidential CEII because they reveal specific facility information.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
8	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	5	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q5 SUPP	Provide photo data for Risk Events.	PGE does not have any non-confidential or non-privileged data to provide in response to this request. The photos provided in this feature class may be subject to attorney client privilege or the work product doctrine and may be subject to an ongoing investigation. Additionally, PGE risk event photos are confidential CEII because they reveal specific facility information.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/13/2023	4/13/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
9	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	6	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q6	Under Initiatives, please provide Grid Hardening data, including Hardening Log, Hardening Point, and Hardening Line data. Inspection data is not requested at this time.	In response to this request, PGE is providing non-confidential data for the System Hardening, Buffer County Rebuild, and Risk Underpinning WMP initiative programs that were included in the Grid Hardening Log, Grid Hardening Point, and Grid Hardening Line feature classes and related table. Additional initiative projects reported in these feature classes include data where PGE is using non-privileged data to provide in response to this request.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
9	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	6	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q6 SUPP	Under Initiatives, please provide Grid Hardening data, including Hardening Log, Hardening Point, and Hardening Line data. Inspection data is not requested at this time.	In response to this request, PGE is providing non-confidential data for the System Hardening, Buffer County Rebuild, and Risk Underpinning WMP initiative programs that were included in the Grid Hardening Log, Grid Hardening Point, and Grid Hardening Line feature classes and related table. Additional initiative projects reported in these feature classes include data where PGE is using non-privileged data to provide in response to this request.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/13/2023	4/13/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
10	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	7	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q7	Under Initiatives, please provide Other Initiative data for point, line, polygon features and the Other Initiative Log	In response to this request, PGE is providing WMP initiative program data for the Weather Station Installation and Optimization and Camera Installation that were included in the Other Initiative Log and Other Initiative Point related table and feature class. Additional WMP initiative projects reported in this feature class and related table include data where PGE is using non-privileged data to provide in response to this request.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
10	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	7	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q7 SUPP	Under Initiatives, please provide Other Initiative data for point, line, polygon features and the Other Initiative Log	In response to this request, PGE is providing WMP initiative program data for the Weather Station Installation and Optimization and Camera Installation that were included in the Other Initiative Log and Other Initiative Point related table and feature class. Additional WMP initiative projects reported in this feature class and related table include data where PGE is using non-privileged data to provide in response to this request.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/13/2023	4/13/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
11	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	8	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q8	Under Other Required Data, please provide Red Flag Warning Day polygon data.	PGE is providing the Red Flag Warning Day polygon data, as requested by MGR.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
11	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	8	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q8 SUPP	Under Other Required Data, please provide Red Flag Warning Day polygon data.	PGE is providing the Red Flag Warning Day polygon data, as requested by MGR.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/13/2023	4/13/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
12	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	9	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q9	Please provide a layer indicating calculated circuit-level risk using the methodology presented in the WMP. a) Independent probability and consequence layers exist, please provide these independently as well.	The method described in the 2022 WMP to aggregate model results is conducted to produce a circuit segment level risk value but it is not used to produce a circuit level risk value. However, the geospatial representation of circuit segments that would be provided in response to this data request involves the identification of CEII, which we are required by law to maintain as confidential and must also be without the unauthorized access to protect the information therein.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/10/2023	4/7/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	0	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation	
12	MGR	Data Request No. 1	MGR_Data_Request No. 1	9	Supp	MGR_Data_Request No. 1_Q9 SUPP	Please provide a layer indicating calculated circuit-level risk using the methodology presented in the WMP. a) Independent probability and consequence layers exist, please provide these independently as well.	The method described in the 2022 WMP to aggregate model results is conducted to produce a circuit segment level risk value but it is not used to produce a circuit level risk value. However, the geospatial representation of circuit segments that would be provided in response to this data request involves the identification of CEII, which we are required by law to maintain as confidential and must also be without the unauthorized access to protect the information therein.	Joseph Mitchell	3/29/2023	4/21/2023	4/21/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGR_001.zip	1	NA	6.4	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk Analysis Results and Presentation
13	CaPA	Set WMP-08	CaPA_Set WMP-08	1	CaPA_Set WMP-08_Q1	PGE's WMP states: "The EVM Program concluded at the end of 2022. PGE will continue to strengthen our existing WMP programs. PGE is transitioning the maintenance of enhanced corridors that were in the Distribution System Inventory (DSI) to the WMP program. We established a new program for enhanced corridors, which is the Enhanced Corridor Program (ECP). This program is designed to provide enhanced corridors to our new Tree Inventory Program. This program will focus on working down the risk associated with the remaining DSI. These units were identified under EVM guidelines and will be over a period of time based on a number of constraints or other factors that hindered completion of work. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk." a) For this program, please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. b) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. c) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget.	a) PGE is extending the minimum clearance recommendations of 12 feet in HPD (per G.O. 19 Rule 26, Appendix 1) to 12 feet within HRA. b) There is an anticipated increase of tree removal vs trim as it is the first location of arborist recommended at the end of listing per the Distribution System Inventory (DSI) program. Funding is available for this program. c) The program budget is \$1.3 million. d) The program budget is \$1.3 million. e) The program budget is \$1.3 million.	Holy Wetman	3/30/2023	4/5/2023	4/5/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/CalAdvocates_D08.zip	0	NA	8.2.2.2.6	Vegetation Management and Inspections	Discontinued Programs	
14	CaPA	Set WMP-08	CaPA_Set WMP-08	2	CaPA_Set WMP-08_Q2	This is a new transitional program for 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is intended to reduce outages and potential ignition using a risk informed, geospatially informed, and data driven approach. PGE estimates that our EVM program included over 300,000 trees at the end of 2022. Under the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, PGE states: "The EVM Program concluded at the end of 2022. PGE will continue to strengthen our existing WMP programs. PGE is transitioning the maintenance of enhanced corridors that were in the Distribution System Inventory (DSI) to the WMP program. We established a new program for enhanced corridors, which is the Enhanced Corridor Program (ECP). This program is designed to provide enhanced corridors to our new Tree Inventory Program. This program will focus on working down the risk associated with the remaining DSI. These units were identified under EVM guidelines and will be over a period of time based on a number of constraints or other factors that hindered completion of work. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk." a) For this program, please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. b) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. c) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget.	a) PGE is extending the minimum clearance recommendations of 12 feet in HPD (per G.O. 19 Rule 26, Appendix 1) to 12 feet within HRA. b) There is an anticipated increase of tree removal vs trim as it is the first location of arborist recommended at the end of listing per the Distribution System Inventory (DSI) program. Funding is available for this program. c) The program budget is \$1.3 million. d) The program budget is \$1.3 million. e) The program budget is \$1.3 million.	Holy Wetman	3/30/2023	4/5/2023	4/5/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/CalAdvocates_D08.zip	0	NA	8.2.2.2.4	Vegetation Management and Inspections	Tree Removal Inventory	
15	CaPA	Set WMP-08	CaPA_Set WMP-08	3	CaPA_Set WMP-08_Q3	This is a new transitional program for 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is intended to reduce outages and potential ignition using a risk informed, geospatially informed, and data driven approach. PGE estimates that our EVM program included over 300,000 trees at the end of 2022. Under the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, PGE states: "The EVM Program concluded at the end of 2022. PGE will continue to strengthen our existing WMP programs. PGE is transitioning the maintenance of enhanced corridors that were in the Distribution System Inventory (DSI) to the WMP program. We established a new program for enhanced corridors, which is the Enhanced Corridor Program (ECP). This program is designed to provide enhanced corridors to our new Tree Inventory Program. This program will focus on working down the risk associated with the remaining DSI. These units were identified under EVM guidelines and will be over a period of time based on a number of constraints or other factors that hindered completion of work. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk." a) For this program, please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. b) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. c) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget.	a) PGE is extending the minimum clearance recommendations of 12 feet in HPD (per G.O. 19 Rule 26, Appendix 1) to 12 feet within HRA. b) There is an anticipated increase of tree removal vs trim as it is the first location of arborist recommended at the end of listing per the Distribution System Inventory (DSI) program. Funding is available for this program. c) The program budget is \$1.3 million. d) The program budget is \$1.3 million. e) The program budget is \$1.3 million.	Holy Wetman	3/30/2023	4/5/2023	4/5/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/CalAdvocates_D08.zip	0	NA	8.2.2.2.3	Vegetation Management and Inspections	VM for Operational Mitigations	
16	CaPA	Set WMP-08	CaPA_Set WMP-08	4	CaPA_Set WMP-08_Q4	This is a new transitional program for 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is intended to reduce outages and potential ignition using a risk informed, geospatially informed, and data driven approach. PGE estimates that our EVM program included over 300,000 trees at the end of 2022. Under the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, PGE states: "The EVM Program concluded at the end of 2022. PGE will continue to strengthen our existing WMP programs. PGE is transitioning the maintenance of enhanced corridors that were in the Distribution System Inventory (DSI) to the WMP program. We established a new program for enhanced corridors, which is the Enhanced Corridor Program (ECP). This program is designed to provide enhanced corridors to our new Tree Inventory Program. This program will focus on working down the risk associated with the remaining DSI. These units were identified under EVM guidelines and will be over a period of time based on a number of constraints or other factors that hindered completion of work. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk. We will update the Tree Removal/Inventory Program, which is focused on removing risk." a) For this program, please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. b) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. c) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget.	a) PGE is extending the minimum clearance recommendations of 12 feet in HPD (per G.O. 19 Rule 26, Appendix 1) to 12 feet within HRA. b) There is an anticipated increase of tree removal vs trim as it is the first location of arborist recommended at the end of listing per the Distribution System Inventory (DSI) program. Funding is available for this program. c) The program budget is \$1.3 million. d) The program budget is \$1.3 million. e) The program budget is \$1.3 million.	Holy Wetman	3/30/2023	4/5/2023	4/5/2023	https://www.pge.com/energy_safety/emergency-preparedness-natural-disasters/wildfires/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/CalAdvocates_D08.zip	0	NA	8.2.2.2.5	Vegetation Management and Inspections	Focused Tree Inspections	
17	CaPA	Set WMP-08	CaPA_Set WMP-08	5	CaPA_Set WMP-08_Q5	PGE is restructuring our VM Program starting in 2023. Based on recent data and analysis, the risk reduction of the EVM program is less than the risk reduction from the EPPS program that was replaced by the EVM program. a) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. b) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget. c) Please provide the program description, the program timeline, and the program budget.	a) PGE is restructuring the comparison of risk reduction and Risk Speed Efficiency (RSE) or EPPS EVM in the 2022 WMP to 2023 GRC Supplemental EVM in February 2023. This comparison is described in the 2022 GRC, E-Unit 3 Chapter 4 page 3-2 through 3-7. The updated wildfire mitigation strategy for 2023 is described in the 2023 WMP. b) PGE is restructuring the comparison of risk reduction and Risk Speed Efficiency (RSE) or EPPS EVM in the 2022 WMP to 2023 GRC Supplemental EVM in February 2023. This comparison is described in the 2022 GRC, E-Unit 3 Chapter 4 page 3-2 through 3-7. The updated wildfire mitigation strategy for 2023 is described in the 2023 WMP. c) PGE is restructuring the comparison of risk reduction and Risk Speed Efficiency (RSE) or EPPS EVM in the 2022 WMP to 2023 GRC Supplemental EVM in February 2023. This comparison is described in the 2022 GRC, E-Unit 3 Chapter 4 page 3-2 through 3-7. The updated wildfire mitigation strategy for 2023 is described in the 2023 WMP											

368	MGRA	Data Request No. 6	MGRA_Data Request No. 6	1	MGRA_Data Request No. 6_01	PG&E was requested to provide an Excel spreadsheet containing outage IDs. These were delivered with an OutageID tool updated to the DOutageID that it lists in its outage data provided as a result of DR1. Please provide the file in response to DR4-08 as soon as possible.	"WMP-Discovery2023_DR_MGRA_006-0001Aho1.xlsx" contains a new column called "OutageID" that will align with the same outage identifier (ID) from DR1.	Joseph Mitchell	5/15/2023	5/18/2023	5/18/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	1	N/A	8.1.8.1.1	Grid Operations and Procedures	Protective Equipment and Device Settings
369	MGRA	Data Request No. 6	MGRA_Data Request No. 6	2	MGRA_Data Request No. 6_02	Please add (or re-add) a simple "cause" attribute to this outage file.	"WMP-Discovery2023_DR_MGRA_006-0001Aho1.xlsx" contains a new column called "basic_cause" as requested.	Joseph Mitchell	5/15/2023	5/18/2023	5/18/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.8.1.1	Grid Operations and Procedures	Protective Equipment and Device Settings
370	MGRA	Data Request No. 6	MGRA_Data Request No. 6	3	MGRA_Data Request No. 6_03	Likewise, please add a "cause" attribute to the outage data in the GIS files issued in response to MGRA DR1. Alternatively, provide an Excel file in which cause is cross-referenced to OutageID.	"WMP-Discovery2023_DR_MGRA_006-0001Aho1.xlsx" includes both "basic_cause" and "OutageID" for cross-referencing.	Joseph Mitchell	5/15/2023	5/18/2023	5/18/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.8.1.1	Grid Operations and Procedures	Protective Equipment and Device Settings
371	MGRA	Data Request No. 6	MGRA_Data Request No. 6	4	MGRA_Data Request No. 6_04	If there are refusals or delays to the above please provide the EPSIS data in a kmz format similar to that provided in response to MGRA DR2-Question 8.	Not applicable.	Joseph Mitchell	5/15/2023	5/18/2023	5/18/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.8.1.1	Grid Operations and Procedures	Protective Equipment and Device Settings
372	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005	1	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_01	1. Regarding costs inherent in PG&E's undergrounding grid hardening mitigation initiative projects, used in calculating cost efficiency and project feasibility as described in the 2023-2025 WMP (p. 340 and p. 968), to date and looking forward: a) What was the average cost per circuit mile for undergrounding in 2022, 2021, and 2020, in the HFTO, non-HFTO, and Terrestrial? 2. Provide the utility's cost estimate breakdown for undergrounding per mile. Provide the cost estimate in a commonly used cost-estimating format (e.g., Uniform), if the utility uses a different format, provide internal documentation on that format so SPD can understand the cost estimate.	1. Regarding costs inherent in PG&E's undergrounding grid hardening mitigation initiative projects, used in calculating cost efficiency and project feasibility as described in the 2023-2025 WMP (p. 340 and p. 968), to date and looking forward: a) What was the average cost per circuit mile for undergrounding in 2022, 2021, and 2020, in the HFTO, non-HFTO, and Terrestrial? 2. Provide the utility's cost estimate breakdown for undergrounding per mile. Provide the cost estimate in a commonly used cost-estimating format (e.g., Uniform), if the utility uses a different format, provide internal documentation on that format so SPD can understand the cost estimate.	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
373	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_02	2	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_02	3. How is PG&E incorporating subsurface variability (e.g., encountering hard rock, slope, or other conditions presenting significant, physical obstacles) into undergrounding cost calculations? Provide an example.	3. How is PG&E incorporating subsurface variability (e.g., encountering hard rock, slope, or other conditions presenting significant, physical obstacles) into undergrounding cost calculations? Provide an example.	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
374	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_03	3	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_03	4. PG&E has stated that CalTrans trench depth requirements exceeded PG&E trench depth requirements. How has this impacted costs and planning? For planning purposes, what percentage of anticipated underground circuit miles will be impacted by the CalTrans trench depth requirements for 2023-2027?	4. PG&E has stated that CalTrans trench depth requirements exceeded PG&E trench depth requirements. How has this impacted costs and planning? For planning purposes, what percentage of anticipated underground circuit miles will be impacted by the CalTrans trench depth requirements for 2023-2027?	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
375	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_04	4	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_04	5. How does service life impact cost calculation?	5. How does service life impact cost calculation?	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
376	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_05	5	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_05	6. What is the estimated multiplier for conversion from overhead (OH) line to underground (UG) (e.g., 1.25 MWh OH converts to 1.0 MWh UG)? a) How was it established as the accepted operating average for project planning purposes? 7. On what projects completed to date: a) What is the total all-in cost per mile? b) What is the breakdown of project costs per mile? SPD expects to see the following components made of the costs, although SPD understands they may not be broken down in this exact format:	6. What is the estimated multiplier for conversion from overhead (OH) line to underground (UG) (e.g., 1.25 MWh OH converts to 1.0 MWh UG)? a) How was it established as the accepted operating average for project planning purposes? 7. On what projects completed to date: a) What is the total all-in cost per mile? b) What is the breakdown of project costs per mile? SPD expects to see the following components made of the costs, although SPD understands they may not be broken down in this exact format:	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
377	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_06	6	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_06	8. Please provide WMP-Discovery2023_DR_TURN_007-0001Aho1CONF.xlsx used to address TURN Data Request 7, Question 1, discussing RSE calculation for system hardening.	8. Please provide WMP-Discovery2023_DR_TURN_007-0001Aho1CONF.xlsx used to address TURN Data Request 7, Question 1, discussing RSE calculation for system hardening.	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
378	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_07	7	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_07	9. On page 151 of the 2023-2025 WMP, PG&E states that the WDRM v3 ignition source is PG&E's historical lightning data, 2015-2021 (approximately 2,500 CPUC-reportable ignitions and approximately 1,500 non-reportable ignitions). A describe how PG&E is using the ~1,500 non-CPUC-reportable ignitions in its risk modeling. Provide a list of the mitigation effectiveness data, a corresponding column, and a column header. 1. After it was ported out by SPD that there appeared to be a discrepancy in the methodologies used to calculate the mitigation effectiveness of EPSS, Undergrounding and Covered Conductor (CC), PG&E stated that CC is probably the most "mature" mitigation effectiveness as it is based on general data, and that it is the least mature mitigation effectiveness as it is based on general data, and that it is the least mature mitigation effectiveness as it is based on general data, and that it is the least mature mitigation effectiveness as it is based on general data.	9. On page 151 of the 2023-2025 WMP, PG&E states that the WDRM v3 ignition source is PG&E's historical lightning data, 2015-2021 (approximately 2,500 CPUC-reportable ignitions and approximately 1,500 non-reportable ignitions). A describe how PG&E is using the ~1,500 non-CPUC-reportable ignitions in its risk modeling. Provide a list of the mitigation effectiveness data, a corresponding column, and a column header. 1. After it was ported out by SPD that there appeared to be a discrepancy in the methodologies used to calculate the mitigation effectiveness of EPSS, Undergrounding and Covered Conductor (CC), PG&E stated that CC is probably the most "mature" mitigation effectiveness as it is based on general data, and that it is the least mature mitigation effectiveness as it is based on general data, and that it is the least mature mitigation effectiveness as it is based on general data, and that it is the least mature mitigation effectiveness as it is based on general data.	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
379	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_08	8	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_08	1. What types of covered conductor (size of conductor, material of conductor, voltage rating of conductor) - PG&E used in product data from a manufacturer, this would be preferred? PG&E use and does PG&E choose different types of covered conductor types near coastal areas?	1. What types of covered conductor (size of conductor, material of conductor, voltage rating of conductor) - PG&E used in product data from a manufacturer, this would be preferred? PG&E use and does PG&E choose different types of covered conductor types near coastal areas?	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
380	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	005	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_09	9	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_005_09	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request 19 Question 8.	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request 19 Question 8.	Kevin Miller	5/15/2023	6/12/2023	6/12/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/MGRA_006_ip	0	N/A	6.2.1	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Risk and Risk Component Identification
381	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	006	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_006_01	1	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_006_01	PG&E notes that the calculation of risk mitigation effectiveness can be computed in various ways, and taking different approaches to calculate effectiveness for different mitigation does not necessarily constitute a discrepancy. The mitigation effectiveness calculation for covered conductor was articulated as being the most "mature" because the vital LHA assessed on a common contribution of utility's data of estimated, it is discussed during a staff meeting with SPD on 3/23/2023. PG&E currently states in taking points, the PG&E website, and a customer materials that "Placing overhead powerlines underground reduces ignition risk by approximately 90% in that location". PG&E intended the phrase "in that location" to articulate that the 90% risk mitigation applies to the area, or the actual locations, actually located.	PG&E notes that the calculation of risk mitigation effectiveness can be computed in various ways, and taking different approaches to calculate effectiveness for different mitigation does not necessarily constitute a discrepancy. The mitigation effectiveness calculation for covered conductor was articulated as being the most "mature" because the vital LHA assessed on a common contribution of utility's data of estimated, it is discussed during a staff meeting with SPD on 3/23/2023. PG&E currently states in taking points, the PG&E website, and a customer materials that "Placing overhead powerlines underground reduces ignition risk by approximately 90% in that location". PG&E intended the phrase "in that location" to articulate that the 90% risk mitigation applies to the area, or the actual locations, actually located.	Kevin Miller	5/17/2023	5/22/2023	5/22/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/SPD_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.8.1.1	Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Protective Equipment and Device Settings
382	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	006	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_006_02	2	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_006_02	The CONFIDENTIAL attachments are being provided pursuant to the accompanying confidentiality declaration. Please refer to Table 18 - Primary Aluminum ACSR and Copper XLP E Wire (page 10 of 12) in PG&E standard 09026, "Conductors for Overhead Lines" (WMP-Discovery2023_DR_SPD_006-0001Aho1CONF.pdf) for the full text of the CONFIDENTIAL attachments are being provided pursuant to the accompanying confidentiality declaration.	The CONFIDENTIAL attachments are being provided pursuant to the accompanying confidentiality declaration. Please refer to Table 18 - Primary Aluminum ACSR and Copper XLP E Wire (page 10 of 12) in PG&E standard 09026, "Conductors for Overhead Lines" (WMP-Discovery2023_DR_SPD_006-0001Aho1CONF.pdf) for the full text of the CONFIDENTIAL attachments are being provided pursuant to the accompanying confidentiality declaration.	Kevin Miller	5/17/2023	5/22/2023	5/22/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/SPD_006_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment - Distribution
383	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)	007	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_007_01	1	CPUC - SPD (Safety Policy Division)_007_01	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request 19 Question 8.	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request 19 Question 8.	Kevin Miller	5/17/2023	5/22/2023	5/22/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/SPD_007_ip	0	N/A	8.1.2.1	Grid Design and System Hardening	Covered Conductor Installation - Distribution
384	OEIS	006	OEIS_006_01	1	OEIS_006_01	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request 19 Question 8.	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request 19 Question 8.	Dakota Smith	5/18/2023	5/23/2023	5/23/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/0EIS_006_ip	8	N/A	8.1.7	Open Work Orders	N/A
385	OEIS	006	OEIS_006_02	2	OEIS_006_02	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request 19 Question 8.	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request 19 Question 8.	Dakota Smith	5/18/2023	5/23/2023	5/23/2023	https://www.pge.com/page_global/common/pdf/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfire/wildfire-mitigation-plan/reference-docs/2023/0EIS_006_ip	2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
386	OEIS	006	OEIS_006_03	3	OEIS_006_03	Regarding PG&E's response to OEIS DR 2 Question 10, Attachment 1: a. Explain the difference between a Field Safety Assessment and a Planned Field Safety Assessment. b. In what instances would PG&E extend a work order due date through a Field Safety Assessment? Include any supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. c. In what instances would a Standards Change lead to extending a work order due date? Provide all supporting documentation and criteria, including any procedures and inspection protocols demonstrating decision-making. Additionally, provide examples in which this has occurred, including any sweeping changes. d. Include any criteria that would fall under "Other reassessment" as seen in Column 1 Reason for reinspection (if applicable). e. PG&E included three Priority A level work orders within the tab labeled "Tab 13 - Open". f. Provide the work order documentation associated with each of these tags. (i.e. Electric Corrective notification). g. If within non-HFTO, PG&E included 13 Priority H level work orders that were closed in 2022 and 52 that are still open. h. Explain what circumstances would lead to a Priority H tag within non-HFTO. i. Provide a list of the projects in which the 13 closed work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. j. Provide a list of the projects in which the 52 work orders were associated with, including details on the associated mitigation being used. k. Regarding PG&E's ignition risk notification: l. Provide documentation and/or procedures PG&E uses to determine whether or not a work order meets ignition risk criteria, including any relevant thresholds (equipment type, risk score, etc.). This should also include an explanation as to how PG&E prioritizes within the categorization of ignition risk tags (i.e. planning for timing of correction based on known risk). m. Provide PG&E's list of Facility Damage Action (FDA) data determining which ones present an ignition risk, as discussed in response to CalAdvocates Data Request											

