Pacific Gas and Electric Company

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Dixie Wildfire

July 14 – Aug 13, 2021



AFTER ACTION REPORT

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ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

1. The title of this document is *Dixie Wildfire, July 14 – August 13, 2021.*
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As of October 2021, disaster recovery operations continue for the Dixie Fire that ignited on July 13, 2021, in the Feather River Canyon area above Cresta Dam in Butte County. The fire caused catastrophic damages to the town of Quincy, extensive, prolonged evacuations, and the loss of homes and property for community members including PG&E coworkers in Butte and Plumas counties.

At 4:00 pm, July 14, 2021, PG&E activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) virtually for a Level 3 emergency for the Dixie Fire. Over the ensuing months, the fire escalated to 517,945 acres with 5,603 customer outages when the EOC deactivated on August 13, 2021. PG&E Safety and Infrastructure Protection Team (SIPT) crews performed protective work in and around PG&E facilities in the area, saving numerous power poles and protecting PG&E assets including powerhouses.

According to the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), the fire had grown to 1,200 acres within challenging and difficult to access terrain with 0% containment as of July 14, 2021. Due to the fire's smoke, PG&E transmission protection equipment in the area operated as designed to de-energize assets in support of safety, resulting in an unplanned outage to approximately 11,000 customers. Despite strong efforts by CAL FIRE and other first responders, the fire had grown to approximately 19,000 acres as of the morning of July 18, 2021. The fire was reported to have grown further to 59,984 acres with 458 customer outages as of July 20, 2021. The Dixie Fire is considered to be the second largest recorded fire in California history fully contained on October 25, 2021 with 963,309 acres burned.

As of September 2, 2021, all customers affected by the Dixie Fire who could safely receive power were restored. This report analyzes response results, identifies strengths to be maintained and built upon, highlights potential areas for further improvement, and supports development of those areas.

Major Strengths

Major strengths identified during this response are:

- Transparent EOC Command and General staff communication on the potential for a concurrent Flex Alert/Capacity Shortfall Event.
- Given the unique role PG&E Safety and Infrastructure Protection Teams (SIPTs) have in protecting PG&E-owned facilities, communication and coordination with the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) for incident operations is critical. PG&E's unified Incident Command System (ICS) approach to obtaining SIPT field access helped ensured safe access for asset protection, to include the defense and protection of outbuildings, facilities, and assets at the Canyon Dam Service Center (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Canyon Dam Service Center

In addition to the defense of the Canyon Dam Service Center, PG&E SIPT crews applied fire retardant to 6,798 power poles and defended, saved, and implemented mitigation measures to protect the following:

- Rodgers Flat Hydro Maintenance facility (defended and saved)
- Rock Crest Camp facilities and wooden bridge (prepped)
- Caribou Camp facilities (prepped)
- Wood bridge to Belden PH portal (defended and saved, Figure 2)
- Grizzly Forebay valve house (prepped)
- Critical communications conduits on top of the Rock Creek Switching Center platform (defended and saved)
- Fiber control line for Caribou Powerhouse (prepped)
- Wood bridge at Cresta Powerhouse (prepped)
- Multiple Hydro facility wood water tanks (prepped)

Figure 2: Wooden Bridge Sprinkler Placement

- At the request of Cal Fire and the U.S. Forest Service, SIPT engines also provided the following fire suppression tasks:
    - Helped extinguish fires in the Collins Pine Sawmill/lumbermill in Chester
    - Deployed a long hose placement to contain a large spot fire along Highway 44 near Old Station
    - Extinguished spot fires in the Feather River Canyon
    - Prepped a critical fiber communications link to Susanville, along Highway 395

- Effective de-escalation of temporary generation mission management in scalable manner from the Company Emergency Operation Center (EOC) to division level Operations Emergency Center (OEC) levels.

Primary Areas for Improvement

Throughout the response, PG&E identified several opportunities for improvement in our ability to respond to the incident. The primary areas for improvement, including recommendations, are as follows:

- Key EOC team positions remained unfilled up to and during the activation, resulting in insufficient staffing and a delay in the production of the ICS Incident Action Plan.

- While fire-fighting tactics generally fall within the purview of CAL FIRE and cooperating fire agencies, there is an opportunity within PG&E to provide more training on ICS incident action tactical planning content contained in ICS-300 and ICS-400 courses.
- Lack of clarity on incident related Customer support roles, responsibilities and engagement and communications.
- EOC staff should have access to incident briefing and communication products for situational awareness, to include ICS 201 Incident Briefings and ICS 209 Incident Reports.

SECTION 1: INCIDENT OVERVIEW

Incident Details

Incident Name
7/14/21 Dixie Wildfire

Type of Incident
Wildfire response

Level of Incident
Level 3 Emergency

Incident Date(s)
7/14/2021 to 8/13/2021

Duration of EOC Activation
31 days; 7/14/2021 to 8/13/2021

Locations
Butte, Plumas, Shasta, Tehama, Lassen

Activated Emergency Centers and Coordination Centers

- Company EOC, Hazard Awareness and Warning Center (HAWC), Human Resources Coordination Center (HRCC) Information Technology Coordination Center (ITCC), and Customer Contact Emergency Coordination Center (CCECC)
- Bay Area/Central Regional Emergency Center (Planning and Logistics)
    - Yosemite Operations Emergency Centers
- North Regional Emergency Center (Planning and Logistics)
    - North Valley Operations Emergency Centers

Customer Impact

- Event Summary for period 7/14/2021 – 8/13/2021
  - 57,094 Total Customers[1] out for event[2]
    - 83.81% of customers restored within 6 hours
    - 4.21% of customers restored within 12 hours
    - 0.78% of customers restored within 18 hours
    - 0.42% of customers restored within 24 hours
    - 2.83% of customers restored within 48 hours

- Outages greater than 24 hours.
  - 177 outages restored 24 – 48 hours
  - 0 outages restored 48 – 72 hours
  - 10 outage restored > 72 hours

Customer Communications

- Contact Center
  - Customer Service Representative (CSR) handled calls: 404,074
  - Interactive Voice Response (IVR) handled calls: 414,971

- Outage Communications
  - Unplanned Outage Communications Report Level 1 Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR) Accuracy Performance (July 14 – August 13, 2021)

	Total Outages	Total Affected Customers	Customers Restored by Auto ETOR		Customers Restored by 1st Manual ETOR		Customers Restored by Auto or Manual ETOR		Last ETOR Accuracy (Last group of Cust Restored)	
Systemwide	10,497	719,183	462,580	64.32%	36,205 / 256,603	14.11%	498,785	69.35%	339,296 / 347,170	97.73%

Reliability Impact, Preliminary

Reliability Indices for Dixie Fire – Butte, Lassen, Plumas, Shasta & Tehama Counties
(14 Jul – 13 Aug 2021) Transmission & Distribution
(Excluding Planned Outages)

Date	Outage Level	SAIDI	SAIFI	CAIDI	Unplan SO	CESO	C Min	Total Cust
20210714	SYSTEM	9.0	0.059	153.9	3,136	11,027	1,696,585	188,131
20210715	SYSTEM	0.1	0.000	574.2	10	18	10,336	188,131

[1] NOTE: This customer count number will differ from the reliability Customer Experiencing Sustained Outages (CESO) for multiple reasons. (e. g., outage over-inferences in OEC, single customers are included in this number, and single-phase outages are initially counted as three phase outages.)
[2] As of August 13, 2021, approximately 5,600 PG&E customers remained without power due to damages or impacts related to the Dixie Fire.

Date	Outage Level	SAIDI	SAIFI	CAIDI	Unplan SO	CESO	C Min	Total Cust
20210716	SYSTEM	0.2	0.003	69.2	303	529	36,591	188,131
20210717	SYSTEM	0.2	0.001	408.4	85	109	44,511	188,131
20210718	SYSTEM	0.9	0.008	110.4	385	1,594	175,960	188,131
20210719	SYSTEM	4.9	0.025	197.5	1,632	4,670	922,159	188,131
20210720	SYSTEM	48.8	0.004	13,931.5	299	659	9,180,844	188,131
20210721	SYSTEM	0.7	0.019	38.7	919	3,618	140,101	188,131
20210722	SYSTEM	28.9	0.001	20,583.5	107	264	5,434,033	188,131
20210723	SYSTEM	0.0	0.001	15.8	167	263	4,158	188,131
20210724	SYSTEM	1.1	0.004	244.9	377	807	197,633	188,131
20210725	SYSTEM	1.8	0.042	43.6	532	7,863	342,527	188,131
20210726	SYSTEM	0.1	0.002	46.0	332	455	20,909	188,131
20210727	SYSTEM	0.1	0.001	71.8	83	245	17,592	188,131
20210728	SYSTEM	0.1	0.001	86.5	90	131	11,330	188,131
20210729	SYSTEM	0.1	0.000	548.5	23	31	17,004	188,131
20210730	SYSTEM	0.4	0.005	80.7	579	973	78,506	188,131
20210731	SYSTEM	3.4	0.016	205.3	290	3,090	634,360	188,131
20210801	SYSTEM	3.8	0.010	384.2	926	1,877	721,205	188,131
20210802	SYSTEM	0.6	0.003	181.5	245	628	113,988	188,131
20210803	SYSTEM	13.4	0.000	37,607.8	42	67	2,519,721	188,131
20210804	SYSTEM	30.0	0.043	696.4	1,892	8,094	5,637,036	188,131
20210805	SYSTEM	0.0	0.000	87.4	19	30	2,621	188,131
20210806	SYSTEM	0.6	0.002	287.4	208	391	112,383	188,131
20210807	SYSTEM	0.6	0.002	380.9	178	288	109,697	188,131
20210808	SYSTEM	0.4	0.010	43.7	418	1,791	78,355	188,131
20210809	SYSTEM	0.5	0.002	205.5	270	455	93,518	188,131
20210810	SYSTEM	1.1	0.004	313.9	430	685	214,996	188,131
20210811	SYSTEM	0.9	0.005	173.6	621	1,004	174,332	188,131
20210812	SYSTEM	99.7	0.026	3,831.3	1,631	4,896	18,757,945	188,131
20210813	SYSTEM	1.3	0.003	456.1	274	519	236,739	188,131
JUL 14 – AUG 13	**SYSTEM**	**253.7**	**0.302**	**82,060.1**	**16,503**	**57,071**	**47,737,675**	**188,131**

***There was no Major Event days between 7/14-8/13.**

Financial Summary

Through September 30, 2021, PG&E has incurred approximately $25.1M for Dixie Fire restoration and recovery work. Approximately $20.9M in Expense and $4.3M in Capital spend. As the Dixie Fire was a state declared emergency, these costs qualify and are tracked in the Catastrophic Event Memorandum Account (CEMA) for cost recovery. The Dixie Fire restoration and rebuild effort will continue into the future and continue to incur costs as appropriate.

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SECTION 2: ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE

This AAR Report synthesizes data, reconstructs observations, and analyzes trends. Section 2 presents hotwash issues organized by PG&E Core Capabilities (referenced in the PG&E Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan [MYTEP 2021-2023]). Issue identification and trend analysis identifies patterns in strengths, areas for improvement, and major changes in operations over time. For example, a trend analysis on reoccurring hazards and capability topics will guide future planning, training, and exercise design and development.

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Capability Summary: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and lines of business that supports the execution of core capabilities.

Strengths

- Leadership emphasis on the use of the chain of command to achieve operational objectives.
- EOC staffs' willingness to step in and work laterally across functions to help co-workers when needed.
- Effective shift from multiple reporting structures for temporary generation deployments to a single source from the division level Operations Emergency Center.
- Flexible problem-solving approach to late breaking requirement for Safety and Infrastructure Protection Team (SIPT) field access.

Areas for Improvement

- Key EOC team positions remained unfilled up to and during the activation, resulting in insufficient staffing and a delay in the production of the ICS Incident Action Plan required for EOC team reference.
- Multiple parallel, inefficient efforts focused on the potential use of Sierra Pacific Industries Cogeneration plant supplemental power.
- A lack of night shift staff required day shift EOC staffers to work into the night when they would otherwise rest.

Core Capability: Operational Communication

Capability Summary: Ensure timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations.

Strengths

- Effective intra-organizational communication in response to combined impacts of wildfire evacuations and a potential capacity shortfall electric load reduction event.
- Clear communication between EOC Temporary Generation Branch and Field Temporary Generation Team.

Areas for Improvement

- Need additional training and practice in sending initial and follow up notifications in the Everbridge emergency notification system, to include creation of groups and entering new individuals into the system.
- Incoming EOC team did not receive a sufficient transition brief. Required details were not always communicated from one team during team to team or shift to shift transitions.
- Use of Power Point slides to communicate EOC rosters is time consuming and inefficient.

Core Capability: Situational Awareness

Capability Summary: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Strengths

- Strong Geographic Information System (GIS) support.
- Effective cross-functional collaboration to create PG&E building location maps in relation to fire activity using .kmz files.
- Hazard Awareness & Warning Center's (HAWC) delivery of photos and aerial mapping products in response to potential fire danger at material laydown site.

Areas for Improvement

- PG&E lacks a single-source location of affected customer data during wildfire incidents.
- Clarity around data sharing with external parties such as public safety partners. This includes use of Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs) for protected information.
- Duplicate GIS requests caused inefficiency in fulfilling the GIS requests.

Core Capability: Critical Resources (Logistics)

Capability Summary: To effectively coordinate required resources to provide essential services.

Strengths

- Strong cross functional, ICS chain of command aligned, and IAP objective based EOC Logistic Section coordination and support.

- Comprehensive, three-way communications carried out by Logistic Section personnel during Logistics coordination calls.

Areas for Improvement

- Need for proactive planning for Base Camps, including leveraging expertise from Land and Environmental teams to ensure proper steps are taken to mitigate or prevent negative environmental impacts.
- Lack of procedural guidance outlining roles and responsibilities to ensure compliance with the Employee Housing Act for field incident housing.
- Improve logistical coordination for janitorial, HVAC, lighting, etc. after hours or hours outside regular business hours.

Core Capability: Planning

Capability Summary: Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole enterprise, as appropriate, in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or organization-based approaches to meet defined objectives.

Strengths

- Power Generation and Electric Operations proactively huddled together to strategize Humboldt Bay Generation Station islanding due to wildfire activity in the vicinity of transmission lines connecting Humboldt County customers to the grid.
- Use of the EOC demobilization planning process, to include creation of a demobilization plan that effectively transferred the event to the Regional Emergency Center.

Areas for Improvement

- Although virtually engaged from July 14, 2021 forward, there was a delay in the production of the EOC Incident Acton Plan until July 19, 2021. This resulted in an information gap for EOC personnel with insufficient incident task organization, strategic, and tactical awareness.
- Better communication of temporary generation decision points, timelines, key actions, and responsible parties.

Core Capability: Environmental Health and Safety

Capability Summary: Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities.

Strengths

- Empathetic, caring response for employees who lost their homes due to the wildfire.

- Strong coordination in response to emergent needs for personnel safety at Powerhouse located in mandatory evacuation zone.
- Good coordination and communication between Operations Emergency Center (OEC) Safety Officer and EOC Safety Officer.
- Decision to stand down work due to high Air Quality Index rating.

Areas for Improvement

- Consolidate both the PG&E and Pacific Service Area Employee Association (PSEA) grants.

SECTION 3: CONCLUSION

EOC team members demonstrated strength, flexibility, and resilience by stepping in and working laterally across functions to help reduce damages and minimize threats to customers, community members and infrastructure. Areas of improvement include better on-call responsiveness, and participation including pre-incident EOC team member staff coordination to fill vacancies, which will improve operational effectiveness.

In timber type fires such as the Dixie Fire, the untreated upper portion of wooden power poles often ignite from flying embers. Despite often intense fire behavior and extreme fuel load conditions surrounding poles within or proximate to the Dixie Fire perimeter, PG&E Safety and Infrastructure Protection Team (SIPT) pre-treated 6,798 electric utility poles with fire retardant. Of the treated poles, fire surrounded and overcame 922 poles. Of the 922 poles, 707 poles were saved by SIPT treatment (76.7% survival rate), resulting in a total Company savings of $17,675,000 based on an estimate replacement cost of $25,000/pole.

In addition to electric distribution and transmission poles, PG&E SIPT resources defended, saved, and implemented mitigation measures to protect the following:

- Canyon Dam Service Center (defended)
- Rodgers Flat Hydro Maintenance facility (defended and saved)
- Rock Crest Camp facilities and wooden bridge (prepped)
- Caribou Camp facilities (prepped)
- Wood bridge to Belden PH portal (defended and saved)
- Grizzly Forebay valve house (prepped)
- Critical communications conduits on top of the Rock Creek Switching Center platform (defended and saved)
- Fiber control line for Caribou Powerhouse (prepped)
- Wood bridge at Cresta Powerhouse (prepped)
- Multiple Hydro facility wood water tanks (prepped)

While fire-fighting tactics fall within the purview of CAL FIRE and cooperating fire agencies, there is an opportunity to provide additional ICS-300 and 400 to EOC C&G Staff to train on the use of ICS based incident action tactical planning. Specifically, ICS Incident Action Plans use a series of standardized forms (e.g., ICS 202, 203, 204, and 205); however, questions posed during the hotwash suggest an opportunity for additional training on the use of ICS forms and the incident action planning process.

Lack of a central repository for active Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) related to emergency planning and response data sharing for non-PSPS emergencies caused confusion over responsible parties and process ownership.

The frequency of the Humboldt Bay Generation Station islanding supported the creation of a standard playbook, which is in progress. There is also an opportunity for improved coordination on the use of the islanding concept where feasible, for local power generation resources such as Sierra Pacific Industries Cogeneration plant.

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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

Acronym	Meaning
AAR	After Action Report
CAIDI	Customer Average Interruption Duration Index
CAL FIRE	California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
CCECC	Customer Contact Emergency Coordination Center
CEMA	Catastrophic Event Memorandum Account
CESO	Customers Experiencing Sustained Outages
CPUC	California Public Utilities Commission
CSR	Customer Service Representative
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EP&R	Emergency Preparedness and Response
ETOR	Estimated Time of Restoration
GIS	Geographic Information System
HAWC	Hazard Awareness and Warning Center
HRCC	Human Resources Coordination Center (reports to the EOC)
HVAC	Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
ICS	Incident Command System
ITCC	Information Technology Coordination Center (reports to the EOC)
IVR	Interactive Voice Response
kmz	File format for Google Earth
MYTEP	Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan
NDA	Non-Disclosure Agreement
OEC	Operations Emergency Center (OEC's report to a REC)
OMT	Outage Management Tool
PG&E	Pacific Gas and Electric Company
PSEA	Pacific Service Area Employee Association
REC	Regional Emergency Center (REC's report to the EOC, and contain OEC's)
SAIDI	System Average Interruption Duration Index
SAIFI	System Average Interruption Frequency Index
SIPT	Safety and Infrastructure Protection Team
SO	Sustained Outages

APPENDIX B: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

The following section-specific corrective actions are in draft form and may require input from PG&E LOBs before being uploaded to the Corrective Action Program.

Customer Care							
ID	**Core Capability**	**Area for Improvement**	**Corrective Action**	**Responsible LOB**	**LOB Point of Contact**	**Start Date**	**End Date**
37a	Coordination	Have a single file location for customer data similar to PSPS--maybe used Palantir to capture this information.	For non-PSPS event, create a single file location for customer data similar to PSPS--maybe used Palantir to capture this information.				

Command Staff							
ID	**Core Capability**	**Area for Improvement**	**Corrective Action**	**Responsible LOB**	**LOB Point of Contact**	**Start Date**	**End Date**
42a	Coordination	Better define CSO roles & responsibilities and communicate it across the team.	Improve CSO roles, responsibilities & engagement and communicate across the team				
42b	Planning	Clear role transition of reporting out OMT info. This should go to planning.					

Finance and Admin							
ID	**Core Capability**	**Area for Improvement**	**Corrective Action**	**Responsible LOB**	**LOB Point of Contact**	**Start Date**	**End Date**
28a	Coordination	Use one application grant process for both PG&E and PSEA requests for employees who lose their home due to wildfire.	**Potential CAP** Create one application grant process for both PG&E and PSEA requests for employees who lose their home due to wildfire.				

Logistics							
ID	**Core Capability**	**Area for Improvement**	**Corrective Action**	**Responsible LOB**	**LOB Point of Contact**	**Start Date**	**End Date**
69b	Planning	Live Link for GIS to create overlaying PG&E Facilities with respect to active fires. This past event showed the fire increased in 100,000 acres in one day. Having this information (similar to what the HAWC team has would be very beneficial to assess, remove assets safely, notify employees in Facilities and vendors supporting these sites. We were able to create a kmz file overlay for now, but a live feed with this information would be valuable to all.	**Potential CAP** If not already available, recommend building a GIS Live Link overlaying PG&E facility in relation to active fires.				
76a	Logistics and Supply	It looks like there is need to develop a procedure to outline roles and responsibilities to ensure compliance with the Employee Housing Act.	**Potential CAP** Review policies concerning the Employee Housing Act and, as needed, create standards & process/procedure for compliance.				
78a	Planning	We have identified and Law (Missy Parry) working on addressing the potential for legal violations on sites where staff or contractors are setup or allowed to sleep (more than 4 individuals). Regulations for Employee Housing Programs has a permit that we need to secure prior to staff sleeping on site. This has been a practice and was not addressed in the past. This needs to be an intake question when assessing potential sites with OPs being aware of this being an issue.	**Potential CAP** If not precluded by existing policy, there is a need for a policy and procedure addressing on-site sleeping arrangements for four or more employees or contractors.				

Planning							
ID	**Core Capability**	**Area for Improvement**	**Corrective Action**	**Responsible LOB**	**LOB Point of Contact**	**Start Date**	**End Date**
30a	Coordination	1 Lesson Learned is many updates on the IPA during the Planning took a bit longer to get it approved and the Incident Action Plan went out later than planned. If officers/approvers will be travelling or busy, request their review and approval during the call.	**Potential CAP – Document Approval Process** Improve IAP approval process and delegation of authority to meet publication routine				
53a	Public Information	PSS needs to have a refresher in the sharing of PG&E data. We got a request from PSS today to share data with the forestry service in Shasta. They didn't run this by Law, nor did they seem aware they had to. We really can't share data (especially data that comes from the GIS analyst) with outside groups without an NDA.	**Potential CAP** If not already available, recommend building a GIS Live Link overlaying PG&E facilities in relation to active fires.				
85a	Coordination	Recommend reviewing existing demob plan template to see how the demob plan for the Dixie Fire differed from other events.	**Potential CAP.** Evaluate current Demob plan to determine if transfer to REC will be used in the future				

Operation							
ID	**Core Capability**	**Area for Improvement**	**Corrective Action**	**Responsible LOB**	**LOB Point of Contact**	**Start Date**	**End Date**

Operation							
ID	**Core Capability**	**Area for Improvement**	**Corrective Action**	**Responsible LOB**	**LOB Point of Contact**	**Start Date**	**End Date**
49a	Planning	Frequent application of the Humboldt Bay Generation Station islanding supports the creation of a standard playbook upon which operations staff can train and exercise.	**Recommended CAP** Create Humboldt Bay Generation Station Islanding Playbook.				
49b	Coordination	There seems to be a lot of people disengaged over the weekend EOC shifts. I am not sure if it's the virtual nature of the EOC today, the fact that it's a weekend, or something else but a lot of the calls in ops and planning had more people missing. This should probably be an everybody priority.	Improve on-call responsiveness and ensure teams participates in planning meeting especially over the weekends.				