August 24, 2026

Director Forest Kaser
Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety
300 Capital Mall, Suite 500
Sacramento, CA 95814

Docket Number #: 2026-EC

SUBJECT: 2026 Executive Compensation Structure Submission of Southern California Edison Pursuant to Assembly Bill 1054

Dear Director Kaser:

In response to the 2026 Executive Compensation Structure Submission Guidelines (2026 Guidelines) adopted by the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (Energy Safety) on July 16, 2026, Southern California Edison Company (SCE) submits its 2026 Executive Compensation Structure for approval. SCE thanks Energy Safety for its continuing engagement and feedback as we advance our shared goals to improve safety, reduce wildfire risk and support the ongoing resiliency of our communities. SCE recognizes that continuing to strengthen and evolve its executive compensation structure plays a key part in this ongoing work.

The attached Required Information Template describes SCE's compensation program for its executive officers, including how compensation is determined and how the executive compensation structure aligns with Public Utilities Code section 8389(a) and incorporates most elements contained in Assigned Commissioner's Ruling Proposal 9 for Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) (which other electrical corporations are encouraged to *consider* adopting).[1]

Energy Safety's December 29, 2025, approval of SCE's 2025 Executive Compensation Structure (2025 Approval) included recommended modifications to SCE's executive compensation structure for 2026. The Compensation and Executive Personnel Committee of the SCE Board of Directors (Compensation Committee)[2] evaluated the recommendations, discussed them with its independent compensation consultant, Pay Governance, and approved changes for 2026, as described below. These recommendations and associated changes apply to three areas: (i) level of safety incentives, (ii) executive engagement and (iii) compensation withholding

[1] Executive Compensation Structure Guidelines Attachments Version 2.0, July 2026, p. A-50.

[2] The Compensation Committee consists solely of independent Board members who have significant experience and qualifications and bring a variety of perspectives to the Committee's deliberations. No officers or other employees serve on the Compensation Committee.

Level of Safety Incentives

The 2025 Approval recommended that SCE increase short-term incentive targets for safety components and/or modify its long-term incentive program to include a safety component.

For 2026, the Compensation Committee increased the weighting of SCE's Safety and Resiliency goal category[3] to 60% of SCE's annual incentive program's overall target weighting. This was done by reallocating five points to Public Safety and Wildfire Resiliency goals from SCE's core earnings goal. For purposes of Energy Safety's categories of "Wildfire Safety" and "Workforce Safety," SCE's total weighting for 2026 has increased to 50%, as reflected in Table 1.3.5 of the Required Information Template.[4] SCE's Safety and Resiliency goal category also includes a combined 10% weighting for cybersecurity and grid, technology and other capital deployments that overall enhance safety and resiliency; however, the weighting for those goals has been allocated in Table 1.3.5 to Energy Safety's "Security" and "Financial" categories in accordance with the instructions.

The Compensation Committee also is evaluating incorporating explicit safety metrics into the company's long-term incentive program beginning with 2027 grants. Although the long-term incentive awards granted in 2026 do not include a standalone safety metric, the program's existing performance measures provide a strong incentive for executives to mitigate risk and improve the safety and resiliency of our communities. For example, performance shares with a total shareholder return metric that vested on December 31, 2025, terminated for no value due to below-threshold performance tied to the Eaton Fire. In addition, SCE executive officers' stock options with a January 2, 2026, expiration date that were outstanding on January 7, 2025, terminated for no value on their expiration date.

Executive Engagement

The 2025 Approval recommended that SCE include executive engagement in safety discussions with the workforce as a component of its incentive compensation structure and that performance measures be used for this purpose instead of input measures such as number of engagements.

For 2026, the Compensation Committee approved new individual and corporate goal success measures for executive engagement aligned with Energy Safety's recommendation. These new success measures serve as leading indicators that are intended to increase the extent of meaningful executive-employee interaction on safety and contribute to improved results in Energy Safety's next Safety Culture Assessment for SCE.

At the beginning of 2026, individual goals were established for SCE's executive officers that required participation in multiple listening tours and other safety discussion engagements with the

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[3] Please see Table 1.3.5 of the Required Information Template, which explains how the metrics in SCE's "Safety and Resiliency" category align with the categorization prescribed by Energy Safety.

[4] SCE's total target weighting for Energy Safety's Wildfire Safety and Workforce Safety categories increased from 40% for 2025 to 50% for 2026: five percentage points were reallocated from the core earnings goal to Wildfire Safety goals, and the 5% weighting for the Quality conformance index was included in Energy Safety's Wildfire Safety category for 2026 (rather than as an "Other Operation/Improvement" metric as in prior years) because it serves as a leading indicator of wildfire risk reduction and has a focus of quality conformance with safety and resiliency impacts.

workforce. In addition, the Compensation Committee expanded the annual incentive workforce development goal for 2026 to add employee engagement action plan milestones. These milestones include goals for senior leaders to conduct numerous meetings with non-executive leaders in small, informal groups for discussions that include physical and psychological safety.

The Compensation Committee will use the scores on Energy Safety's next Safety Culture Survey to inform subsequent annual incentive goals that pertain to this topic.

Compensation Withholding

The 2025 Approval recommended that SCE develop a policy that creates a presumption that SCE would withhold a material portion of incentive compensation in the event SCE causes a catastrophic wildfire that results in one or more fatalities.

The Compensation Committee has discretion to reduce or eliminate annual incentive awards in the event of a significant safety or compliance lapse, or if they deem it advisable for other circumstances. In light of the impact of the Eaton Fire, the Compensation Committee reduced the 2025 annual incentive awards that otherwise would have been payable to SCE President and Chief Executive Officer Steven Powell and Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Jill Anderson by over [redacted] as well as by about [redacted] for most of SCE's other executive officers.[5] In making these decisions, the Compensation Committee took into consideration the significant impact on long-term incentives from the Eaton Fire.[6]

The Compensation Committee is evaluating incorporating a presumption of withholding for 2027 incentives. For 2026, the Compensation Committee considered the material impacts on SCE executive officer incentive compensation tied to the Eaton Fire and determined that the executive compensation structure, with the changes for 2026 discussed above, provides proper incentives for safety while also supporting retention and recruitment of highly qualified executives dedicated to safety – especially when compared to compensation packages from the companies with whom SCE competes in the market for talent.

The 2025 Approval also recommended that the Compensation Committee "exercise its discretion to suspend vesting of performance shares, stock options, and restricted stock units pending completion of the causal investigations of the wildfires." As discussed above, the total shareholder return performance shares that vested on December 31, 2025, and the outstanding stock options with an expiration date of January 2, 2026, terminated for no value under the contractual terms applicable to those awards. Similarly, the contractual terms applicable to other long-term incentives

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5 [redacted] The Edison International (EIX) Compensation Committee similarly exercised its discretion to reduce by approximately 40% the 2025 annual incentive award that otherwise would have been payable to Pedro Pizarro, the president and chief executive officer of Edison International.

6 For example, the compensation actually paid to Mr. Pizarro (calculated using the methodology required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; see pages 75-76 of EIX's 2026 proxy statement) decreased by more than two-thirds from 2024 to 2025, due mostly to decreases in long-term incentive value tied to the Eaton Fire.

that were outstanding in 2025 did not give the Compensation Committee any authority to unilaterally suspend vesting.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this submission and for the continued work ahead to reduce wildfire risks in California. Please contact me if you have questions or require additional information.

Sincerely,

//s//
Michael A. Backstrom

Senior Vice President
Regulatory Affairs

1.1 Incentive Compensation Components

Rationale: For the issuance of a Safety Certification, Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(4) requires that electrical corporations' executive incentive compensation structures include "incentive compensation based on meeting performance metrics that are measurable and enforceable, for all executive officers...." To evaluate an electrical corporation's compliance with this requirement, Energy Safety must know: (a) who are the electrical corporation's executive officers and (b) what incentive compensation structure exists.

Definition: "Executive officer" is defined in Public Utilities Code section 451.5(c) and "means any person who performs policy making functions and is employed by the public utility subject to the approval of the board of directors, and includes the president, secretary, treasurer, and any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or function of the public utility." Energy Safety considers divisions or units responsible for electrical operations, gas operations or wildfire-related functions principal business units, divisions, or functions of the public utility.

Instructions: In Table 1.1.1, for each executive officer subject to the executive compensation filing requirements, the electrical corporation must provide the executive title and function, the executive name (if the executive is classified as an Officer of the Company per the Company's website), the target percentage of Short-Term Incentives (STIP) and Long-Term Incentives (LTIP) as a proportion of Total Incentive Compensation (TIC) for the appropriate filing year. See the definition of the proceeding terms in Attachment 2.

For the purpose of calculating the percentage of TIC, use the grant value of the compensation as determined for accounting purposes. Grant value is the value that is disclosed in proxy statement summary compensation tables for executive officers who are proxy officers. Percentages must be specified for each executive officer and not a range for various position levels.

Table 1.1.1
Incentive Compensation at the Target Level

Executive Title/ Function and Name (where applicable)	Target Quarterly STIP as a Percent of TIC	Target Annual STIP as a Percent of TIC	Target Total STIP as a Percent of TIC	Target LTIP as a Percent of TIC
President and Chief Executive Officer - Steven D. Powell	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Jill C. Anderson	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Senior Vice President ("SVP") and Chief Financial Officer - Aaron D. Moss[7]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
Vice President ("VP"), Chief Accounting Officer & Controller – Kara G. Ryan[7]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and General Counsel - Jennifer R. Hasbrouck	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and Chief Customer Officer - Olufunmilayo A. Williamson	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP, Transmission & Distribution – Orville O. Cocking	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

[7] Mr. Moss ceased to serve as the SVP, Chief Financial Officer of SCE as of the close of business on July 3, 2026. The Board of Directors of SCE ("SCE Board") designated Ms. Ryan to function as, and perform the duties of, the Chief Financial Officer of SCE while continuing to serve in her position as VP, Chief Accounting Officer and Controller. In connection with this designation, the SCE Board designated Ms. Ryan as an executive officer of SCE under Rule 3b-7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These designations became effective as of the close of business on July 3, 2026.

Instructions: In Table 1.1.2, for each executive officer subject to the executive compensation filing requirements, the electrical corporation must provide the executive title and function, the executive name (if the executive is classified as an Officer of the Company per the Company's website), the target percentage of Base Salary, STIP and LTIP as a proportion of Total Direct Compensation (TDC) for the appropriate filing year. See the definition of the proceeding terms in **Attachment 2**.

Table 1.1.2
Total Direct Compensation at the Target Level

Executive Title/ Function and Name (where applicable)	Target Base Salary as a Percent of TDC	Target Quarterly STIP as a Percent of TDC	Target Annual STIP as a Percent of TDC	Target LTIP as a Percent of TDC
President and Chief Executive Officer - Steven D. Powell	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Jill C. Anderson	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and Chief Financial Officer - Aaron D. Moss	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
VP, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller – Kara G. Ryan	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and General Counsel - Jennifer R. Hasbrouck	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and Chief Customer Officer - Olufunmilayo A. Williamson	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP, Transmission & Distribution – Orville O. Cocking	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]

Instructions: In Table 1.1.3, for each executive officer subject to the executive compensation filing requirements, provide the target percentages of quarterly STIP, annual STIP and LTIP as a percentage of base salary for the appropriate filing year.

Table 1.1.3
Target Incentive Compensation as a Percent of Base Salary

Executive Title/ Function and Name (where applicable)	Target Quarterly STIP as a Percent of Base Salary	Target Annual STIP as a Percent of Base Salary	Target LTIP as a Percent of Base Salary
President and Chief Executive Officer - Steven D. Powell	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Jill C. Anderson	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and Chief Financial Officer - Aaron D. Moss	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
VP, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller - Kara G. Ryan	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and General Counsel - Jennifer R. Hasbrouck	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and Chief Customer Officer - Olufunmilayo A. Williamson	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP, Transmission & Distribution - Orville O. Cocking	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]

1.2 Executive Officer Exclusion Rationale

Rationale: For the issuance of a Safety Certification, Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(4) requires that electrical corporations' executive incentive compensation structures include "incentive compensation based on meeting performance metrics that are measurable and enforceable, for all executive officers...." To ensure incentive compensation is used for all executive officers, Energy Safety must understand why certain top-level officials do not fit within the definition of "executive officers" as defined in Public Utilities Code section 451.5(c).

Instructions: For the purpose of completing Table 1.2.1, the electrical corporation must include all the positions of the highest three tiers of the executives or officers of the electrical corporation that do not fit within the definition of "executive officers" as defined in Public Utilities Code section 451.5(c). For those positions, the electrical corporation must provide an explanation regarding why the executives holding those positions are not considered “executive officers” as set forth in Public Utilities Code section 451.5(c).[8] The electrical corporation must include all positions within a tier in the table.

Table 1.2.1
Public Utilities Code Section 451.5(c) Exclusion Rationales

Executive Title/Role	Rationale
SCE Executive Vice President, Public Policy & Corporate Affairs	This individual is not in charge of a principal business unit, division or function of SCE and does not otherwise perform a policy-making function for SCE
SCE Senior Vice President and Chief Human Resources Officer	This individual is not in charge of a principal business unit, division or function of SCE and does not otherwise perform a policy-making function for SCE
SCE Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer	This individual is not in charge of a principal business unit, division or function of SCE and does not otherwise perform a policy-making function for SCE
SCE Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs	This individual is not in charge of a principal business unit, division or function of SCE and does not otherwise perform a policy-making function for SCE
SCE Senior Vice President, System Planning & Engineering	This individual is not in charge of a principal business unit, division or function of SCE and does not otherwise perform a policy-making function for SCE

* The three highest tiers of executives or officers of SCE are:

1. President and Chief Executive Officer
2. Executive Vice President
3. Senior Vice President

Except for the senior vice presidents and executive vice president listed above in Table 1.2.1, all of SCE’s executives and officers in these three highest tiers are “executive officers” of SCE as defined in Pub. Util. Code § 451.5(c). None of SCE’s executives or officers below these three highest tiers is an “executive officer” of SCE as defined in Pub. Util. Code § 451.5(c), other than Ms. Ryan on account of her designation by the SCE Board to function as, and perform the duties of, the Chief Financial Officer of SCE. See pages 3-5 of the reply comments submitted by SCE on April 24, 2023 (Southern California Edison Company’s Comments in Reply to Cal Advocates’ Comments on the 2023 Executive Compensation Structure Submission) in Docket# 2023-EC (SCE 4/24/23 Reply Comments) for additional information regarding the determination of “executive officers.”

[8] Public Utilities Code Section 451.5(c) (https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=451.5&lawCode=PUC, accessed Feb. 18, 2025).

1. *Definition of policy making:*

The electrical corporation must explain how the electrical corporation defines policy making for purposes of the inclusion or exclusion of personnel pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 451.5(c) (i.e., what constitutes policy making):

On an annual or more frequent basis, the SCE Board evaluates and determines who performs policy making functions for SCE. The SCE Board designates these policymakers as its executive officers under Rule 3b-7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 3b-7). As the California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) stated in its decision in SCE's 2021 General Rate Case (2021 GRC), the definition of "executive officer" in Pub. Util. Code § 451.5 "is similar to the definition provided in Rule 3b-7."[9] One of the similarities is that both definitions provide that executive officers perform policy making functions.

There are two key aspects of policy making for purposes of the executive officer determination. First, only policy decisions that could have a material impact on the company are considered for this purpose.[10] Second, policy makers must regularly exercise final authority over material policy decisions. Officers who merely influence policy decisions are policy advisors, not policy makers.[11] All of our officers at some point advise on material policy decisions. But only executive officers regularly exercise final authority to make material policy decisions.

See pages 3-5 of the SCE 4/24/23 Reply Comments for additional information.

1.3 Short-Term Incentive Program (STIP)

Rationale: For the issuance of a Safety Certification, Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(4) requires that electrical corporations' executive incentive compensation structures are "structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety and utility financial stability with performance metrics, including incentive compensation based on meeting performance metrics that are measurable and enforceable, for all executive officers... ." To ensure that the executive compensation structure for electrical corporation executive officers is structured to promote safety as a priority and ensure public safety and utility financial stability, Energy Safety must have an in-depth understanding of:

- The performance-based components of an executive compensation structure.
- How that structure is promoting safety.
- How effective metrics are in changing safety and financial outcomes.
- How adjustments to metrics are tied to performance.

Instructions: The STIP includes all performance-based compensation awarded on a performance term of less than three years. If the electrical corporation uses more than one short-term incentive mechanism, the electrical corporation must repeat this information for each mechanism (e.g., quarterly, and annually).

[9] D.21-08-036, p. 417, fn. 1353. *See also* D. 25-09-030 (2025 GRC), p. 648, fn. 2256 (noting that "officer" is "defined as employees of the IOUs in positions with titles of Vice President or above, consistent with Rule 3b-7 of the Securities Exchange Act.")

[10] According to guidance from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), "Policy-making function" is not intended to include policy-making functions that are not significant." 17 CFR 240.16a-1(f).

[11] *See SEC v. Prince*, 942 F. Supp. 2d 108, 135 (D.D.C. 2013) ("substantial influence and involvement with regard to [material functions such as] mergers and acquisitions issues" did not constitute a policy-making function because the individual "did not have final, policy making authority over that program.")

1.3.1 STIP Structure

Instructions: The electrical corporation must provide the requested STIP information regarding payment type, triggers, deductions, the use of individual performance modifiers, the use of company performance modifiers, the use of thresholds, targets, and maximums and the associated percentages, and how performance between categories is interpolated.

1. ***STIP Payment Type.***

   Check one for the current year:

   Cash: ☒ Other: ☐

   If other, describe the other type of STIP payment:

2. ***Use of Any Performance Triggers***

a) Does the electrical corporation's STIP for the current year use any non-discretionary performance triggers (e.g., must achieve certain annual earnings per share before any STIP payments are made)? Check one:

   Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe any performance triggers:

Performance triggers are an aspect of our foundational goals and core earnings goal. Foundational goals are a deduct-only category. Safety and compliance are foundational, and significant lapses (e.g., events such as employee fatalities, significant non-compliance events or a catastrophic wildfire involving SCE's facilities for which SCE cannot make a good faith showing that its conduct was consistent with the actions of a reasonable utility) can result in reduction or elimination of short-term incentive compensation (STIP), depending upon the assessment of the circumstances by the Compensation and Executive Personnel Committee of the SCE Board (Compensation Committee). The Compensation Committee has exercised its authority in this area multiple times to reduce STIP awards for safety performance. See Table 1.3.8 below for examples. The core earnings goal also provides that the STIP payout may be zero if core earnings fall below the threshold level.

In addition to non-discretionary performance triggers, the Compensation Committee may exercise its discretion to reduce or eliminate annual incentive awards if they deem it advisable for other circumstances. See Section 1.3.1.7 (b) below for a discussion of the Compensation Committee's determination to exercise its discretion to reduce STIP payouts for 2025 for certain executives of SCE in light of the impact of the Eaton Fire.

b) If this changed from the prior year, explain the reason for the change:

N/A

3. *Use of Any Automatic, Non-Discretionary Deductions*

a) Does the electrical corporation's STIP for the current year include any automatic non-discretionary deductions (e.g., failure to achieve WMP targets results in X% reduction, catastrophic wildfire results in zeroing out all safety metrics)? Check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe all automatic, non-discretionary deductions:

Awards made to each of the executive officers of SCE under the 2026 STIP are subject to the Incentive Compensation Recoupment Policy, which mirrors the requirements of Rule 10D-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended and Section 303A.14 of the New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual. This policy requires recoupment of certain forms of incentive-based compensation (which would include awards under the 2026 STIP) in the event of certain accounting restatements described in more detail in such policy.

b) If this changed from the prior year, explain the reason for the change:

N/A

4. *Use of Any Specifically Defined Discretionary Deductions*

a) Does the electrical corporation's STIP for the current year include any defined deductions (e.g., foundational, deduct only goals) that are part of the compensation structure? Check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe all specific/defined discretionary deductions that are part of thestructure:

See Section 1.3.1.2 above for an overview of our foundational deduct-only goals and core earnings threshold performance level. Additional information for the 2026 STIP is in 1.3.3. In addition, awards made to each of the executive officers of SCE under the 2026 STIP are subject to misconduct recoupment provisions that allow the Compensation Committee to recoup such awards from officers who are terminated or suspended without pay for certain forms of misconduct to the extent such recoupment is permitted by applicable law.

b) If this changed from the prior year, explain the reason for the change:

N/A

5. *Use of a Performance Range – Previous Year*

a) Were the STIP payouts for the previous year based on a performance range (i.e., below minimum/threshold, minimum/threshold, target, maximum)? Check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

b) Did the electrical corporation use one range for all previous year's STIP metrics or differing ranges based on the category of metric? Check one:

One range for all metrics: ☐ Multiple ranges: ☒

If multiple ranges are used, explain why:

With the two exceptions noted below, the same basic scoring range is used for all quantitative performance goals: 0% for Unmet/Minimum performance or below, 100% for Met/Target performance, and 200% for Exceeded/Maximum performance or above.

As discussed above in Section 1.3.1.2, the core earnings goal includes a Threshold level for performance below Unmet/Minimum performance. Core earnings below the Threshold level may result in zero STIP payout.

In addition, as discussed above in Section 1.3.1.2, the Compensation Committee established certain safety and compliance goals that it views as foundational. Significant lapses can result in either a reduction or an elimination of STIP awards for all or some plan participants, depending upon the Compensation Committee's assessment of the circumstances. Since this is a deduct-only goal that has zero as its target, there is no performance range for scoring above zero.

Provide the previous year's STIP metric performance range(s):

Table 1.3.1
Previous Year STIP Metric Performance Range(s)

	Below Minimum	Minimum	Target	Maximum
Foundational Goals*	Up to -100%	0%	0%	0%
Core Earnings Goal*	-100%	0%	100%	200%
Other Quantitative Performance Goals*	0%	0%	100%	200%

c) Describe the interpolation method between categories (e.g., straight line):

*The explanations provided above in Sections 1.3.1.2 and 1.3.1.5 regarding the scoring of foundational goals and the scoring of Below Minimum performance on the core earnings goal also applies to this Table 1.3.1.

For the core earnings goal, performance between Unmet/Minimum and Met/Target and between Met/Target and Exceeded/Maximum was scored using linear interpolation. The Threshold level was set at 80% of the core earnings target, while the Unmet/Minimum level was set at 90% of the core earnings target.

For other quantitative performance goals, performance between Unmet/Minimum and Met/Target and between Met/Target and Exceeded/Maximum was initially scored using linear interpolation with practical rounding.

See Section 1.3.1.7 (b) below for more information about Compensation Committee discretion in determining STIP scoring and payouts.

6. *Use of a Performance Range – Current Year*

a) Do the STIP payouts for the current year include a performance range (i.e., below minimum/threshold, minimum/threshold, target, maximum)? Check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

b) Is the electrical corporation using one range for all current year's STIP metrics or differing ranges based on the category of metric)? Check one:

One range for all metrics: ☐ Multiple ranges: ☒

If multiple ranges are used, explain why:

The explanation provided above in Section 1.3.1.5 also applies to this Section 1.3.1.6.

Provide the current year STIP metric performance range(s):

Table 1.3.2

Current Year STIP Metric Performance Range(s)

	Below Minimum	Minimum	Target	Maximum
Foundational Goals*	Up to -100%	0%	0%	0%
Core Earnings Goal*	-100%	0%	100%	200%
Other Quantitative Performance Goals*	0%	0%	100%	200%

c) Describe the interpolation method between categories:

*The explanations provided above in Sections 1.3.1.2 and 1.3.1.5 regarding the scoring of foundational goals and the scoring of Below Minimum performance on the core earnings goal also applies to this Table 1.3.2.

For the core earnings goal, performance between Unmet/Minimum and Met/Target and between Met/Target and Exceeded/Maximum is scored using linear interpolation. The Threshold level is set at 80% of the core earnings target, while the Unmet/Minimum level is set at 95% of the core earnings target.

For other quantitative performance goals, performance between Unmet/Minimum and Met/Target and between Met/Target and Exceeded/Maximum is initially scored using linear interpolation with practical rounding.

See Section 1.3.1.7 (b) below for more information about Compensation Committee discretion in determining STIP scoring and payouts.

d) Did the performance range change for any metrics from the previous year to the current year? Check one:

Yes: ☐ No: ☒

If "Yes," describe and quantify the change for each such metric:

7. *Use of Performance Modifiers – Previous Year Actual*

a) Did the electrical corporation's STIP for the previous year involve the use of any of the following types of performance modifiers?

Individual Performance Modifier – Previous Year, check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe each performance modifiers:

The 2025 STIP payout for an executive officer equaled the target payout for that executive officer established by the Compensation Committee times (i) the company multiplier determined by the Compensation Committee after assessing SCE's performance on 2025 goals and (ii) an individual performance modifier ("IPM") for the executive officer determined by the Compensation Committee based on its evaluation of the executive officer's 2025 performance. The potential range for the IPM was 0% to 150%. Actual IPMs for SCE's executive officers are provided below in Table 1.3.3. The potential range for the STIP payout (after taking into account the company multiplier and the IPM) was 0% to 200% of the target payout.

If "Yes," quantify for each executive their individual performance modifiers:

Table 1.3.3
Individual Performance Modifiers – Previous Year Actual

Executive Title/ Function and Name (where applicable)	Increase/ Decrease	Percentage Change	Factors in/ Reason for Adjustment (1)
President and Chief Executive Officer - Steven D. Powell	[redacted]	[redacted]	See SCE Footnote to Table 1.3.3
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Jill C. Anderson	[redacted]	[redacted]	See SCE Footnote to Table 1.3.3
SVP and Chief Financial Officer - Aaron D. Moss	[redacted]	[redacted]	See SCE Footnote to Table 1.3.3
VP, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller – Kara G. Ryan	[redacted]	[redacted]	See SCE Footnote to Table 1.3.3
SVP and General Counsel - Jennifer R. Hasbrouck	[redacted]	[redacted]	See SCE Footnote to Table 1.3.3
SVP and Chief Customer Officer - Olufunmilayo A. Williamson	[redacted]	[redacted]	See SCE Footnote to Table 1.3.3
SVP, Transmission & Distribution – Orville O. Cocking	[redacted]	[redacted]	See SCE Footnote to Table 1.3.3

(1) Providing the broad category for the 'Factors in/Reasons for the Adjustment' column is sufficient when those reasons are not safety related (e.g., Other Non-Safety Related, Superior Financial Performance, etc.). If the reason for an adjustment is safety and/or WMP related then the reason provided must be specific (e.g., failure to achieve covered conductor installation WMP targets).

SCE Footnote to Table 1.3.3: The Compensation Committee decided to use an IPM of 100% for Mr. Powell because the Compensation Committee believes it is important to align the initial calculation of the CEO's annual incentive award to SCE's scorecard performance on its annual goals. The IPMs for the other executive officers reflect the Committee's holistic assessment of each officer's overall performance for 2025 on a variety of matters, including ones related to safety, resiliency, and finances. Since the assessment is holistic, a variance from a 100% IPM is not solely attributable to any single metric or reason. [redacted]

In addition to assessing each executive officer's IPM, the Compensation Committee may also exercise its discretion to reduce or eliminate annual incentive awards if they deem it advisable for other circumstances. See Section 1.3.1.7 (b) below for a discussion of the Compensation Committee's determination to exercise its discretion to reduce STIP payouts for 2025 for certain executives of SCE in light of the impact of the Eaton Fire on communities within SCE's service area.

b) Did the electrical corporation's STIP for the previous year involve the use of any of the following types of performance modifiers?

Company Performance Modifier – Previous Year, check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe and quantify the impact of the company performance modifier:

As explained above in Section 1.3.1.7, the 2025 STIP payout for an executive officer equaled the target payout for the executive officer established by the Compensation Committee times (i) the company multiplier and (ii) the IPM. Early in 2025, the Compensation Committee established rigorous corporate performance goals for the year. Nearly all goals were based on the achievement of objectively measurable performance against pre-established quantitative success measures. The company multiplier was determined by the Compensation Committee in early 2026 after assessing SCE's performance on 2025 goals. The company multiplier for 2025 was used to determine annual incentive awards for all exempt employees, including executive officers. The potential range for the company multiplier was 0% to 200%. As noted above, the potential range for the STIP payout (after taking into account both the company multiplier and the IPM) was 0% to 200% of the target payout. The Compensation Committee had discretion to make any adjustments within this range it deemed advisable should circumstances warrant. See below for additional information about Compensation Committee discretion, including the latest example of the Compensation Committee's exercise of discretion. It reduced the corporate modifier for 2025 in light of the impact of the Eaton Fire on communities within SCE's service area.

Board Discretion, check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe and quantify the impact of the board's discretion:

The SCE Board has delegated authority and responsibility for the STIP to the Compensation Committee, which is composed solely of independent Board members who have significant experience and qualifications and bring a variety of perspectives to the Compensation Committee's deliberations. No officers or other employees serve on the Compensation Committee. The Compensation Committee retains an independent compensation consultant, Pay Governance, to assist in evaluating executive officer compensation.

At a Compensation Committee meeting in February following the end of the goal year, the Compensation Committee determines the score achieved for each success measure that was approved for the STIP at the beginning of the goal year. Nearly all 2025 goals were based on the achievement of objectively measurable performance against pre-established quantitative success measures, with rigorous performance metrics. Only 13% of SCE's target weighting was allocated to qualitative success measures.

The Compensation Committee established an overarching goals framework whereby the goals must be achieved while living the Company's values, and events such as fatalities or significant non-compliance issues can result in the reduction or elimination of annual incentive awards for all or some plan participants, depending upon the Committee's assessment of the circumstances. The Compensation Committee can further exercise discretion to reduce or increase STIP payouts within the range of zero to 200% of target should circumstances warrant.

For 2025, the Compensation Committee approved the sum of the scores of the individual success measures as the company multiplier. In light of the impact of the Eaton Fire on communities within SCE's service area, the Compensation Committee exercised its discretion and decided to reduce by approximately [redacted] the STIP payouts otherwise payable for 2025 to Mr. Powell and Ms. Anderson. The reductions for Mr. Moss and Mses. Hasbrouck and Williamson were approximately [redacted] The Compensation Committee did not exercise such discretion with respect to the STIP payouts for Mr. Cocking and Ms. Ryan. The Eaton Fire occurred in January 2025, whereas Mr. Cocking joined SCE in September 2025. Ms. Ryan was not an executive officer during 2025.

1.3.2 Previous Year STIP Metrics – Minimum, Target, Maximum and Actual

Instructions: Complete Table 1.3.4 for the previous year' STIP metrics, adding rows as necessary. See **Attachment 3** for a discussion of categories and sub-categories.

Table 1.3.4
Previous Year STIP – Minimum, Target, and Maximum Versus Actual

Category	Sub-Category	Metric	Metric Type	Weight	Min	Target	Max	Actual Performance	Weighted Contribution
Other Safety; Security; ESG	Public Safety; Compliance / Adherence	Foundational Goals[12]	Lagging Outcome	Deduct Only	No Deduct	No Deduct	No Deduct	Met	0
			Subtotal:	**Deduct Only**					**0**
Other Safety	Workforce Safety	Employee Edison Electric Institute (EEI) SIF Rate	Lagging Outcome	5%	0.045	0.030	0.015	0.023	= 5%*147% **7%**
		Achieve count of High Energy Control Assessments (HECA) on high-hazard tasks	Leading	3%	25,500	30,000	34,500	33,324	= 3%*174% **5%**

[12] The foundational goals had the following success measures: no employee fatalities; no serious injuries to public from system failure; no significant non-compliance events; and maintain effective controls and cybersecurity measures to prevent and mitigate significant disruption, data breach or system failure. See explanation provided in Section 1.3.1.2 for additional information about potential deductions.

Category	Sub-Category	Metric	Metric Type	Weight	Min	Target	Max	Actual Performance	Weighted Contribution
		Achieve count of quality observations of employees in high-hazard occupations that include either opportuni-ties or recognition	Leading	2%	27,200	32,000	36,800	43,292	= 2%*200% **4%**
			Subtotal	**10%**					**16%**
Wildfire Safety	Wildfire Mitigation Metrics	CPUC Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA)	Leading/ Lagging Outcome [13]	6%	45	37	29	29	= 6%*200% **12%**
		Covered Conductor	Leading	6%	525	650	775	690[14]	= 6%*132% **8%**
		Targeted Underground-ing	Leading	2%	30	40	50	50	=2%*200% **4%**
		Overhead Inspections and Remediations in HFRA	Leading	5%	60%	70%	80%	74%	=5%*140% **7%**
		Vegetation Line Clearing	Leading	5%	81%	86%	91%	94%	=5%*200% **10%**

[13] Ignitions is a lagging/outcome metric for reducing wildfire risk, but a leading indicator for reducing public safety serious injuries and fatalities.

[14] Upon subsequent validation, covered conductor performance reported in SCE's 2026 Annual Implementation report was 706 miles, which was slightly higher than the achievement used to calculate the STIP payout.

Category	Sub-Category	Metric	Metric Type	Weight	Min	Target	Max	Actual Performance	Weighted Contribution
		PSPS: Improve Customer Notifications Before De-energization	Leading	6%	96%	98%	100%	99% (Jan) / 100% (Feb-Dec)	=1%*130% + 1%*0% + 2%*195% + 2%*195% **6%**[15]
		PSPS: Improve Customer Notifications After De-energization	Leading					95% (Jan) / 100% (Feb-Dec)	
		Subtotal:		**30%**					**47%**
Security		Phishing Simulation Exercise Click Rate	Leading	3%	5.5%	4.5%	3.5%	3.3%	=3%*200% **6%**
		Phishing Simulation Exercise Reporting Rate	Leading	2%	33%	38%	43%	30.9%	=2%*0% **0%**
		Subtotal:		**5%**					**6%**
Other Operational / Improvement		Quality conformance index	Lagging Outcome	5%	88%	91%	94%	93%	=5%*167% **8%**
		Implement 2025 planned improvement actions	Activity-based*	6%	N/A	N/A	N/A	Target	=**6%**

[15] January performance was evaluated separately from the performance for February through December. This approach accounts for unique challenges related to January extreme weather events. February through December performance was 99.9% (close to maximum) for before and after de-energization. January performance for before de-energization was above target while after de-energization was below minimum. Overall, the goal was scored at target.

Category	Sub-Category	Metric	Metric Type	Weight	Min	Target	Max	Actual Performance	Weighted Contribution
		Improve employee experience through execution of Business Resource Group business plans	Activity-based*	2%	N/A	N/A	N/A	Target	=**2%**
			Subtotal:	**13%**					**16%**
Financial		Execute grid, technology, electrification and other improvement to deliver safe, reliable, clean, and affordable energy for customers	Activity-based*	5%	N/A	N/A	N/A	Slightly below target	=**4%**
		Achieve SCE core earnings target[16]	Lagging Outcome	25%	$2,462 million	$2,736 million	$3,010 million	$2,911 million	=25%*164% **41%**
			Subtotal:	**30%**					**45%**
Customer Service	Reliability	SAIDI, Repair	Lagging Outcome	4%	105	95	85	108	=4%*0% **0%**
		Billing & Payment and Outage Net Score Index	Lagging Outcome	6%	-5	7	19	15	=6%*167% **10%**
			Subtotal:	**10%**					**10%**

[16] The STIP payout may be zero if core earnings performance falls below the Threshold level. The Threshold level is 80% of the core earnings target.

Category	Sub-Category	Metric	Metric Type	Weight	Min	Target	Max	Actual Performance	Weighted Contribution
Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG)		Transportation Electrification (TE) charging port installations	Lagging Outcome	2%	2,800	4,600	7,800	6,250	=2%*152% **3%**
			Subtotal:	**2%**					**3%**
TOTAL				**100%**					**143%**

* Activity-based metrics are qualitative in nature.

1.3.3 Current Year STIP Metrics – Minimum, Target, and Maximum

Instructions: The electrical corporation must complete Table 1.3.5 for the current year's STIP. The electrical corporation must provide details of the STIP metrics and minimum, target and maximum performance values for the filing year. The electrical corporation must categorize wildfire safety metrics separately (with no other metrics) and must include a weighting. The electrical corporation may add additional rows as needed.

Table 1.3.5
Current Year STIP Metrics

Energy Safety Category	Energy Safety Sub-Category	Metric	Metric Type	Weight	Min	Target	Max
Performance Range					0%	0%	0%
Workforce Safety; Wildfire Safety; Other Safety; Security	Workforce Safety; Wildfire Mitigation; Public Safety – Other Electric	Foundational Goals[17]	Lagging Outcome	Deduct Only	No deduct	No deduct	No deduct
			Subtotal:	**Deduct Only**			
Performance Range					0%	100%	200%
Workforce Safety	Workforce Safety	Employee Edison Electric Institute (EEI) SIF Rate**	Lagging Outcome	5%	0.038	0.023	0.008
		High Energy Control Assessments (HECA) on high-hazard tasks**	Leading	3%	30,600	34,000	37,400
		Quality observations of employees in high-hazard occupations**	Leading	2%	39,600	44,000	48,400
			Subtotal:	**10%**			

[17] The foundational goals have the following success measures: no catastrophic wildfire involving SCE's facilities for which SCE cannot make a good faith showing that its conduct was consistent with the actions of a reasonable utility; no employee fatalities; no serious injuries to public from non-wildfire-related system failure; no significant non-compliance events; and maintain effective controls and cybersecurity measures to prevent and mitigate significant disruption, data breach or system failure. See explanation provided in Section 1.3.1.2 for additional information about potential deductions.

Energy Safety Category	Energy Safety Sub-Category	Metric	Metric Type	Weight	Min	Target	Max
Performance Range					0%	100%	200%
Wildfire Safety	Wildfire Mitigation	Weather-adjusted ignitions ratio**	Leading/Lagging Outcome[18]	7%	5.06	4.14	3.22
		Covered Conductor**	Leading	5%	200	240	280
		Targeted Undergrounding**	Leading	5%	55	70	85
		Overhead Inspections and Remediations in HFRA**	Leading	6%	60%	70%	80%
		Vegetation Line Clearing**	Leading	6%	83%	88%	93%
		PSPS: Customer Notifications**	Leading	6%	96%	98%	100%
		Quality conformance index**	Leading/Lagging Outcome[19]	5%	88%	91%	94%
			Subtotal:	**40%**			
Performance Range					0%	100%	200%
Security		Simulation exercise Click Rate**	Leading	3%	5.5%	4%	2.5%
		Simulation exercise Reporting Rate**	Leading	2%	31%	36%	41%
			Subtotal:	**5%**			
Performance Range					0%	100%	200%
Other Operational / Improvement		Improve employee experience through execution of Employee Engagement action plan milestones and Business Resource Group business plans	Activity-based*	4%	N/A	N/A	N/A
		Implement 2026 planned improvement actions focused on key NextGen, Integrated Grid Planning and Execution, and customer operations efforts	Activity-based*	5%	N/A	N/A	N/A
			Subtotal:	**9%**			
Performance Range					0%	100%	200%
Customer Service	Satisfaction	Net Score Index	Lagging Outcome	5%	13	25	37
			Subtotal:	**5%**			

[18] Ignitions ratio is a lagging/outcome metric for reducing wildfire risk, but a leading indicator for reducing public safety serious injuries and fatalities.
[19] Quality conformance index is a lagging/outcome metric for the programs measured by the index, but a leading indicator for reducing wildfire risk.

Energy Safety Category	Energy Safety Sub-Category	Metric	Metric Type	Weight	Min	Target	Max
Performance Range					0%	100%	200%
Reliability	Electric Reliability	SAIDI, Repair	Lagging Outcome	2%	104	94	84
		CEMI – 4	Lagging Outcome	2%	360,000	330,000	300,000
		Subtotal:	**4%**				
Performance Range					0%	100%	200%
Environmental		Transportation Electrification (TE) charging port installations	Lagging Outcome	2%	3,200	5,300	7,400
			Subtotal:	**2%**			
Performance Range					0%	100%	200%
Financial		Execute grid, technology, electrification and other improvements to deliver safe, reliable, clean, and affordable energy for customers[20]**	Activity-based*	5%	N/A	N/A	N/A
		Achieve SCE core earnings target[21]	Lagging Outcome	20%	95% of Target	Core Earnings Target[22]	105% of Target
			Subtotal:	**25%**			
Total				**100%**			

* Activity-based metrics are qualitative in nature.

** The Compensation Committee included these metrics in the "Safety and Resiliency" goal category for SCE, which comprises 60% of the total weight for 2026, as follows: the combined weight of 50% for Energy Safety's categories of "Wildfire Safety" and "Workforce Safety," plus 5% weight for cybersecurity (which is in Energy Safety's "Security" category) and 5% weight for grid, technology, and other capital deployments that overall enhance safety and resiliency (which is in Energy Safety's "Financial" category).

[20] Represents scope of executing SCE's authorized capital plan, which is a measure of work performed, consistent with appropriate regulatory direction.

[21] The STIP payout may be zero if core earnings performance falls below the Threshold level. The Threshold level is 80% of the core earnings target.

[22] EIX's publicly issued earnings per share guidance range for 2026 reflects a range for SCE's 2026 core earnings from approximately $2,620 million to approximately $2,720 million. SCE's 2026 core earnings goal for STIP is within that range, but the specific target is material nonpublic information.

1.3.4 Current Year STIP Metric Definition and Calculation

Instructions: The electrical corporation must provide definitions, whether the metric is leading, lagging or outcome, and calculations for the current year's STIP metrics. For each metric, the electrical corporation must provide a definition of the metric, any adjustments or exclusions, the basis for the definition and the actual calculation such that if Energy Safety requested the source data/inputs, the electrical corporation would be able to derive the reported results. The electrical corporation must provide an explanation of any adjustments or exclusions.

Table 1.3.6
Current Year STIP – Metric Definitions and Calculation

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
Employee EEI SIF Rate	Edison Electric Institute (EEI) serious injury and fatality (SIF) rate measures the number of serious injuries and fatalities normalized by the actual hours worked. This is a lagging/ outcome-based metric.	The total number of EEI serious injury and fatalities. Multiply this number by 200,000 (base hours worked for 100 full-time equivalent employees). Divide the result by the total number of hours worked.	Employees only, excludes contractor and temporary workers.	No. Included to promote employee safety. Industry recognized metric for serious injuries or fatalities normalized by work hours. Benchmarkable with peer utilities.
High Energy Control Assessments (HECA) on high-hazard tasks	Count of the number of High Energy Control Assessments performed on high-	Total number of High Energy Control Assessments (HECA) performed on high-hazard tasks.	Only HECAs of field operations employees in high-hazard organizations and/or departments are included. HECAs	No. Included to promote employee safety. Leading indicator for reducing serious injuries and fatalities (SIF).

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
	hazard tasks. This is a leading metric.		performed on contractors, those with anonymous Observee(s), those where the only observee is the same person as the observer, those with no tasks identified, those with no high-energy hazard identified, and those with only "other" high-energy hazards identified are excluded.	
Count of quality observations of employees in high-hazard occupations	Count of the number of quality observations of employees in high-hazard occupations. This is a leading metric.	Total number of quality observations of employees in high-hazard occupations.	Only includes job titles in high-hazard OUs and/or departments. Observations must include "Safe" and/or "Opportunity." The observation must also indicate at least one of the following outcomes: "Recognition", "Follow-Up," "Action Taken," or "Coaching." Contractors, observations of anonymous employees, those where the only observee is the same	No. Included to promote employee safety. Leading indicator for reducing serious injuries and fatalities (SIF).

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
			person as the observer, those not containing an opportunity or recognition, those with no associated comments, and those randomly sampled where comments are not related to safety are excluded. Additionally, observations that AI identifies, and are manually validated, as having 90% similarity to previously submitted observations are excluded.	
Weather-adjusted Ignitions Ratio	Ratio of the total number of CPUC reportable ignitions within SCE's High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) that are associated with SCE equipment and meet CPUC reportable ignition criteria relative to the number of HFRA circuit mile-days	Divide the total number of CPUC reportable ignitions within SCE's High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) that are associated with SCE equipment and meet CPUC reportable ignition criteria by the total number of circuit mile days in HFRA experiencing HDF conditions during the year. Multiply the result by 100,000.	Ignitions do not include events not associated with SCE equipment, events that are pending legal claims resolution, or events reported via Electric Safety Incident Reports (ESIR) filed with CPUC per CPUC Resolution E-4184. Only the portion of distribution circuits in HFRA are counted when	No. Included to promote public safety and wildfire resiliency. Ignitions ratio is a lagging/outcome metric for reducing wildfire risk, but a leading indicator for reducing public safety serious injuries and fatalities.

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
	experiencing high dry fuel (HDF) conditions in a year, multiplied by 100,000. This is a leading/lagging outcome-based metric.		meeting high dry fuel conditions.	
Covered Conductor	Install Covered Conductor within SCE's HFRA under the Wildfire Covered Conductor Program as well as other programs that install covered conductor in HFRA. This is a leading metric.	Total number of Covered Conductor miles installed within SCE's HFRA under the Wildfire Covered Conductor Program as well as other programs that install covered conductor in HFRA.	Replacement of damaged Covered Conductor in HFRA is not included.	Yes. Includes WMP metric SH-1 and other programs that install covered conductor in HFRA. STIP minimum performance level aligns with WMP target as approved in SCE's Petition to Amend its 2026-2028 WMP.
Targeted Undergrounding	Miles of underground wire installed in SCE's HFRA, including Palisades and Eaton rebuild, and non-	Total number of underground miles installed in HFRA, including Palisades and Eaton rebuild, and non-HFRA Eaton rebuild.	N/A	Yes. Includes WMP metric SH-2 scope, Palisades and Eaton rebuild scope, and non-HFRA Eaton rebuild scope. STIP minimum performance level aligns

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
	HFRA Eaton rebuild. This is a leading metric.			with WMP target as approved in SCE's Petition to Amend its 2026-2028 WMP.
Overhead Inspections and Remediations in HFRA	Complete ground and aerial-based inspection scope in SCE's HFRA and remediate associated findings. This is a leading metric.	Inspection: Complete all 2026 ground and aerial overhead inspections of the riskiest structures as outlined in the 2026-2028 Wildfire Mitigation Plan. Remediation: The percentage of all Priority 2 findings due in 2026 in High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA) remediated 30 days or more before a given compliance due date, measured on a cumulative basis. Priority 2 findings refer to safety and/or reliability risks with variable requirements in terms of time to remediate per California General Order 95 (CA GO 95) Rule 18. On time refers to the CA GO 95 compliance due date.	Priority 1 findings are excluded from the calculation because they require immediate action in accordance with CA GO 95. Priority 3 findings are excluded from the calculation because they do not pose a material safety, reliability, or fire risk. These types of conditions do not require near-term remediation and are typically repaired in conjunction with other scheduled work on a structure. Findings generated or brought back into the queue after the assigned due date as a result of externally driven factors are excluded. Priority 2 findings that qualify for GO 95	Yes. 2026 ground and aerial overhead inspection counts align with WMP metrics IN-1.1.A, IN-1.1.B, IN-1.2.A, and IN-1.2.B, respectively, as approved in SCE's 2026-2028 WMP.

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
			exceptions or are delayed due to worker and/or safety conditions will be excluded from the measure.	
Vegetation Line Clearing	Complete trimming of vegetation near power lines across SCE's service area within planned schedule to support compliance with CA GO 95 requirements. This is a leading metric.	The percentage of trims completed within planned schedule to support compliance with CA GO 95 requirements, measured on a cumulative basis. GO 95 does not specify a timeframe for trimming vegetation. Instead, SCE on its own establishes an aggressive trimming schedule. Within planned schedule trims are defined as being complete within 60 days of planned trim month if the tree is not subject to Environmental Holds and within 90 days of planned trim month if the tree is subject to Environmental Holds.	Trees that are reviewed and identified for rework through the quality control process are excluded to avoid double counting. Trees that require work multiple times in an annual cycle in order to maintain clearance distances are also excluded for the same reason.	No. Included to promote public safety and wildfire resiliency. This is a leading metric for reducing wildfire risk and supports compliance with GO 95. SCE on its own establishes an aggressive trimming schedule.
PSPS: Customer Notifications	Percentage of PSPS impacted customers who receive	Number of PSPS impacted customers who receive notification before de-	Customers with inaccurate or missing contact information, those	No. Included to promote public safety and wildfire resiliency. Metric measures

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
	notification before de-energization. This is a leading metric.	energization. Divide the result by total number of PSPS impacted customers de-energized. Multiply the result by 100 to convert to percentage.	impacted by rapid weather changes, and instances where SCE's notification vendor successfully sent notifications where successful receipt by the customer could not be verified are excluded.[23] Instances where SCE purposefully suppressed notifications to customers due to risk of providing incorrect notification information or due to conditions such as fire and severe storms where notifications could create an adverse risk to customers seeking to enter back into areas of high risk are also excluded.	timely communications to customers who are de-energized due to PSPS. PSPS is an important wildfire mitigation effort.
	Percentage of PSPS impacted customers	Sum the number of PSPS impacted customers who: i) receive notifications once de-	Customers with inaccurate or missing contact information and instances	No. Included to promote public safety and wildfire resiliency. Metric measures

[23] To reduce instances of inaccurate phone numbers, the Compensation Committee also set a related qualitative goal to validate 100% of customer mobile phone numbers that were on file as of Jan. 1, 2026.

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
	who received notifications once de-energization is initiated. This is a leading metric.	energized, ii) receive prepare for restoration notifications, and iii) receive restoration confirmation notifications. Divide the result by 3 times the total number of PSPS impacted customers de-energized. Multiply the result by 100 to convert to percentage.	where SCE's notification vendor successfully sent notifications where successful receipt by the customer could not be verified are excluded.[23] Instances where SCE purposefully suppressed notifications to customers due to risk of providing incorrect notification information or due to conditions such as fire and severe storms where notifications could create an adverse risk to customers seeking to enter back into areas of high risk are also excluded.	timely communications to customers who are de-energized due to PSPS. PSPS is an important wildfire mitigation effort.
Phishing Simulation exercise Click Rate	Click rate of workers that have been sent a simulated email phish. This is a leading metric.	Percentage of workforce who clicked on a Level 1-3 simulated email phish in each of the six exercises conducted throughout the year. Then take the average of this percentage for the six exercises during the year.	N/A	No. Included to mitigate cybersecurity risk to promote safety and resiliency. Metric is a leading indicator to assess readiness of workforce to identify, report, and not click on suspicious emails. .

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
		Level 3 simulations, as defined by SCE, but informed by industry benchmark (attributes include: 0-1 grammatical errors, suspicious domain/links, high business relevance, impersonation, personal) are harder than Level 2 simulations (attributes include: 1-2 grammatical errors, suspicious domain/links, some business relevance, personal) and Level 1 simulations (attributes include: 3+ grammatical errors, suspicious domain/links, no business relevance, generic).		
Phishing Simulation exercise Reporting Rate	Reporting rate of workers that have been sent a simulated email phish. This is a leading metric.	Percentage of workforce who reported the Level 1-3 simulated email phish in each of the six exercises conducted throughout the year. Then take the average of this percentage for the six exercises during the year.	N/A	

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
		Levels 1-3 simulations same as defined above in Phishing Simulation exercise Click Rate section.		
Quality conformance index	Quality conformance rate index based on a weighted average of quality conformance rates across 5 key programs: Distribution Construction, Transmission Construction, Overhead Inspection, Vegetation Management, and Distribution Service Planning. This is a leading/lagging outcome-based metric.	For Distribution Construction, Transmission Construction, Overhead Inspection, and Distribution Service Planning programs, determine the quality conformance rate by multiplying the number of conforming structures by 100 and dividing the result by the number of inspections. For the Vegetation Management program, determine the quality conformance rate by multiplying the number of conforming trees by 100 and dividing the result by number of trees inspected. Quality conformance rate index is a weighted average of: Distribution construction (30%), Overhead Inspection (20%), Vegetation Management (20%), Transmission Construction	Findings which pose a risk of low potential impact (i.e., P3 findings as defined in GO95 guidelines and SCE procedures) to safety or reliability are excluded.	No. Included to improve grid safety and resiliency for customers. Metric is a lagging/outcome metric for the programs measured by the index, but a leading indicator for reducing wildfire risk.

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
		(15%), and Distribution Service Planning (15%) conformance rates.		
Execute grid, technology, electrification and other improvements to deliver safe, reliable, clean, and affordable energy for customers	Achieve CPUC and FERC jurisdictional capital improvement plan execution, which is a measure of work performed, consistent with appropriate regulatory direction. This is an activity-based metric.	Capital deployment amount informed by applicable regulatory authorization (e.g. 2025 CPUC GRC). Includes delivery of utility owned storage commitments.	N/A	No. Included to improve grid safety and resiliency for customers.
Core Earnings	See section 1.3.1.4 and the footnotes for the core earnings goal in Table 1.3.5.	Core earnings are defined as SCE's earnings less non-core items for SCE. Non-core items include income or loss from discontinued operations and income or loss from significant discrete items that management does not consider representative of ongoing earnings, such as write downs, asset impairments and other income and expense related to changes in law, outcomes	N/A	No. Included to promote utility financial stability in accordance with AB 1054.

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
		in tax, regulatory or legal proceedings, and exit activities, including sale of certain assets and other activities that are no longer continuing.		
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), Repair	Number of minutes, on average, a customer was without power in a year due to sustained interruptions from unplanned, or emergent, outages lasting five minutes or more. This is a lagging/outcome-based metric.	Sum of all sustained customer interruption durations from unplanned, or emergent, outages lasting five minutes or more divided by the total number of customers served.	Excludes major event days (MEDs), Public Safety Power Shut Off (PSPS) events, fire encroachment de energizations, and expanded Fast Curve (FC) impacts (measured as the above-normal delta between FC setting 2.0 and FC 3.0 or higher).	No. Included to improve reliability for customers.
Customers Experiencing Multiple Interruptions (CEMI) - 4	Number of customers experiencing four or more sustained outages, planned or unplanned, lasting five minutes or more. This is a	Cumulative count of customers experiencing four or more sustained outages lasting five minutes or more throughout the year across both planned and unplanned outages.	Excludes Major Event Days (MEDs) and Public Safety Power Shut Off (PSPS) events.	No. Included to improve reliability for customers.

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
	lagging/outcome-based metric.			
Improve employee experience through execution of Employee Engagement action plan milestones and Business Resource Group (BRG) business plans	Drive employee experience and workforce development efforts through execution of Employee Engagement action plan and BRG business plans. This is an activity-based metric.	Employee Engagement action plan focus is on improving employee experience and engagement. Success criteria includes goals for senior leaders to meet in small, informal groups with non-executive leaders for discussions that include a safety focus. Business Resource Groups' focus is on developing business plans and achievement of KPIs.	N/A	No. Included to promote workforce development and engagement, including with respect to safety.
Clean Energy Transition: Transportation Electrification (TE) charging port installations	TE charging port installations. This is a lagging/outcome-based metric.	Number of charging port installations. Scope includes ports from Charge Ready Light Duty (LD) programs, Charge Ready Transport (Medium/Heavy Duty [MDHD]), and Commercial electric vehicle (Rule 29, Rule 15, and Rule 16) programs.	N/A	No. Included to promote clean energy and sustainability.
Net Score	Customer Satisfaction index metric which measures four	Net score is measured on a -100 to +100 point scale and is calculated by taking the percentage of customers who	Excludes non-mass market business customers and SMS survey results.	No. Included to improve customer experience.

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
	unique experiences: (1) The Billing and Payment experience, comprised of (i) The Bill Questions experience, where customers call in to SCE's call center to ask questions about their bill and (ii) the Payment experience, where customers are surveyed when they successfully complete a payment on SCE.com or via Interactive Voice Response, (2) The Outage experience, comprised of (i) the maintenance outage experience, where customers are surveyed after a maintenance outage is completed,	scored 9's and 10's (considered promoters) on the survey minus the percentage of customers who scored 1-6 on the survey (considered detractors).		

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
	rescheduled, or canceled and (ii) the repair outage experience, where the customers who reported the outage as well as the customers impacted by the outage are surveyed, (3) The Credit experience, where customers are surveyed after requesting more time to make a payment, and (4) The Move-in/Move-out (MIMO) experience, where customers are surveyed following a transaction to start, stop, or transfer service. This is a lagging/outcome-based metric.			

Measure/Metric	Detailed Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Alignment with WMP Metrics
Operational Excellence: Implement 2026 planned improvement actions focused on key NextGen, Integrated Grid Planning and Execution, and customer operations efforts	Measures completion of key Operational Excellence efforts with meaningful impacts in 2026. This is an activity-based metric.	2026 planned improvement actions focus on NextGen critical path activities, key Integrated Grid Planning and Execution milestones, and customer operations initiatives.	N/A	No. Included to improve grid safety and resiliency for customers.

1.3.5 STIP Changes

Instructions: The electrical corporation must describe any changes from the previous year to the current year in terms of STIP eligibility, structure, modifiers, metrics (including changes to minimum/threshold, target, and maximum performance values), weightings and definitions. The electrical corporation must explain the reason for the change(s).

Each year, SCE engages in an extensive goal development process that begins in June with a strategic refresh of company priorities by the Board and concludes in February of the goal year when final goals and success measures are approved by the Compensation Committee. During this process, SCE reviews internal and external developments such as regulatory commitments (e.g., Wildfire Mitigation Plan) and guidance, progress on current goals, performance gaps, budgetary issues, external factors impacting the company, and evolving best practices. Success measures are adjusted to account for recent and historical performance, availability of internal resources, improvements in measuring performance, and other developments.

The result of this process, in terms of STIP changes from 2025 to 2026, includes the following changes (changes made in response to Energy Safety's recommendations in the 2025 Approval are **<u>underlined and in bold</u>**):

- **<u>Increase the total weight of Wildfire Safety and Workforce Safety goals to 50% (from 40% for 2025)</u>**: 5 percentage points were reallocated from the core earnings goal to Wildfire Safety goals; and the 5% weighting for the 2026 Quality conformance index was appropriately included in Energy Safety's Wildfire Safety category (rather than as an "Other Operation/Improvement" metric as in 2025) because it serves as a leading indicator for reducing wildfire risk and has a focus of quality conformance with safety and resiliency matters impacts.
- **<u>An expanded workforce development metric for 2026 that adds employee engagement action plan milestones, including goals for senior leaders to meet in small, informal groups with non-executive leaders for discussions that include a safety focus.</u>**
- **<u>At the beginning of 2026, individual goals were established for SCE executive officers requiring participation in multiple listening tours and other safety discussion engagements with the workforce. The minimum number of listening tours and other safety discussion engagements with the workforce varies by role, up to 25 separate engagements for some of SCE's executive officers.</u>** Failure to satisfy these requirements will result in a downward adjustment to the executive's 2026 individual performance modifier.
- Revised the wildfire resiliency ignition metric to measure the weather adjusted ignitions ratio of CPUC reportable ignitions in HFRA relative to the number of high-dry-fuel-days experienced in HFRA.
- A new reliability metric to measure the number of Customers Experiencing Multiple Interruptions (CEMI) – more than four in the calendar year.

In addition, the following foundational goal success measure was added for 2026 as a clarification of prior practice: no catastrophic wildfire involving SCE's facilities for which SCE cannot make a good faith showing that its conduct was consistent with the actions of a reasonable utility.

The goal development process described above also resulted in other changes to metrics, target weights, etc. (compare Table 1.3.4 with Table 1.3.5), and to definitions used for success measures (compare Table 1.3.6 of this submission with Table 1.3.6 of SCE's May 23, 2025 Executive Compensation Structure Submission to Energy Safety).

1.3.6 Historical STIP Data

Instructions: the electrical corporation must provide historical performance data for Current Year's STIP metrics. If data is lacking, or should be considered in a certain context, explain in the Notes/Context field provided why there is no data for a given year(s) and the relevant context. The electrical corporation must provide historical STIP data for any newly added metric in the current performance period. The electrical corporation may add rows as necessary.

Table 1.3.7
STIP Metric Historical Actual Performance

Metric/Measure	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Employee EEI SIF Rate	0.031	0.024	0.045	0.036	0.023
High Energy Control Assessments (HECA) on high-hazard tasks*	N/A	N/A	N/A	25,945	33,324
Quality observations of employees in high-hazard occupations *	N/A	N/A	N/A	35,854	43,292
Weather adjusted ignitions ratio*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Covered Conductor	1,454	1,399	1,220	796	706[24]
Targeted Undergrounding*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Overhead Inspections and Remediations in HFRA	74%	80%	79%	69%	74%
Vegetation Line Clearing	79%	88%	86%	86%	94%
PSPS: Improve Customer Notifications Before De-energization*	N/A	N/A	97%	100%	99%
PSPS: Improve Customer Notifications After De-energization*	N/A	N/A	86%	94%	96%
Validate customer mobile phone numbers*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulation exercise Click Rate*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulation exercise Reporting Rate*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Quality conformance index*	N/A	N/A	93%	93%	93%
CPUC and FERC Capital Execution*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

[24] Covered Conductor historical figures for 2023-2025 reflect performance following subsequent validation. Footnote 14 of Table 1.3.4 addresses the 706 miles validated for 2025.

Metric/Measure	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), Repair	102	100	94	99	108
Customers Experiencing Multiple Interruptions (CEMI-4)*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Improve employee experience through execution of Employee Engagement action plan milestones and Business Resource Group business plans *	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Transportation Electrification (TE) charging port installations *	N/A	N/A	N/A	4,048	6,250
Net Score Index*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Implement 2026 planned improvement actions focused on key NextGen, Integrated Grid Planning and Execution, and customer operations efforts*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Notes/Context:

*“N/A” is used in this row for years where the collected data (if any) reflects a different methodology or definition than is being applied to the calculation for the current year, or the measure is qualitative.

1.3.7 Previous Year STIP Adjustments

Instructions: The electrical corporation must provide an explanation of any increases and decreases in STIP compensation in the previous year due to failure to meet safety or other targets. The electrical corporation must separately describe any adjustments to STIP compensation levels made by the Compensation Committee or executive management and the amount and reason for the reduction. The electrical corporation must detail any adjustments made to increase compensation beyond the levels warranted by the actual performance (in any metric classification) and the reasons for the adjustments

1. **Actual performance lower than target due to failure to meet safety target(s):**

For 2025, no metrics failed to achieve safety performance targets and therefore, no reductions were assessed.

2. **Actual performance lower than target due to failure to meet other target(s):**

Performance associated with execution of grid, technology, electrification and other improvements and SAIDI, Repair were lower than target. Weighted contributions are outlined in Table 1.3.4.

3. **Any deductions due to failure to meet "foundational goals":**

No deductions for the 2025 foundational goal success measures. See Section 1.3.1.7 (b) above for a discussion of the Compensation Committee's determination to exercise its discretion to reduce STIP payouts for 2025 for certain executives of SCE.

4. **Any deductions due to failure to meet earnings targets or thresholds:**

No deductions

5. **Any additional deductions, or upward adjustments, to individual metrics or overall performance payout made by executive management, the CompensationCommittee, or full Board of Directors:**

See Table 1.3.3 above for information on executive officers' individual performance modifiers. See also Section 1.3.1.7 (b) above for a discussion of the Compensation Committee's determination to exercise its discretion to reduce STIP payouts for 2025 for certain executives of SCE in light of the impact of the Eaton Fire on communities within SCE's service area.

1.3.8 Historical STIP Adjustments

Instructions: In Table 1.3.8 the electrical corporation must provide details of all downward adjustments to STIP compensation, including both formula-based reductions and negative discretionary reductions, by any decision-making body, including but not limited to the Board of Directors, Compensation Committee, or executive management, for the past five years, including reductions due to failure to meet safety or other performance targets. The information should be provided for individual metric adjustments and for the STIP as a whole. The electrical corporation must clearly identify whether each adjustment was formula-based or a negative discretionary reduction and separately describe any discretionary deductions to STIP compensation levels made by any decision-making body, including but not limited to the Board of Directors, Compensation Committee, or executive management, and the amount and reason for the reduction for the past five years.

A formula-based reduction is a decrease in STIP compensation that results directly from pre-established performance metrics and scoring methodologies. In other words, the payout is automatically reduced based on the approved formula when performance outcomes fall below established targets.

A negative discretionary reduction is a downward adjustment applied after the formula-based results have been calculated. This type of reduction reflects the judgment of any decision-making body, including but not limited to the Board of Directors, Compensation Committee, or executive management, and is typically based on qualitative considerations, specific events, or performance factors not fully captured in the formula.

Table 1.3.8
Historical STIP Reductions for Individual Metrics and Total STIP Award

Year	STIP Deductions for Safety, Wildfire Resiliency, and Other metrics	Provide a summary breakdown showing how the total point deductions are allocated across each STIP metric
2025	Minimum of 5-point deduction; up to 64-point deduction (for SCE CEO)	SAIDI, Repair (-4 pt deduction); CPUC and FERC Capital Execution (-1 pt deduction); see Section 1.3.1.7 (b) above for a discussion of the Compensation Committee's determination to exercise its discretion to reduce STIP payouts for 2025 for certain executives of SCE in light of the impact of the Eaton Fire on communities within SCE's service area
2024	21-point deduction	SIF Rate (-5 pt deduction); CPUC reportable ignitions in HFRA (-6 pt deduction); Covered Conductor miles installed (-6 pt deduction); Overhead Inspections and Remediations in HFRA (-1 pt deduction); CPUC and FERC Capital Execution (-1 pt

		deduction); SAIDI, Repair (-1 pt deduction); and DBE Spend (-1 pt deduction)
2023	28-point deduction	Employee fatality and two serious public injuries due to contact with power lines (-8 pt discretionary reduction); Employee SIF Rate (-5 pt deduction); Employee DART Rate (-3 pt deduction); PSPS customer notifications (-4 pt deduction); CPUC and FERC Capital Execution (-1 pt deduction); DEI Action Plans (-2 pt deduction); Clean Energy Pathway (-2 pt deduction); Achieve Billing & Payment and Outage Net Score (-3 pt deduction)
2022	18-point deduction	Serious public injury from downed power line and significant non-compliance event (-7 pt deduction); Employee Safety (-10 pt deduction); Reliability (-1 pt deduction)
2021	8-point deduction	Wildfire Resiliency Sub-Category (-4 pt deduction); Reliability Sub-Category (-1 pt deduction); Other Operational Category (-3 pt deduction)

Instructions: In Table 1.3.9, the electrical corporation must detail any adjustments made to increase or decrease compensation beyond the levels warranted by the actual performance (in any metric classification) and the reasons for the adjustments for the past five years.

Table 1.3.9
Historical STIP Discretionary Adjustments (Increases) for Individual Metrics and/or Total STIP Award

Year	Amount of any Discretionary Increase to Earned STIP Metric Value or Total STIP Award	Detailed Description/Explanation
2025	N/A	N/A
2024	1 point above formula-based outcome for SAIDI, Repair	Performance reflects adjustment for above 5-year average de-energization from external agency requests. See footnote 9 of Table 1.3.4 in SCE's 2025 Executive Compensation Structure Submission.
2023	N/A	N/A
2022	N/A	N/A
2021	N/A	N/A

1.3.9 Current Year STIP Metric Ties to Other Metrics

Rationale: Understand how an electrical corporation's Executive Compensation Structure metrics relate to its WMP, SPMs and SOMs. The CPUC requires PG&E, SCE, Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) and SDG&E (collectively the investor-owned utilities or IOUs) to annually report on safety performance metrics (SPMs) to measure achieved safety improvements.[25] Additionally, the CPUC adopted Safety and Operational Metrics (SOMs) for PG&E[26] to be used in accordance with the approved PG&E's post-bankruptcy reorganization plan.[27]

Instructions: For each metric included in the STIP for the current year, all electrical corporations must indicate whether the metric is tied to its WMP (and the associated initiative number) and whether the metric is similar in nature to SPM metrics (and the associated SPM number). PG&E must also indicate whether the metric is similar in nature to SOM metrics (and the associated SOM number). For metrics similar in nature to a SOM, PG&E must explain any differences between its calculation of that metric and the required SOM method of calculation of that metric. All other electrical corporations must also indicate whether each metric included in the STIP for the current year is similar in nature to SOM metrics and to explain any differences between its calculation of that metric and SOM method of calculation of the metric.

Table 1.3.10

Current Year STIP Ties to WMP, SPMs, and SOMs

Executive Compensation Structure Submission STIP Measure/ Metric	Related to WMP Yes/ No	Related to WMP Initiative Number	Similar to SPM Yes/ No	Similar to SPM SPM Number	Similar to SOM Yes/ No	Similar to SOM SOM Number	Description of Computational/ Definitional Differences
SIF Rate	No	N/A	Yes	15	N/A	N/A	None
High Energy Control Assessments	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Safety Observations	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Weather-Adjusted Ignitions Ratio	No	N/A	Yes	4	N/A	N/A	SPM includes all ignitions annually reportable to the CPUC per Decision 14-02-

[25] CPUC Decision 19-04-020 (https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M288/K389/288389255.PDF, accessed Jan. 31, 2025).

[26] CPUC Decision 21-11-009 in eight separate files (https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/SearchRes.aspx?DocFormat=ALL&DocID=421107805, accessed Jan. 31, 2025).

[27] CPUC Decision 20-05-053 (https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M338/K816/338816365.PDF, accessed Jan. 31, 2025).

Executive Compensation Structure Submission STIP Measure/ Metric	Related to WMP Yes/ No	Related to WMP Initiative Number	Similar to SPM Yes/ No	Similar to SPM SPM Number	Similar to SOM Yes/ No	Similar to SOM SOM Number	Description of Computational/ Definitional Differences
							015 while the STIP measure is limited to ignitions in HFRA only and also considers the fuel conditions present.
Covered Conductor	Yes	SH-1	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	None
Targeted Undergrounding	Yes	SH-2	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	WMP only includes conductor miles undergrounded in HFRA while the STIP measure includes additional miles undergrounded in non-HFRA fire restoration areas
OH Inspections / Remediations	Yes	IN-1.1 IN-1.2	Yes	26 / 29	N/A	N/A	SPM measurement is compliance only inspections. Ground and aerial inspections in the STIP measure are expanded beyond GO 165.
Vegetation Line Clearing	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Executive Compensation Structure Submission STIP Measure/ Metric	Related to WMP Yes/ No	Related to WMP Initiative Number	Similar to SPM Yes/ No	Similar to SPM SPM Number	Similar to SOM Yes/ No	Similar to SOM SOM Number	Description of Computational/ Definitional Differences
PSPS Customer Notifications	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cybersecurity Click Rate	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Cybersecurity Reporting Rate	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Quality	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CPUC and FERC Capital Execution	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Core Earnings	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Reliability	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Workforce Development	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Clean Energy Transition	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Customer Experience	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Operational Excellence	No	N/A	No	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

1.4 Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP)

Rationale: For the issuance of a Safety Certification, Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(4) requires that electrical corporations' executive incentive compensation structures are "structured to promote safety as a priority and to ensure public safety and utility financial stability with performance metrics, including incentive compensation based on meeting performance metrics that are measurable and enforceable, for all executive officers... ." To ensure that the executive compensation structure for electrical corporation executive officers is structured to promote safety as a priority and ensure public safety and utility financial stability, Energy Safety must have an in-depth understanding of the performance-based components of an executive compensation structure.

Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) requires "[s]trict limits on guaranteed cash compensation, with the primary portion of the executive officers' compensation based on achievement of objective performance metrics." Subsection (i)(II), requires "[n]o guaranteed monetary incentives in the compensation structure." Subsection (ii) requires that the compensation structure "satisfies the compensation principles identified in paragraph (4)," noted above. Subsection (iii) requires "[a] long-term structure that provides a significant portion of compensation, which may take the form of grants of the electrical corporation's stock, based on the electrical corporation's long-term performance and value. This compensation shall be held or deferred for a period of at least three years." Subsection (iv) requires "[m]inimization or elimination of indirect or ancillary compensation that is not aligned with shareholder and taxpayer interest in the electrical corporation."

Instructions: The LTIP includes all performance-based compensation awarded on a performance term of three or more years. If the electrical corporation uses more than one long-term incentive mechanism, the electrical corporation must repeat this information for each mechanism (e.g., three-year, four-year).

1.4.1 LTIP General Eligibility

Instructions: The electrical corporation must include the LTIP target percentage of base salary for each executive officer in the filing. The electrical corporation must describe any changes in LTIP eligibility from the prior period. The electrical corporation may add additional rows as needed.

Table 1.4.1

LTIP General Eligibility and Executive Officer Targets

Executive Title/Function	LTIP Target Percentage of Base Salary
Program Eligibility:	
All SCE executives, including all SCE executive officers, participate in the LTIP and are subject to the same terms and conditions.	
Executive Officer LTIP Target:	
President and Chief Executive Officer - Steven D. Powell	[redacted]
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Jill C. Anderson	
SVP and Chief Financial Officer - Aaron D. Moss	
VP, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller – Kara G. Ryan	
SVP and General Counsel - Jennifer R. Hasbrouck	
SVP and Chief Customer Officer - Olufunmilayo A. Williamson	
SVP, Transmission & Distribution – Orville O. Cocking	

1.4.2 Current Year LTIP Structure – Award Type, Weighting, Measures and Vesting Period

Definitions: In the case of the LTIP, the "current year" refers to the first year of the performance period beginning in the submission year and ending in accordance with the vesting schedule. For example, for a 2026 submission with performance share units that vest after three years, the "current year" refers to 2026, and the performance period refers to 2026-2028.

Instructions: Complete Table 1.4.2 for the current year's LTIP. For each LTIP award type, indicate the weighting, the measures/basis for the award, and the vesting period. If the award types or bases of the awards differ between positions or persons, the electrical corporation must copy Table 1.4.2 as necessary and indicate who the table applies to in space provided at the top of the table.

Table 1.4.2
Current Year LTIP Structure - Award Type, Weighting, Measures, and Vesting Period

Executive Title/ Function and Name: **All Executive Officers**			
LTI Award Type	**Weight**	**Measure(s)**	**Vesting**
Stock Grant	0%	N/A	N/A
Stock Option	25%	Stock Options (weighted at 25%): see the description under Table 1.4.4 – 2026 LTIP Performance Range(s)	Three-year ratable (33-1/3%/year)
Restricted Stock Unit (RSU)	25%	Restricted Stock Units (weighted at 25%): payout value depends on EIX stock performance and dividends	Three-year cliff vesting
Performance Share Unit (PSU)/ Performance Restricted Stock Unit (PRSU)	50%	25% based on EIX's 3-year TSR compared to the other companies in the UTY 25% based on EIX's 3-year cumulative core EPS measured against target levels	Three-year cliff vesting
Cash	0%		
Weighting Total:	100%		

If other LTIP vehicles are used for current LTIP, please describe:

1. **Is any LTIP compensation not at risk?**

   Yes: ☐ No: ☒

Describe/Explain whether answering either Yes or No:

All of SCE's LTIP compensation (stock options, RSUs, and PSUs) is at-risk because it is subject to time-based vesting conditions (i.e., the vesting of the award is subject to the executive providing services through the applicable vesting date).

In addition, all of SCE's LTIP compensation is equity-based and at risk because the value the grant recipient will ultimately receive will depend on EIX's stock performance. A company's stock can lose value, even all its value. For example, wildfires and other significant safety events may materially affect EIX's stock price and, as a result, the value of LTIP awards. PSUs and stock options are subject to performance conditions that may result in zero payout or below-target payouts. For example, the TSR PSUs that were granted in 2023 terminated for no value after their performance period ended December 31, 2025 due to below-threshold performance tied to the Eaton Fire. In addition, executive officers' stock options with a January 2, 2026, expiration date that were outstanding on January 7, 2025, terminated for no value on their expiration date.

2. **Provide the current year LTIP metric performance range(s):**

Table 1.4.3
LTIP Metric Performance Range(s) for the Current Year

	Below Minimum	Minimum	Target	Maximum
TSR Performance Shares*	0%	25%	100%	200%
EPS Performance Shares*	0%	25%	100%	200%
Stock Options*	0%	0%	N/A	N/A

Describe the interpolation method between categories (e.g., straight line):

* With respect to both TSR Performance Shares and EPS Performance Shares, the number of shares paid is interpolated on a straight-line basis for performance between minimum (25%) and target (100%) or between target (100%) and maximum (200%). Interpolation is not relevant for purposes of stock options.

The exercise price for a stock option (which is equal to the closing price of a share of EIX Common Stock on the grant date) is the minimum level of performance. If EIX Common Stock is trading at or below that exercise price, then the stock option cannot be exercised for any value at that time. If EIX Common Stock is trading above that exercise price, then the stock option (if vested) can be exercised with a payout based on the difference between the market price at exercise and the exercise price.

3. Use of Any Performance Triggers

Does the electrical corporation's LTIP awards for the current year use any performance triggers (e.g., must achieve annual earnings per share of at least XYZ before any LTIP payments are made)? Check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe any performance triggers:

As described above for Tables 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, performance shares and options have minimum performance thresholds, and performance below those minimum thresholds results in zero payout.

4. Use of Any Automatic, Non-Discretionary Deductions

Does the electrical corporation's LTIP for the performance period starting in the current year include any automatic, non-discretionary deductions (e.g., failure to achieve WMP targets results in X% reduction, catastrophic wildfire results in zeroing out all safety metrics)? Check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe all automatic, non-discretionary deductions:

The performance shares granted to each of the executive officers of SCE are subject to the Incentive Compensation Recoupment Policy, which for SCE mirrors the requirements of Rule 10D-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended and Section 303A.14 of the New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual. This policy requires recoupment of certain forms of incentive-based compensation (which would include the performance shares) in the event of certain accounting restatements described in more detail in such policy.

5. Use of Any Specifically Defined Discretionary Deductions

Does the electrical corporation's current year LTIP include any potential deductions that are part of the compensation structure? Check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

If "Yes," describe all specific/defined discretionary deductions that are part of thestructure:

The LTI awards granted to each of the executive officers of SCE are subject to misconduct recoupment provisions that allow the Compensation Committee to recoup such awards from officers who are terminated or suspended without pay for certain forms of misconduct to the extent such recoupment is permitted by applicable law. Misconduct recoupment provisions apply to awards granted on or after January 1, 2024.

6. **Changes in the LTIP Structure, Performance Ranges, Performance Triggers, Discretionary or Non-Discretionary Deductions**

Were there any changes from the previous year to the current year in the LTIP weighting, performance ranges, performance triggers, discretionary deductions or non-discretionary deductions? Check one:

Yes: ☐ No ☒

If "Yes," describe the changes and the reason for each change:

1.4.3 Current Year LTIP Measures, Definitions and Calculations

Instructions: The electrical corporation must provide definitions and calculations for the current year LTIP metrics. For each metric, the electrical corporation must provide a definition of the metric, any adjustments or exclusions, the basis for the definition and the actual calculation such that if Energy Safety requested the source data/ inputs, Energy Safety would be able to derive the reported results. The electrical corporation must also provide the weight given to the metric and the minimum, target, and maximum values for the metric.

Table 1.4.4
Current Year LTIP Measures

Measure/ Metric	Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Weight	Min.	Target	Max.
Total Shareholder Return (Performance Shares)	EIX's TSR over a 36-month performance period compared to the other companies that are in the UTY at the beginning of the performance period and continue to be publicly traded through the performance period period	TSR is calculated using the difference between (i) the average closing stock price for the stock for the 5 trading days ending with the last NYSE trading day preceding the first day of the performance period and (ii) the average closing stock price for the stock for the 5 trading days ending with the last trading day of the performance period, and assumes all dividends are reinvested on the ex-dividend date. The discrete	Adjustments may be made in response to certain mergers or other significant corporate transactions during the performance period involving a company in the UTY	25%	25th Percentile	50th Percentile	≥75th Percentile

Measure/ Metric	Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Weight	Min.	Target	Max.
		percentile ranking methodology is used to determine EIX's percentile ranking. The performance period for the TSR Performance Shares granted in 2026 commenced on March 1, 2026 and ends on February 28, 2029.					
Earnings Per Share (Performance Shares)[28]	EIX's three-year cumulative core EPS for a three-calendar-year performance period measured against pre-established target levels.	The Compensation Committee establishes the three-year cumulative core EPS target in February at the beginning of the performance period. The publicly announced core EPS guidance range serves as the basis for the goal levels.	None	25%	See footnote (27) below	See footnote (27) below	See footnote (27) below

[28] EIX's publicly issued core EPS guidance range for 2026 is $5.90 to $6.20 based on a weighted average shares assumption of ~385 million shares. This publicly announced EIX core EPS guidance for 2026 serves as the basis for the 2026 core EPS target for the EPS performance shares granted in 2024 and 2025 (see SCE's 2024 Executive Compensation Structure Submission and 2025 Executive Compensation Structure Submission to Energy Safety, respectively, for additional information on the calculation methodology used for 2024 and 2025 EPS performance share grants). EIX's publicly issued guidance range for the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) for core EPS for the 2025 to 2030 period is 5-7%. The 2026 core EPS and 2025-2030 CAGR guidance ranges, adjusted for one-time items addressed in EIX's publicly issued guidance, serve as the basis for EIX's three-year cumulative core EPS minimum, target, and maximum levels for the 2026-2028 performance period for EPS performance shares granted in 2026. The specific goal levels are material nonpublic information.

Measure/ Metric	Definition	Calculation Methodology	Any Adjustment/ Exclusions	Weight	Min.	Target	Max.
		The performance period for the EPS Performance Shares granted in 2026 commenced on January 1, 2026 and ends on December 31, 2028.					
Change in EIX Stock Price (Stock Options)	A stock option may be exercised to purchase one share of EIX Common Stock at an exercise price equal to the closing price of a share of EIX Common Stock on the grant date	Value at exercise = market price at exercise minus exercise price (i.e., closing price at grant)	None	25%	Stock price at grant	N/A	N/A
Change in EIX Stock Price (Restricted Stock Units)	The value of EIX restricted stock units at payout is based on the price of EIX Common Stock.	If the stock price on the date of payout is above the stock price on the grant date, then the payout value will be more than the grant value. If the stock price on the date of payout is less than the stock price on the grant date, that will result in a lower value. Reinvested dividend equivalents also impact the payout value.	N/A	25%	N/A	N/A	N/A

1. **Changes in LTIP measures**

Were there any changes from the previous year in the LTIP measures, definitions, calculation methodology, or performance goals in the current year? Check one:

Yes: ☐ No: ☒

If "Yes," describe the changes and the reason for each change:

1.4.4 Performance Share Unit Metric Actual Performance

Instructions: The electrical corporation must provide historical performance data for the PSU metrics for LTIP awards that vested in the previous year. If the PSU metric results for the performance period are based on annual, rather than cumulative data for the period, provide the annual data and the calculated performance period results, as shown in Example 2 in the table below. If data is lacking, or should be considered in a certain context, the electrical corporation must explain in the Notes/Context field following the table. The electrical corporation may add rows as necessary.

Table 1.4.5

Minimum, Target and Maximum Performance versus Actual Performance for PSUs that Vested in Previous Year

Performance Period		Weight	Below Min	Min	Target	Max	Actual	Performance Multiplier	Weighted Contribution
2023 to 2025	TSR	50%	N/A	25th Percentile	50th Percentile	75th Percentile	15th Percentile	0%	***0%***
2023		50%	N/A	3.68	4.60	5.52	4.76	118%	
2024			N/A	3.92	4.90	5.88	4.93	103%	
2025			N/A	4.93	6.16	7.40	6.55	131%	
2023 to 202			N/A					117%	***58.5%***
Total		**100%**							**58.5%**

Notes/Context:

The Performance Shares that vested in 2025 were the Performance Shares granted in 2023. The 2023 Performance Share awards vested upon completion of the January 1, 2023 through December 31, 2025 performance period. A relative TSR metric and a Core EPS metric were used to measure performance share payouts.

Relative TSR performance resulted in a 15th percentile ranking resulting in a 0% payout with respect to the TSR Performance Shares granted in 2023. EPS performance resulted in a multiple of 1.17x (117% of target) with respect to the EPS Performance Shares granted in 2023 (calculated as the average of the annual EPS performance multiples for 2023, 2024, and 2025). The resulting overall payout percentage for Performance Shares granted in 2023 was 58.5%.

1.4.5 Historical LTIP Data

Instructions: The electrical corporation must provide historical performance data for the LTIP metrics that vested in each of the prior five years. Include data for metrics currently in place, as well as the metrics used in previous performance periods. If data is lacking, or should be considered in a certain context, the electrical corporation must explain in the Notes/Context field provided why there is no data for a given year(s) and the relevant context. The electrical corporation may add rows as necessary.

Table 1.4.6

LTIP Metric Historical Actual Performance Over Performance Period

Metric/Measure	Vesting Year				
	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Total Shareholder Return (TSR) vs. UTY Peers	85% (2019-2021 Performance Period)	0% (2020-2022 Performance Period)	195% (2021-2023 Performance Period)	200% (2022-2024 Performance Period)	0% (2023-2025 Performance Period)
Earnings Per Share (EPS)	113% (2019-2021 Performance Period)	107% (2020-2022 Performance Period)	113% (2021-2023 Performance Period)	107% (2022-2024 Performance Period)	117% (2023-2025 Performance Period)

Notes/Context:

1.4.6 LTIP Adjustments for Performance Period Ending in Previous Year

Instructions: The electrical corporation must provide an explanation of any increases and decreases in LTIP compensation for the LTIP components that vested in the previous year due to failing to meet safety or other targets. The electrical corporation must separately describe any adjustments to LTIP compensation levels made by the Compensation Committee or executive management and the amount and reason for the reduction. The electrical corporation must detail any adjustments made to increase compensation beyond the levels warranted by the corporation's actual performance (in any metric classification) and the reasons for the adjustments.

1. **Actual performance lower than target due to failure to meet safety target(s):**

N/A

2. **Actual performance lower than target due to failure to meet other (non-safety) target(s):**

TSR performance shares granted in 2023 reached the end of their three-year performance period at the end of 2025. EIX's relative TSR performance was below minimum for the three-year period, so the payout for those TSR performance shares was $0.

3. **Any additional deductions, or upward adjustments, made by any decision-making body, including but not limited to the Board of Directors, Compensation Committee, or executive management, and the reason for each adjustment:**

N/A

1.4.7 Historical LTIP Adjustments

Instructions: In Table 1.4.7 the electrical corporation must provide details of all downward adjustments to LTIP compensation, including both formula-based reductions and negative discretionary reductions, by any decision-making body, including but not limited to the Board of Directors, Compensation Committee, or executive management, for the past five years, including reductions due to failure to meet safety or other targets. The information should be provided for individual metric adjustments and for the LTIP as a whole. The electrical corporation must separately describe any discretionary deductions to LTIP compensation levels made by any decision-making body, including but not limited to the Board of Directors, Compensation Committee, or executive management, and the amount and reason for the reduction for the past five years.

A formula-based reduction is a decrease in LTIP compensation that results directly from pre-established performance metrics and scoring methodologies. In other words, the payout is automatically reduced based on the approved formula when performance outcomes fall below established targets.

A negative discretionary reduction is a downward adjustment applied after the formula-based results have been calculated. This type of reduction reflects the judgment made by any decision-making body, including but not limited to the Board of Directors, Compensation Committee, or executive management, and is typically based on qualitative considerations, specific events, or performance factors not fully captured in the formula.

Table 1.4.7 Historical LTIP Reductions

Year	LTIP Deduction for Executive Officers Due to Unmet Safety, Wildfire Resiliency, and Other Goals	Provide a summary breakdown showing how the total point deductions are allocated across each unmet goal
2026	N/A	N/A
2025	41.5 percentage point deduction from target for PSUs overall	Entire deduction due to TSR PSUs granted in 2023 (0% payout due to below-threshold performance)
2024	N/A	N/A
2023	N/A	N/A
2022	46.5 percentage point deduction from target for PSUs overall	Entire deduction due to TSR PSUs granted in 2020 (0% payout due to below-threshold performance)
2021	1 percentage point deduction from target for PSUs overall	Entire deduction due to TSR PSUs granted in 2019 (85% payout due to below-target performance)

1.4.8 Actuals for LTIPs with a Performance Period Ending in the Previous Year or Vesting in the Previous Year

Instructions: For any LTIP awards with a performance period that ended in the previous year which vested in either the previous year or in the current year, provide details of projected and actual payouts/performance. For any LTIP awards with earlier performance periods that vested in the previous year provide the same information.

For the purpose of calculating the grant value as a percentage of TIC, the electrical corporation must use the grant value of the compensation as determined for accounting purposes. Grant value is the value that is disclosed in proxy statement summary compensation tables for executive officers who are proxy officers. For purposes of calculating Earned Value as a percentage of TIC, the electrical corporation must use the value at the date of vesting. The electrical corporation must specify the percentages for each executive officer and not a range for various position levels. The electrical corporation must provide a table for each executive officer. The electrical corporation may make copies of Table 1.4.8 as necessary.

Table 1.4.8

LTIP Programs with a Performance Period Ending in the Previous Year or that Vested in the Previous Year

Executive Title/ Function and Name: President and Chief Executive Officer – Steven D. Powell								
LTIP Program Name	**Performance Measure**	**Target Value as % of TIC**	**Grant Date**	**Stock Price at Grant Date**	**Grant Date Fair Value as a % of TIC**	**Vesting Date**	**Stock Price at Vesting Date**	**Earned Value as a % of TIC at Vesting Date**
Stock Grants	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2021 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2021 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2022 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2023 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2024 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2022 Restricted Stock Units (RSU)	Stock Price	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Earnings Per Share	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Total Shareholder Return	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

Executive Title/ Function and Name: Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer – Jill C. Anderson								
LTIP Program Name	Performance Measure	Target Value as % of TIC	Grant Date	Stock Price at Grant Date	Grant Date Fair Value as a % of TIC	Vesting Date	Stock Price at Vesting Date	Earned Value as a % of TIC at Vesting Date
Stock Grants	N/A	N/A			N/A			N/A
2021 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2021 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2022 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2023 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2024 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2022 Restricted Stock Units (RSU)	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Earnings Per Share	[redacted]						
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Total Shareholder Return	[redacted]						

Executive Title/ Function and Name: Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer – Aaron D. Moss								
LTIP Program Name	Performance Measure	Target Value as % of TIC	Grant Date	Stock Price at Grant Date	Grant Date Fair Value as a % of TIC	Vesting Date	Stock Price at Vesting Date	Earned Value as a % of TIC at Vesting Date
Stock Grants	N/A	N/A			N/A			N/A
2021 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2022 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2022 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2023 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2024 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2022 Restricted Stock Units (RSU)	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2022 Restricted Stock Units (RSU)	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Earnings Per Share	[redacted]						
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Total Shareholder Return	[redacted]						

Executive Title/ Function and Name: Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller – Kara G. Ryan								
LTIP Program Name	Performance Measure	Target Value as % of TIC	Grant Date	Stock Price at Grant Date	Grant Date Fair Value as a % of TIC	Vesting Date	Stock Price at Vesting Date	Earned Value as a % of TIC at Vesting Date
Stock Grants	N/A	N/A			N/A			N/A
2023 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2024 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
Restricted Stock Units (RSU)	N/A	[redacted]						
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Earnings Per Share	[redacted]						
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Total Shareholder Return	[redacted]						

Executive Title/ Function and Name: Senior Vice President and General Counsel – Jennifer R. Hasbrouck									
LTIP Program Name	Performance Measure	Target Value as % of TIC	Grant Date	Stock Price at Grant Date	Grant Date Fair Value as a % of TIC	Vesting Date	Stock Price at Vesting Date	Earned Value as a % of TIC at Vesting Date
Stock Grants	N/A	N/A			N/A			N/A
2021 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2022 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2023 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2024 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2022 Restricted Stock Units (RSU)	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Earnings Per Share	[redacted]						
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Total Shareholder Return	[redacted]						

Executive Title/ Function and Name: SVP and Chief Customer Officer – Olufunmilayo A. Williamson								
LTIP Program Name	Performance Measure	Target Value as % of TIC	Grant Date	Stock Price at Grant Date	Grant Date Fair Value as a % of TIC	Vesting Date	Stock Price at Vesting Date	Earned Value as a % of TIC at Vesting Date
Stock Grants	N/A	N/A			N/A			N/A
2023 Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
2024 Stock Options	Stock Price							
Restricted Stock Units (RSU)	N/A							
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Earnings Per Share							
2023 Performance Share Units (PSU)	Total Shareholder Return							

Executive Title/ Function and Name: SVP, Transmission & Distribution – Orville O. Cocking									
LTIP Program Name	Performance Measure	Target Value as % of TIC	Grant Date	Stock Price at Grant Date	Grant Date Fair Value as a % of TIC	Vesting Date	Stock Price at Vesting Date	Earned Value as a % of TIC at Vesting Date
Stock Grants	N/A	N/A			N/A			N/A
Stock Options	Stock Price	[redacted]						
Restricted Stock Units (RSU)	Stock Price							
Performance Share Units (PSU)	Earnings Per Share							
Performance Share Units (PSU)	Total Shareholder Return							

1. Please explain the calculation methodology to determine the projected percent of base salary at grant date:

The Projected Percent of Base Salary at Grant Date is calculated by dividing the accounting grant-date fair value of the Long-Term Incentive Plan ("LTIP") award by the executive officer's annual base salary and expressing the result as a percentage.

2. Please explain the calculation methodology to determine the actual percent of base salary at vesting date:

The Actual Percent of Base Salary at Vesting Date is calculated by dividing the actual value realized upon vesting of the Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) award by the executive officer's annual base salary and expressing the result as a percentage.

1.5 Catastrophic Wildfire History

Rationale: Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(4) requires an electrical corporation to have an executive incentive compensation structure that promotes safety as a priority and is structured to ensure public safety and utility financial stability. It states that the structure may include tying 100 percent of incentive compensation to safety performance and denying all incentive compensation in the event the electrical corporation causes a catastrophic wildfire that results in one or more fatalities. Energy Safety must have an in-depth understanding of incentive compensation denied as a result of a catastrophic wildfire caused by an electrical corporation.

Instructions: In Table 1.5.1, for each year in which the electrical corporation caused a catastrophic fire that resulted in one or more fatalities, the electrical corporation must provide the name of the catastrophic fire or fires that occurred that year, and for each executive officer, the percentage of the Total Incentive Compensation (TIC) awarded in that year compared to the target TIC, and the percentage of the Total Compensation (TC) awarded in that year compared to the target TC. The electrical corporation may use the Notes/Context field to provide additional narrative information for a catastrophic wildfire that supplements or provides context for the information entered in the Detailed Description/Explanation field. Any additional information provided must include an explanation of why the information is relevant to the information presented in the Detailed Description/Explanation field.

For purposes of calculating the percentage of TC, use the grant value of the compensation as determined for accounting purposes. Grant value is the value that is disclosed in proxy statement summary compensation tables for executive officers who are proxy officers. Percentages must be specified for each executive officer and not a range for various position levels.

Table 1.5.1
Catastrophic Wildfire Incentive History

Note*:* The Compensation Committee has discretion to reduce or eliminate annual incentive awards if it deems advisable under the circumstances. In light of the impact of the Eaton Fire on the communities SCE serves, the Compensation Committee reduced the 2025 annual incentive awards that otherwise would have been payable to SCE President and Chief Executive Officer Steven Powell and Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Jill Anderson by more than [redacted] Annual incentive awards for most of SCE's other executive officers were reduced by approximately [redacted].[29] In making these decisions, the Compensation Committee also considered the significant impact that the Eaton Fire had on executive officers' long-term incentives. For example, performance shares with a total shareholder return metric that vested on December 31, 2025, terminated for no value due to below-threshold performance tied to the Eaton Fire. In addition, executive officers' stock options that expired on January 2, 2026, that were outstanding on January 7, 2025, terminated for no value on their expiration date. The EIX Compensation Committee similarly exercised its discretion. It reduced by approximately 40% the 2025 annual incentive award that otherwise would have been payable to EIX President and Chief Executive Officer Pedro Pizarro.

Table 1.5.1 does not reflect the full impact of the Eaton Fire on executive officers' incentive compensation. Before application of the Eaton Fire-related reductions discussed above, SCE's 2025 corporate performance modifier was 143% of target. Team members across the company came together to achieve critical safety, resiliency and other goals during an exceptionally challenging year. The [redacted] reductions for Messrs. Pizarro and Powell and Ms. Anderson were therefore applied to award calculations that otherwise would have been above target. Because Table 1.5.1 expresses compensation as a percentage of target opportunity, it does not convey the elimination of amounts attributable to above-target performance.

Wildfire Year	Executive Title/ Function	Catastrophic Wildfire(s)	TIC Awarded as a Percent of Target	TC Awarded as a Percent of Target	Detailed Description/Explanation
2026	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2025	President and Chief Executive Officer - Steven D. Powell	Eaton	[redacted]	[redacted]	See Note above this table and "Notes/Context" box below.
2025	Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Jill C. Anderson	Eaton	[redacted]	[redacted]	See Note above this table and "Notes/Context" box below.

29 [redacted]

2025	Former SVP and Chief Financial Officer - Aaron D. Moss	Eaton	[redacted]		See Note above this table and "Notes/Context" box below.
2025	Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller - Kara G. Ryan	Eaton	[redacted]		See Note above this table and "Notes/Context" box below.
2025	SVP and General Counsel - Jennifer R. Hasbrouck	Eaton	[redacted]		See Note above this table and "Notes/Context" box below.
2025	SVP and Chief Customer Officer - Olufunmilayo A. Williamson	Eaton	[redacted]		See Note above this table and "Notes/Context" box below.
2025	SVP, Transmission & Distribution - Orville O. Cocking	Eaton	[redacted]		See Note above this table and "Notes/Context" box below.
2024	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2023	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2022	President and Chief Executive Officer - Steven D. Powell	Fairview	[redacted]		See "Notes/Context" box below.
2022	Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Jill C. Anderson	Fairview	[redacted]		See "Notes/Context" box below.

2022	Former SVP and Chief Financial Officer - Aaron D. Moss	Fairview	[redacted]		See “Notes/Context” box below.
2022	Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller - Kara G. Ryan	Fairview	[redacted]		There is no information to report for this executive officer because she commenced employment after the year of the Fairview Fire. See “Notes/Context” box below.
2022	SVP and General Counsel - Jennifer R. Hasbrouck	Fairview	[redacted]		See “Notes/Context” box below.
2022	SVP and Chief Customer Officer - Olufunmilayo A. Williamson	Fairview	[redacted]		There is no information to report for this executive officer because she commenced employment after the year of the Fairview Fire. See “Notes/Context” box below.
2022	SVP, Transmission & Distribution - Orville O. Cocking	Fairview	[redacted]		There is no information to report for this executive officer because he commenced employment after the year of the Fairview Fire. See “Notes/Context” box below.
2021	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Notes/Context:

SCE has assumed that references to “catastrophic wildfire” and “catastrophic fire” in the instructions to this Table 1.5.1 mean the same thing. Consistent with the information provided by SCE in connection with its 2026-2028 Wildfire Mitigation Plan, this table treats a fire as a “catastrophic wildfire” and/or “catastrophic fire” if it meets Energy Safety’s definition of “catastrophic”, i.e., a fire that caused at least one death, damaged over 500 structures or burned over 5,000 acres. Table 1.5.1 includes fires where an investigating agency opined that SCE infrastructure was the likely cause of an ignition. While SCE is providing this information in accordance with the definitions and template required by Energy Safety, the information provided in this table should not be construed as an admission of SCE's wrongdoing, liability, negligence or imprudence. Even where an authority having jurisdiction has issued a report on the cause(s) of a wildfire, SCE may dispute the conclusions of such report.

The percentages included in the column entitled "TIC Awarded as a Percent of Target" are based on the following fraction: (i) Bonus Paid for the Wildfire Year + Intrinsic Value (determined as of Dec. 31 of the Wildfire Year) of the LTI *Awarded* in the Wildfire Year ***divided by*** (ii) Target Bonus for the Wildfire Year + Target Grant Value of the LTI *Awarded* in the Wildfire Year. The percentages included in the column **"**TC Awarded as a Percent of Target" are based on this same fraction but also include, in both the numerator and denominator, the salary and indirect and ancillary compensation for the Wildfire Year. For purposes of these fractions, LTI is considered "Awarded" if the vesting period for the grant ended on either December 31 of the Wildfire Year or the very next business day. Thus, the LTI Awarded in 2025 refers to the LTI granted in 2023, and for consistency, the LTI Awarded in 2022 refers to the LTI granted in 2020. The Target Grant Value is computed in accordance with FASB ASC Topic 718 (consistent with computation used for purposes of the summary compensation table included in annual proxy statements filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). Since the instructions to Table 1.5.1 are ambiguous, this interpretation is intended to provide the information that is responsive to the apparent rationale for Table 1.5.1 of providing Energy Safety a better understanding of the impact of a catastrophic wildfire on realized incentive compensation (or on intrinsic value if not yet realized) compared to target.

Public Utilities Code Section 8389(a)(6)(A):1.6-1.7

Electrical corporations with new or amended contracts for executive officers must comply with the requirements of Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A).[30]

Applicability of Public Utilities Code Section 8389(a)(6)(A)

As previously noted, all electrical corporation executive compensation structure submissions must be consistent with the definitions provided in **Attachment 2** of the Guidelines.

Subsection Requirements for Public Utilities Code Section8389(a)(6)(A)

Electrical corporations' executive compensation structures must meet the principles of Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A):

- Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) requires electrical corporations with new or amended contracts for executive officers be based on the principle of "strict limits on guaranteed cash compensation, with the primary portion of the executive officers' compensation based on achievement of objective performance metrics."
    - For the purposes of compliance with Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(i)(I), the electrical corporations must demonstrate that greater than 50 percent of each executive officer's total direct compensation, at the target performance level, is based on the achievement of objective performance metrics.
- Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(iii) requires electrical corporations' new or amended contracts for executive officers be based on the principle of including a "long-term structure that provides a significant portion of compensation, which may take the form of grants of the electrical corporation's stock, based on the electrical corporation's long-term performance and value." Additionally, this "compensation shall be held or deferred for a period of at least three years."
    - For purposes of compliance with Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(iii), the electrical corporations must demonstrate that each executive officer's total direct long-term compensation at the target performance level a significant portion of that executive officer's total direct compensation. See the definition of Long-Term Incentive Program in Attachment 2 to determine whether compensation is "delayed three or more years."

[30] Public Utilities Code Section 8389 (a)(6) (A) (https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=PUC&sectionNum=8389, accessed March 27, 2026).

- Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(iv) requires electrical corporations' new oramended contracts for executive officers be based on the principle of "minimizationor elimination of indirect or ancillary compensation that is not aligned with shareholder and taxpayer interest in the electrical corporation."
    - For the purposes of compliance with Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(iii) the electrical corporations must demonstrate that total indirect and ancillary compensation that is not aligned with shareholder andtaxpayer interest in the electrical corporation is minimized.

To aid Energy Safety in assessing compliance with Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A),electrical corporations must complete 1.6-1.7 below for any new or amended contracts, plans, or arrangements, whether written or unwritten, for executive officers as defined in Public Utilities Code section 451.5(c).

1.6 Fixed versus Incentive Compensation

Rationale: As part of the documentation required to obtain a Certificate, Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) mandates that "the electrical corporation has established a compensation structure for any new or amended contracts, plans, or arrangements, whether written or unwritten, for executive officers" that meets several principles, including "strict limits on guaranteed cash compensation, with the primary portion of the executive officers' compensation based on achievement of objective performance metrics." To evaluate an electrical corporation's compliance with this requirement, Energy Safety needs to know: (a) who are the electrical corporation's executive officers and (b) what compensation structure exists.

Definition: "Executive officer" is defined in Public Utilities Code section 451.5(c) and "means any person who performs policy making functions and is employed by the public utility subject to the approval of the board of directors, and includes the president, secretary, treasurer, and any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or function of the public utility." Energy Safety considers divisions or units responsible for electrical operations, gas operations or wildfire-related functions principal business units, divisions, or functions of the public utility.

Instructions: In Table 1.6.1, for each executive officer, the electrical corporation must provide the executive title and function, the executive name (if the executive is classified as an Officer of the Company per the Company's website), the target percentage of Base Salary, Short-Term Incentives (STIP), Long-Term Incentives (LTIP), and Indirect and Ancillary Compensation as a proportion of Total Compensation (TC) for the appropriate filing year. See the definition of the proceeding terms in **Attachment 2**.

Exclude all pension plans, whether qualified or non-qualified from Table 1.6.1. The total indirect and ancillary service costs reported in Table 1.6.1 must reconcile with the corresponding values in Table 1.7.1.

For purposes of calculating the percentage of TC, use the grant value of the compensation as determined for accounting purposes. Grant value is the value that is disclosed in proxy statement summary compensation tables for executive officers who are proxy officers. Percentages must be specified for each executive officer and not a range for various position levels.

Table 1.6.1
Fixed versus Incentive Compensation at the Target Level

Executive Title/ Function and Name (where applicable)	Target Base Salary as a Percent of TC	Target Annual STIP as a Percent of TC	Target Quarterly STIP as a Percent of TC	Target LTIP as a Percent of TC	Indirect and Ancillary Compensation as a Percent of TC[31][32]
President and Chief Executive Officer - Steven D. Powell	[redacted]	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer - Jill C. Anderson	[redacted]	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and Chief Financial Officer - Aaron D. Moss	[redacted]	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
VP, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller - Kara G. Ryan	[redacted]	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and General Counsel - Jennifer R. Hasbrouck	[redacted]	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP and Chief Customer Officer - Olufunmilayo A. Williamson	[redacted]	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]
SVP, Transmission & Distribution - Orville O. Cocking	[redacted]	[redacted]	N/A	[redacted]	[redacted]

[31] According to the instructions for Table 1.5.1, the data for this table is for the "appropriate filing year." For the 2026 Indirect and Ancillary Compensation data and the calculation of 2026 TC for this table, we are using the 2026 estimates in Section 1.6 for Indirect and Ancillary Compensation (i.e., the estimates for Table 1.6.1; Table 1.7.1 does not address 2026 data). Any retention payment or signing bonus paid or payable to an executive officer is not considered base salary, STIP, LTIP, or Indirect and Ancillary Compensation, and is therefore not included in the calculations in Sections 1.6-1.7.

[32] The information in the footnote to the Current Estimated Proportion of Current Year TC column of Table 1.6.1 also applies to this column.

List all types of indirect and ancillary compensation included in Table 1.6.1:

Security services.

1.7 Indirect or Ancillary Compensation

Rationale: Public Utilities Code section 8389(a)(6)(A)(iv) requires, for the issuance of a Certificate, that "the electrical corporation has established a compensation structure for any new or amended contracts, plans, or arrangements, whether written or unwritten for executive officers" that meets several principles, including "minimization or elimination of indirect or ancillary compensation that is not aligned with shareholder and taxpayer interest in the electrical corporation." To ensure that the compensation structure for new or amended contracts, plans, or arrangements, whether written or unwritten, whether written or unwritten for executives officers is based on this principle of minimization of indirect or ancillary compensation, Energy Safety must understand what indirect or ancillary compensation are given to executive officers.

1.7.1 Indirect and Ancillary Compensation (not including Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs))

Instructions: The electrical corporation must list all indirect and ancillary compensation (excluding SERP) provided to executive officers with new or amended contracts, plans, or arrangements, whether written or unwritten. See Attachment 2 for the definition of and a list of typical indirect or ancillary compensation. If the electrical corporation provides indirect or ancillary compensation, the electrical corporation must provide the current estimated proportion of TC for each executive officer. The total indirect and ancillary service costs reported in Table 1.7.1 must reconcile with the corresponding values Table 1.6.1. For purposes of calculating the percentage of TC, use the grant value of the compensation as determined for accounting purposes. Grant value is the value that is disclosed in proxy statement summary compensation tables for executive officers who are proxy officers. The electrical corporation must specify percentages for each executive officer and not a range for various position levels. The electrical corporation must exclude all pension plans whether qualified or non-qualified in Table 1.7.1. The electrical corporation may add rows and explanatory notes as necessary.

Table 1.7.1
Current Year Indirect or Ancillary Compensation Example (Excluding SERP)

Title	Current Year Indirect or Ancillary Compensation Element	Eligibility Requirements	Frequency (One-Time, Annual, Other)	Current Estimated Proportion of Current Year TC[33]
President and Chief Executive Officer	Security Services	Exception basis	Periodically evaluated depending on security concerns	[redacted]
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer	Security Services	Exception basis	Periodically evaluated depending on security concerns	
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Vice President, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Senior Vice President and General Counsel	Security Services	Exception basis	Periodically evaluated depending on security concerns	
Senior Vice President and Chief Customer Officer	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Senior Vice President, Transmission & Distribution	Security Services	Exception basis	Periodically evaluated depending on security concerns	

1.7.2 Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)

Instructions: Provide details of the SERP for all executive officers as defined in Public Utilities Code Section 451.5 and Attachment 2.

1. **Availability of Supplemental Retirement Plans**

Does the electrical corporation have supplemental retirement plans for non-ExecutiveOfficers? Check one:

Yes: ☒ No: ☐

[33] [redacted]

If “Yes,” describe the eligibility requirements for the plan(s):

All executives, including executive officers, participate in the Executive Retirement Plan.

2. Structure of Supplemental Retirement Plans

If supplemental retirement plans are available, describe:

- The eligibility requirements for participation in the plan(s).
- The award basis for plan(s) (e.g., years of service, company stock performance over the period of service, etc.).
- The type of payment made (e.g., cash, stock, combination of cash and stock).
- The award schedule for the plan(s).

The Executive Retirement Plan is an unfunded benefit plan permitted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and designed to allow Executive Officers and other executives to receive benefits that would be paid under the SCE Retirement Plan—the company’s qualified defined benefit plan, which provides a cash balance benefit to employees hired before 2018—or the Edison 401(k) Savings Plan (“401(k) Plan”) but for limitations under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code, and certain additional benefits.

Eligibility, Vesting and Payment Form

Company executives, including the Executive Officers, are eligible to participate in the Executive Retirement Plan. Benefits vest after five years of service, upon death or disability, or upon a qualifying severance. Executive Retirement Plan benefits are paid in cash.

Final Average Pay Benefit Formula Prior to 2018

Executives who participated in the Executive Retirement Plan prior to January 1, 2018 accrued an age 65 benefit calculated using the following final average pay formula:

- (1.75% x Total Compensation for each year up to 30 years) + (1% x Total Compensation for each year over 30 years).

Total Compensation is the Executive Officer's base salary and STIP award earned in the 36 consecutive months when the total of these payments was the highest.

The actual benefit payable is reduced and offset by (i) all amounts payable under the SCE Retirement Plan, the company’s qualified defined benefit pension plan, (ii) up to 40% of the executive’s primary Social Security benefits and (iii) the value of 401(k) Plan accounts derived from company profit sharing contributions, if any.

Executive Retirement Account Formula for New Executives After 2017

The Compensation Committee changed the Executive Retirement Plan benefit effective January 1, 2018. An individual who first participates in the plan on or after January 1, 2018 will not receive a final average pay benefit. Instead, the individual's Executive Retirement Plan benefit will be based on the total credits in that executive's Executive Retirement Account ("ERA").

Executives first participating in the Executive Retirement Plan on or after January 1, 2018 receive the following ERA credits: (i) ERA Salary Credits equal to 12% of the differential between the executive's actual salary for a year and the executive's earnings taken into account for purposes of determining deferrals under the 401(k) Plan for that year (unless the executive was employed as a non-executive by the Company prior to 2018 and is receiving cash balance credits under the SCE Retirement Plan, in which case the ERA Salary Credits are calculated in the same manner as described in Benefit Formula for Other Executives below); (ii) 12% of the executive's STIP payout ("ERA Bonus Credits"); and (iii) interest on the ERA balance ("ERA Interest Credits"). An executive hired or rehired on or after July 1, 2024 may also receive additional ERA Salary Credits annually ranging from 1 – 2% of the executive's earnings taken into account for purposes of determining deferrals under the 401(k) Plan for the year. Whether an executive receives such additional ERA Salary Credits depends on the profit sharing contributions that such executive receives under the 401(k) Plan, which is based on age and service points under such plan.

Benefit Formula for Other Executives

Individuals who participated in the Executive Retirement Plan prior to 2018 and were executives on January 1, 2018, will receive a benefit that is the lesser of: (i) the lump sum value of the final average pay benefit determined as described above in Final Average Pay Benefit Formula Prior to 2018 (determined taking into account service before and after January 1, 2018); or (ii) the sum of (x) the lump sum value of the final average pay benefit determined as described above in Final Average Pay Benefit Formula Prior to 2018 but substituting 1% for 1.75% and 0.5% for 1% in the final average pay benefit formula as to years of service accrued after 2017 and (y) the total credits in the participant's Executive Retirement Account. The aggregate benefit under the Executive Retirement Plan (i.e., totaling the final average pay benefit, if applicable, and the ERA benefit) is expected to be reduced for most executives and will be unchanged for the rest.

Executives who participated in the Executive Retirement Plan prior to 2018 received the following ERA credits for 2025:

- 2025 Trued-Up Salary Credits equal to: 12% of the executive's actual salary for 2025; minus an assumed match of 6% of the executive's earnings taken into account for purposes of determining deferrals under the 401(k) Plan for 2025; minus the executive's cash balance pay credits for 2025 under the SCE Retirement Plan. If this calculation resulted in a negative number ("Bonus Adjustment"), the executive received no 2025 Trued-Up Salary Credits and the Bonus Adjustment was applied to the executive's 2025 Trued-Up Bonus Credits.

- 2025 Trued-Up Bonus Credits equal to: 12% of the executive's actual STIP payout for 2025 as adjusted downward by applying any Bonus Adjustment.

- ERA Interest Credits.

Payment of Plan Benefits

Benefits are generally payable as follows. Participants have sub-accounts for annual accruals for which they may elect payment in the form of a single lump-sum, annual installments, a normal life annuity with a 50% spousal survivor benefit following the participant's death, or a contingent annuity. Participants may elect to have their designated form of payment triggered by their separation from service; however, payment will not occur before a participant reaches age 55 other than in the case of death. Payments triggered by separation from service begin upon a specified time following the applicable triggering event.

The final average pay benefit formula includes benefit reductions for termination prior to age 55, or early retirement after attaining age 55 but prior to age 61, similar to the formula for the SCE Retirement Plan. If an Executive Officer terminates prior to age 55 but with a total of 68 years of age and service, the benefit formula includes a special early retirement benefit reduction based on the SCE Retirement Plan formula for early retirement. An unreduced early retirement benefit is available for retirement at age 61 through age 64.

3. Supplemental Retirement Plan Benefits

Instructions: Provide SERP values for all executive officers described in the electrical corporation's executive compensation submission. If an executive officer is not eligible forthe SERP, please indicate.

Table 1.7.2
SERP Values[34,35]

Title	Number of Years Credited Service as of Current Year*	Present Value of Accumulated Benefit – Previous Year as a % of TDC**	Cash Balance Account Lump Sum Value – Previous Year as a % of TDC***[36]
President and Chief Executive Officer	[redacted]		
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer			
SVP and Chief Financial Officer			
VP, Chief Accounting Officer & Controller			

[34] SCE is providing information responsive to the following headers instead of the information requested by the current column headers: (*) "Number of Years Credited Service as of January 1, 2026"; (**) "2025 SERP Service Cost as a % of 2025 TDC"; and (***) "2025 Cash Balance Service Cost as a % of 2025 TDC." The change in the column with one asterisk (*) is the most sensible date to choose for 2026 since it provides an accurate picture of the accumulated SERP benefits through the end of 2025. Please see the footnote that follows this footnote for an explanation regarding the data that SCE is presenting in the third and fourth columns of this table.

[35] The column headings in the 2026 Guidelines for the third and fourth columns of this table suggest calculations with a numerator based on the present value of accumulated SERP or cash balance benefit over an entire career and a denominator for 2025 TDC. Those types of calculations would provide no useful information regarding the compensation structure for 2025, which is the reason that SCE has instead presented information focused entirely on 2025 that is responsive to the column headers identified in the footnote that precedes this footnote. Having a numerator based on the accumulated benefit over a career compared to a single year of TDC would create a false impression of excess compensation for long-serving executive officers. In addition, the present value of accumulated benefits ("PVAB") is recalculated every year to reflect new interest rate and other actuarial assumptions. The recalculation actually revalues previously accumulated benefits due to changes in actuarial inputs. As a result, PVAB is an extremely volatile measure. Not only is the PVAB extremely volatile, but it also may not reflect the actual amounts that ultimately will be paid to the executive officer, since the assumptions used by our SERP for benefit accruals and payments may differ from the constantly changing actuarial assumptions for the PVAB. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") understands that PVAB and Change in Pension Value (which is the year-over-year change in PVAB) are problematic measures for showing compensation for a year. That is why Change in Pension Value is excluded from the calculation of Total Compensation used to identify a company's named executive officers for the proxy statement. SEC Release No. 33-8732A, p. 119 (dated August 29, 2006); 17 C.F.R. §229.402(a)(3), Instruction 1. Change in Pension Value is also excluded from the calculation of total Compensation Actually Paid for a year in the new Pay Versus Performance proxy statement disclosures. 17 C.F.R. §229.402(v)(2)(iii). In response to the instruction for Section 1.7.1 in these Guidelines to "provide SERP values for all executive officers," we are following the approach the SEC requires for the Pay Versus Performance proxy statement disclosure—we are using service cost to show the SERP value for each executive officer for 2025. Id. Service cost is defined in FASB ASC Topic 715 as the actuarial present value of benefits attributed by the pension plan's benefit formula to services rendered by the executive officer during the period. As the SEC explained in the final Pay Versus Performance release, service cost is a better measure than PVAB or Change in Pension Value to reflect one year of pension compensation: service cost is less volatile, the calculation

1.8 ACR 9 Executive Compensation Proposal

As per D. 20-05-053, the Commission has obligated PG&E to comply with the requirements of the Assigned Commissioner Ruling (ACR) Executive Compensation Proposal 9. PG&E must note in its submission how it is addressing the various additional requirements.

Other electrical corporations are encouraged to review and consider adopting measures from the ACR Executive Compensation Proposal 9 in the spirit of transparency and furthering the purpose of AB 1054.

If an electrical corporation adopts measures from the ACR Executive Compensation Proposal the electrical corporation must note in its submission how its compensation structure addresses the elements set forth in Public Utilities Code section 8389(a).

1.8.1 ACR Executive Compensation Proposal Alignment

Instructions: PG&E must demonstrate how it complies with the additional requirements set forth in ACR 9. PG&E must provide an explanation of how its compensation structure aligns or does not align with the element for each element of ACR 9.

Other electrical corporations may demonstrate how they comply with the additional requirements set forth in ACR 9. Other electrical corporations may provide an explanation of how their compensation structure aligns or does not align with each element of ACR 9.

1. **Publicly disclosed compensation arrangements for executives.**

As part of its annual report pursuant to General Order No. 77-M, SCE publicly discloses compensation for executives with base salaries of at least $250,000.

2. **Written compensation agreements for executives.**

As explained below in the "Base Salary and Employment Contracts" section of Attachment A, SCE does not have employment contracts because they benefit the executive more than the company or its stakeholders.

methodology is more comparable among different companies; and service cost is a GAAP measure used for company financial statements, just like grant values for equity (these Guidelines require that grant values be used for equity values in our submission). SEC Release No. 34-95607, pp. 38-47. Accordingly, the percentages in Table 1.7.2 above reflect 2025 service costs for SCE's executive officers as a percentage of their 2025 TDC.

[36] Employees (including executives) hired or re-hired in 2018 or later years do not participate in the SCE Retirement Plan and do not receive a cash balance benefit. Employees (including executives) hired before 2018 who have not separated from service participate in the SCE Retirement Plan and have a cash balance account balance. Attachment 2 of the 2026 Guidelines states that "Benefits unique to executives are indirect or ancillary compensation." Since cash balance benefits are not unique to executives (and instead apply to all employees hired before 2018), cash balance benefits and service cost are not taken into account in this submission for any calculations of Indirect or Ancillary Compensation or Total Compensation. Also, our cash balance benefit is not a SERP benefit; it's a benefit under the SCE Retirement Plan that is a broad-based tax qualified pension plan for employees hired before 2018.

3. **Guaranteed cash compensation as a percentage of total compensation that does not exceed industry norms.**

SCE does not provide guaranteed cash compensation. As explained below in the "Role of Compensation Committee" section of Attachment A, SCE executives' base salaries are reviewed each year and are generally within a competitive range of +/-15% around the market median for the position, which aligns with best practices according to Pay Governance, the independent compensation consultant for the Compensation Committee.

4. **Holding or deferring the majority or super-majority of incentive compensation, in form of equity awards, for at least 3 years.**

SCE's long-term incentive program is aligned with this concept. Our restricted stock units are subject to a three-year cliff vesting requirement; performance shares are subject to a three-year performance based-vesting requirement; stock options vest in installments over a three-year period; and stock ownership requirements for officers require significant equity holdings to be maintained and prohibit or limit sales of stock.

5. **Basing a significant component of long-term incentive compensation on safety performance, as measured by a relevant subset of by the Safety and Operational Metrics to be developed, as well as customer satisfaction, engagement, and welfare. The remaining portion may be based on financial performance or other considerations.**

As discussed in "Long-Term Incentive Awards" in Attachment A below, the financial performance metrics the company uses for its long-term incentives focus executives on the long-term interests of the company and its stakeholders, including risk mitigation, safety improvements, and customer interests. The Compensation Committee also is evaluating incorporating explicit safety and customer experience metrics into the company's long-term incentive program beginning with 2027 grants.

6. **Annual review of awards by an independent consultant**

Pay Governance reviews the annual awards granted to Executive Officers.

7. **Annual reporting of awards to the CPUC through a Tier 1 advice letter compliance filing.**

As part of its annual report pursuant to General Order No. 77-M, SCE publicly discloses compensation for executives with base salaries of at least $250,000, including awards to those executives.

8. **A presumption that a material portion of executive incentive compensation shall be withheld if the PG&E is the ignition source of a catastrophic wildfire, unless the Commission determines that it would be inappropriate based on the conduct of the utility.**

The Compensation Committee has discretion to reduce or eliminate annual incentive awards if it deems advisable. The Compensation Committee exercised this discretion to eliminate bonuses for 2018 for certain Executive Officers in light of the impact of wildfires on SCE's service area. In light of the impact of the Eaton Fire, the Compensation Committee reduced the 2025 annual incentive awards that otherwise would have been payable to SCE President and Chief Executive Officer Steven Powell and Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Jill Anderson by over [redacted] as well as by about [redacted] for most of SCE's other executive officers.

The Compensation Committee is evaluating incorporating a presumption of withholding for 2027 incentives. For 2026, the Compensation Committee considered the material impacts on SCE executive officer incentive compensation tied to the Eaton Fire and determined that the executive compensation structure, with the other changes for 2026 discussed above in this filing, provides proper incentives for safety while also supporting retention and recruitment of highly qualified executives dedicated to safety – especially when compared to compensation packages from the companies with whom SCE competes in the market for talent.

9. Executive officer compensation policies include provisions that allow for restrictions, limitations, and cancellations of severance payments in the event of any felony criminal conviction related to public health and safety or financial misconduct by the reorganized PG&E, for executive officers serving at the time of the underlying conduct that led to the conviction. Implementation of this policy should take into account PG&E's need to attract and retain highly qualified executive officers.

The company's executive severance plan allows the company to cancel severance benefits and require repayment of severance payments already made, in the event of malfeasance by an executive during employment that constitutes "Cause" as defined in the plan and that the company learns about after entering into a severance agreement with the executive.

The company also has a clawback policy that requires recoupment of excess incentive compensation from SCE executive officers if the company restates its financial statements. In addition, STIP and LTIP awards to SCE executive officers are subject to misconduct recoupment provisions that allow the Compensation Committee to recoup such awards from officers who are terminated or suspended without pay for certain forms of misconduct to the extent such recoupment is permitted by applicable law.

SCE intends to implement these various provisions to the full extent permitted under applicable law, including the California Business and Professions Code and California Labor Code (as recently amended by AB 692 to generally prohibit recoupment of payments by employers).

SCE does not believe it would be prudent for the company to implement the specific severance provisions from ACR-9 because (i) its existing clawback policies effectively protect SCE and its customers from dangerous and egregious conduct by further placing at risk the largest components of executive officer compensation (i.e., short-term and long-term incentive compensation); (ii) the Compensation Committee has implemented clawback provisions where it believes advisable, based in part on a wholistic assessment of market practice as informed by discussions with Pay Governance, its independent compensation consultant and (iii) implementing these severance provisions would unnecessarily make positions at SCE less attractive for recruitment purposes, especially when compared to compensation packages from the companies and industries where we recruit (including utilities other than PG&E and Sempra's utilities).

1.9 Attachment A: Supplemental Attachment to the 2026 Executive Compensation Structure Submission of Southern California Edison Company (SCE)

Overview of SCE's Executive Compensation Structure

SCE's executive compensation structure promotes safety as a priority, helps ensure public safety and utility financial stability, and otherwise meets (i) the requirements set forth in Public Utilities Code (Pub. Util. Code) Sections 8389(a)(4) and 8389(a)(6), (ii) the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety's (Energy Safety) Executive Compensation Guidelines Version 2.0 (2026 Guidance), and (iii), as discussed in Section 1.8 above, the majority of elements in Assigned Commissioner Ruling, Proposal 9 for Pacific Gas and Electric Company.

The Compensation Committee determines three compensation elements each year that constitute Total Direct Compensation for our Executive Officers – base salary, annual incentive awards and long-term incentive awards. Base salary is a fixed rate of income for the year. Annual incentive awards are the variable portion of market-based cash compensation and are designed to focus attention on specific safety, operational, financial and strategic objectives that benefit our customers and other stakeholders. Long-term incentive compensation is largely tied to underlying stock performance, promotes a focus on the company's long-term goals and financial health, in alignment with our customers, investors and other stakeholders. To effectively recruit and retain qualified executives to run the utility, the company aligns with market practice for all three pay elements.

The structure of SCE's executive incentive compensation prioritizes and focuses on safety outcomes in a variety of ways, including:

- SCE's annual incentive award program provides that safety and compliance are foundational, and significant lapses can result in the Compensation Committee reducing or eliminating annual incentive compensation for the year. The Compensation Committee has exercised its authority in this area multiple times to reduce annual incentive awards for Executive Officers, including eliminating annual incentive awards for 2018 and reducing annual incentive awards for 2025 for certain Executive Officers in light of the impact of wildfires on SCE's service area. In the event "the electrical corporation causes a catastrophic wildfire that results in one or more fatalities," the Compensation Committee can, as outlined in Pub. Util. Code §8389(a), deny all annual incentive compensation.
- Focusing on safety outcomes by placing a target weighting of 60% on its Safety and Resiliency goal category for 2026 annual incentive awards — using Energy's Safety's categorization for goals, this includes 50% on Wildfire Safety and Other Safety goals, 5% on Security (SCE's goals for cybersecurity), and 5% on Financial (SCE's goals on grid development, technology and other).
- Reducing annual incentive award payouts if specific safety and safety-related targets are not achieved.

- The value of the long-term incentive awards, with their multiple-year vesting periods, is primarily tied to long-term share price performance and incentivizes executives to adopt a longer-term view of corporate performance in the decisions they make today, such as emphasizing safety and safety culture. The company's share price is linked to SCE's long-term ability to satisfy the needs and expectations of our many stakeholders including customers, communities, regulators and investors. Significantly, the risks associated with wildfires have impacted the long-term incentive plan value for executives including in 2025. The awards provide a strong incentive for executives to take actions that mitigate risk and improve the safety and resiliency of our communities in an enduring manner.

Compliance with Pub. Util. Code § 8389(a) and Energy Safety's Guidance
The following table provides an overview of how the three elements of SCE's Total Direct Compensation meet the requirements set forth in Pub. Util. Code §8389(a).

Element of Total Direct Compensation	Form	Alignment with Pub. Util. Code §8389(a)
Base Salary	Fixed Pay: Cash	• SCE does not have employment contracts or guarantees of cash compensation; base salaries comprise less than half of each Executive Officer's target Total Direct Compensation
Annual Incentive Awards	Variable Pay: Cash	• Annual incentive awards require achievement of target objectives that are assessed through various metrics (success metrics) that promote safety and/or utility financial stability • Safety and compliance are also foundational, and the Compensation Committee can reduce or eliminate awards if there are significant lapses in safety or compliance, regardless of the company's performance in the specific safety and compliance metrics established at the beginning of a goal year • No guaranteed minimum payout; maximum payout is capped at 200% of target; significant "at risk" compensation • Nearly all of the success measures that are used to determine the payout are based on meeting performance metrics that are objectively measurable • Performance on annual goals and long-term incentives is reviewed by auditors annually and reviewed and scored by the independent Compensation Committee
Long-Term Incentive Awards	Variable Pay: Equity • 50% performance shares • 25% stock options • 25% restricted stock units	• Promote utility financial stability by enhancing executives' focus on the company's long-term goals • 100% of long-term incentive awards are equity-based and their payout values reflect objective performance metrics • All awards "at risk" with no guaranteed minimum payout • Restricted stock units are subject to a three-year cliff vesting requirement; performance shares are subject to a three-year performance based-vesting requirement; stock options vest in installments over a three-year period; in addition, stock ownership requirements for Executive Officers require significant equity holdings to be maintained and prohibit or limit sales of stock • Long-term and annual incentive awards comprise the majority of Executive Officers' compensation and the variable nature puts these components "at risk" subject to performance

Role of Compensation Committee

The Compensation Committee is responsible for reviewing and determining the total compensation paid to Executive Officers. The Committee is comprised of independent Board members who have significant experience and qualifications and bring a variety of perspectives to the Compensation Committee's deliberations. No officers or other employees serve on the Compensation Committee.

The Compensation Committee retains an independent compensation consultant, Pay Governance, to assist in evaluating Executive Officer compensation, including industry trends and best practices. In alignment with best practices, the Compensation Committee generally targets a competitive range around the market median for each element of Total Direct Compensation offered under our program: base salaries, annual incentive awards and long-term incentives awards.. The Compensation Committee exercises its judgment in setting the compensation level for each Executive Officer.

Base Salary and Employment Contracts

SCE does not have employment contracts or guarantees of base pay. The company has evaluated employment contracts and concluded there are more downsides than benefits to providing contracts. The Compensation Committee evaluates Executive Officers' base salaries every year according to their position and performance. SCE's Executive Officers do not have employment contracts and do not have contractual rights to receive fixed base salaries. Employment contracts in California benefit the executive more than the company. Some of the downsides of employment contracts include:

- The company's ability to terminate at will for performance would be heavily impacted if there was a specified term of employment;
- The company's ability to change the terms of employment for an executive under contract is limited even if business or other conditions warrant a change;
- To the extent contract terms differ from later-adopted policies or programs, the company may need to renegotiate the contract, which could result in a contract of higher value to the executive than the company originally intended; and
- If a contract provision is subsequently prohibited by a change in the law, that may also require a contract renegotiation or otherwise result in a contract of higher value to the executive than intended.

Annual Incentive Awards

Annual incentive awards are structured to promote safety and help ensure public safety and the financial stability of the utility as outlined in Pub. Util. Code §8389 (a). The Safety and Operations Committee of the Board applies its relevant safety experience and formally participates in establishing safety and operational goals and success measures to be used for the annual incentive awards, including the weight afforded to various goal categories.

There are two components that determine the payout of SCE's annual incentive awards: a company multiplier and an individual performance modifier (IPM). The company multiplier is determined by assessing company performance against goals and applies to all employees who receive annual incentive awards, including Executive Officers. The IPM is a modifier for exempt employees, including Executive Officers, and reflects their individual performance.

Annual incentive awards are placed “at risk” and are paid out to the extent important goals and objectives are met or exceeded. In accordance with market practice, poor company performance results in reduced or no payouts, target performance results in target payouts, and exemplary performance is rewarded with above-target payouts. The minimum annual incentive award payout is $0. The maximum award is 200% of target, which Pay Governance has previously advised is the most prevalent practice among our peers. When circumstances warrant reductions in pay for executives – rather than for the entire employee population – IPMs or the company multiplier for certain executives may be further modified. This occurred for 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022 and 2023 annual incentives, when additional deductions were applied for Executive Officers and certain other executives in response to the company’s safety performance. Certain Executive Officers received no annual incentive payment for 2018 and reduced annual incentive payments for 2025 in light of the impact of wildfires on our communities. The process of determining the company multiplier starts at the beginning of each year when the incentive award goals are established. These goals focus executives’ attention on the foundational importance of safety, compliance, and SCE’s values, and the specific success measures, which are mostly focused on safety and financial stability. At the Compensation Committee meeting in February following the end of the goal year, the Compensation Committee assesses all the success measures that were approved at the beginning of the goal year. The Compensation Committee can exercise discretion to adjust the company multiplier, including eliminating the annual incentive award entirely, should circumstances warrant.

Long-Term Incentive Awards

Pub. Util. Code §8389(a) reflects the importance of promoting utility financial stability, which is needed to ensure efficient capital market access and cost of capital, and for affordable customer rates. The company’s long-term incentive awards are tied to the interests of all stakeholders by emphasizing strong long-term financial stability and performance.

All of the company’s long-term incentives (LTI) are awarded as equity instruments reflecting, or valued by reference to, EIX Common Stock. Performance shares comprise 50% of the long-term equity mix and are based on two equally weighted outcome-based performance metrics: relative total shareholder return of EIX Common Stock over a three-year performance period compared to other companies in the PHLX Utility Sector Index; and three-year average annual core earnings per share, measured against target levels. Beginning with 2025 grants, performance for earnings per share Performance Shares will be measured using EIX’s three-year core cumulative EPS for a three-year performance period.

Stock options comprise 25% of the LTI mix and use the change in EIX’s stock price as their objective performance metric. The exercise price for stock options equals the closing EIX stock price on the date of grant. If the stock price stays flat or decreases compared to the exercise price, then the options will have zero value. If the stock price increases above the exercise price, then the executive officer will gain from that increase when exercising the stock option and the gain is directly dependent on the extent of that appreciation in value. The remaining 25% of LTI is awarded as restricted stock units. As is the case with stock options, the objective performance metric for restricted stock units is the change in EIX’s stock price. If the stock price at payout is above the closing stock price on the grant date, then the payout value will be more than the grant value. If the stock price at payout is less than the closing stock price on the grant date, that will result in a lower value.

Restricted stock units and performance shares have three-year cliff-vesting. Stock options vest in approximately equal installments over a period of three years. The company also has an LTI holding requirement. Executive Officers must continue to hold shares obtained from LTI to the extent necessary to meet the stock ownership requirement of up to three-times base salary, depending on the Executive Officer's position.

Although LTI rewards executives based on the growth of the share price, this by no means implies that this element of executive compensation only benefits shareholders. Customers benefit from our use of LTI in a number of ways. While the ultimate value of a fully vested LTI award for the recipient is a function of the stock price, this price is largely based on the company's successful operations which drives financial health. Those metrics translate directly into SCE's ability to lower borrowing costs and reasonably obtain funds for capital projects and other programs to maintain and modernize SCE's power grid and support reliability of service to customers. LTI advances customer interests by aligning them with the strategic goals and initiatives of the company.

SCE's use of LTI helps conserve cash resources. Unlike the fixed cost of base pay and any annual incentive which may be awarded, there is no immediate cash payment to employees for an LTI award due to the multi-year vesting schedule applicable to each form of LTI. Employees who voluntarily leave prior to the full vesting of the LTI award will forfeit all or a substantial portion of the unvested award. As a variable pay component of total compensation, LTI awards do not cause increases in an executive's annual/fixed pension and benefits costs that are a function of base pay. LTI promotes stability of a strong leadership team at SCE as LTI awards and payouts depend on multiple years of continuous employment, strong executive performance and strong SCE financial health.

In addition, although the company's LTI awards have a 100% weighting for financial and stock performance, the LTI awards also provide a strong incentive to safely manage operations to increase the value of those awards. Wildfires, for example, can result in significant decreases in both stock price and the value of LTI awards. For example, performance shares with a total shareholder return metric that were scheduled to vest on December 31, 2025 terminated for no value due to below-threshold performance tied to the Eaton Fire. In addition, executive officers' stock options with an expiration date of January 2, 2026 that were outstanding on January 7, 2025 terminated for no value on their expiration date in 2026. This type of loss provides a strong incentive for risk mitigation and safety improvements and focuses executives' efforts on the long-term interests of the company and its stakeholders.